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ABSTRACT 
 
 
PRINT MEDIA AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN GREECE AND 
TURKEY 
 
 
Öztürk, Duygu 
Ph.D., Department of Political Science  
Supervisor: Professor Dr. Metin Heper 
 
 
 
September 2014 
 
This study investigates how Greek and Turkish newspapers columnists 
interpreted and framed military takeovers in their countries after the takeovers had 
happened. Refuting arguments in the literature asserting that Greek columnists kept 
their silence during the military regime due to censorship, while there was strong 
and open support in Turkey among newspaper columnists for the 12 September 
coup and the subsequent rule, this study argues that the situations in both countries 
were much more complex than these studies have claimed. Directed by this 
approach, it focuses on the pieces published in the Greek newspapers Akropolis, 
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Eleftheros Kosmos, and Ta Nea during the first six months of the military 
interregnum (after the 21 April 1967 takeover), and the ones published in the 
Turkish newspapers Cumhuriyet, Hürriyet, and Milliyet (after the 12 September 
1980 takeover). It shows that important similarities existed between Greek and 
Turkish officers’ approach to the media in their countries during their respective 
periods of rule. In addition, Greek and Turkish columnists shared both similarities 
and differences in their framings and interpretations of the military’s takeover in 
their countries and the subsequent interregna. This study argues that these 
similarities and differences can be better understood by examining the development 
of journalistic profession in Greece and Turkey, as well as by analyzing the 
development of civil-military relations and the role and position of the military in 
politics in both countries since their establishments as nation-states.  
Keywords: Civil-Military Relations, 12 September 1980 takeover, 21 April 
1967 takeover, Greece, Turkey, Political Communication, the media, 
newspapers, newspaper columns.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
TÜRKİYE VE YUNANİSTAN’DA YAZILI BASIN  
VE SİVİL-ASKER İLİŞKİLERİ 
 
 
Öztürk, Duygu 
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Profesör Dr. Metin Heper 
 
 
 
Eylül 2014 
 
 
 Bu çalışma Türk ve Yunan gazete köşe yazarlarının ülkelerinde askerlerin 
yönetimi ele geçirmelerini darbeler olduktan sonra nasıl yorumladıklarını ve 
çerçevelediklerini araştırmaktadır. Literatürde mevcut olan Yunan köşe yazarlarının 
askeri rejim döneminde sansür nedeni ile sessiz kaldıklarını Türk köşe yazarlarının 
da 12 Eylül darbesini ve de sonrasında kurulan yönetimi açık olarak 
desteklediklerini savunan argümanları reddederek, bu çalışma her iki ülkedeki 
durumun da mevcut çalışmaların iddia ettiğinden çok daha karmaşık olduğunu 
savunmaktadır. Bu yaklaşımın ışığında, askeri yönetimlerin ilk altı aylık süreleri 
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boyunca (21 Nisan 1967 darbesi olduktan sonra) Yunanistan’da Akropolis, 
Eleftheros Kosmos ve Ta Nea gazetelerinde, Türkiye’de ise (12 Eylül 1980 darbesi 
olduktan sonra) Cumhuriyet, Hürriyet ve Milliyet gazetelerinde çıkan köşe 
yazılarına odaklanmaktadır. Bu çalışma Türkiye ve Yunanistan’da askerlerin 
yönetimleri sırasında medyaya yaklaşımlarında önemli benzerlikler olduğunu 
göstermektedir. Bunun yanı sıra, Türk ve Yunan köşe yazarlarının ülkelerinde 
askerlerin yönetimi ele geçirmesini ve de sonrasında izleyen askeri yönetimleri 
çerçevelemelerinde ve de yorumlamalarında hem benzerlikler hem de farklılıklar 
olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Bu benzerlik ve farklılıkların Türkiye ve 
Yunanistan’da gazetecilik mesleğinin gelişimi, her iki ülkenin bağımsız ulus 
devletlerini kurmalarından itibaren sivil-asker ilişkilerinin gelişimi ve askerin her 
iki ülkenin siyasi hayatındaki yeri ve de rolü incelenerek daha iyi anlaşılabileceğini 
savunmaktadır.   
Anahtar Kelimeler: Sivil-Asker İlişkileri, 12 Eylül 1980 darbesi, 21 Nisan 
1967 darbesi, Türkiye, Yunanistan, Siyasi İletişim, Medya, Gazeteler, 
Gazete Köşe Yazıları. 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1 The Purpose of the Study  
 
The media has an indispensable place in the development of democratic 
culture and institutions. They perform a watchdog role on the policies of 
governments by adopting a critically evaluative approach. In addition they provide 
the reader with wide-ranging news, evaluations, and analyses. Being among the 
most reliable sources of information, particularly about subjects to which much of 
the public does not have first-hand access, they possess the power to influence 
people’s views and values, contributing to shaping and reshaping them.  
In this regard, the media in Greece and Turkey have played a crucial role in 
the political communication in their countries. Along with their main functions of 
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monitoring the policies of the government on behalf of the public and providing 
news, the media in these two countries have served not only as neutral transmitters 
of information, but also as key actors producing meanings through interpretative 
journalism. Because of their place in the functioning of democratic regimes, the 
stance of the media at times of political crises becomes even more important for the 
development of a democratic culture. Motivated by this argument, this study has 
aimed to research in depth the attitude of Greek and Turkish columnists toward 
military takeovers in those countries, i.e., 21 April 1967 in Greece and 12 
September 1980 in Turkey, following the militaries’ coming to power.  
The literature that has examined editorial columns in newspapers, in 
particular the columns published in Greece and Turkey during the military 
interregna, has not adequately covered the role the media have played in these 
countries’ political communication. Those that have delved into the subject have 
weaknesses that affect their ability to convey a convincing and thorough argument. 
In the Turkish case, for example, Söğüt and Tek, examined several newspapers that 
were published during the 12 September rule (Söğüt 2010; Tek 2006), 
demonstrating that the newspapers in question failed in performing their professed 
duty. In these researchers’ view, the newspapers neither acted like a watchdog for 
the government, nor did they criticize the takeover. Other studies (Mazıcı 1989; 
Neziroğlu 2003) analyzed the newspapers in a broader framework, highlighting the 
role of the press and journalists in democratic societies. They, too, arrived at the 
conclusion that the press did not carry out the role that was expected from it during 
the military interregna under study. The main weakness of these studies, however, 
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was that they failed to take into account the fact of the military’s strict control over 
the media during its rule, which mostly explained why explicit opposition and 
criticism against the takeover and the subsequent interregnum did not exist in 
newspaper columns.  In addition, these studies did not go beyond stating that the 
main attitude of columnists was supportive; they did not intend to explain why 
columnists expressed this particular attitude towards the takeovers and the military 
interregna.  
Different from the Turkish case, the focus of the studies that scrutinized the 
Greek press’ function during the junta’s rule was on the control and censorship of 
the military’s rule over the media. Some of these studies argue that the press could 
not fulfill its duty of monitoring and criticizing the policies, functions, and activities 
of the military’s rule because of the strict censorship introduced by that rule 
(Vlachos 1970, 1972). McDonald (1983) analyzed the censorship over the press 
across time during the junta’s rule, and Stratos (1995) studied the headlines, news, 
and editorials of Greek newspapers to see whether any opposition or criticism 
existed implicitly. However, none of these studies attempted to analyze the way 
columnists perceived the takeover and the colonels’ rule that followed.  
This study takes the militaries’ control over the media as one of the main 
factors that shaped the content of the newspapers and in particular their opinion 
columns. Specifically, this control can explain what was not reported in the 
newspapers. Focusing on this factor answers the question of why there was almost 
no opposition to the takeovers and no explicit criticism about the militaries’ rules in 
both countries. However, when taken on its own, this control could not explain why 
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the newspapers covered some developments and not others. Nor could it 
successfully explain columnists’ evaluations in their daily pieces and the particular 
framing of the issues they chose among a wide range of possible alternatives. Thus, 
addressing this gap in the literature regarding the content of editorial columns, this 
study focuses on answering the question of how Greek and Turkish columnists 
interpreted and framed the military takeover and the subsequent military 
interregnum in their respective countries after the takeover occurred.  
 
 
1.2.  Case Selection and Methodology 
 
In this essay’s analysis of editorial column content related to military 
takeovers, the cases of Greece and Turkey were selected for a number of reasons. 
First of all, and most importantly, the military has been an important actor in 
politics in both countries. Since their establishment as nation-states, the military has 
intervened in politics a number of times in both countries. The similarities in the 
two countries’ civil-military relations record has generated numerous studies that 
have compared and contrasted these relations (Duman and Tsarouhas 2006; Gürsoy 
2008, 2009; Karabelias 1998, 2003). These studies mainly adopt the Huntingtonian 
perspective (1957), which idealized civil-military relations in democratic countries 
– i.e., the total separation of the military from the political and the subordination of 
the former to the latter. In doing so they focus on officers or political elites to 
explain why the military intervened in politics in terms of the similarities and/or 
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divergences between the two countries. This present study also compares and 
contrasts aspects of civil-military relations within the states, but adds a unique 
contribution to the literature by highlighting the importance of meanings as created 
by the media, in particular by columnists. This approach is based on the assumption 
that columnists’ creation of meanings about the military takeovers is also important 
for deepening our understanding of civil-military relations in Greece and Turkey.  
The unit of analysis of this study is the opinion column pieces published in 
Greek and Turkish daily newspapers. Columns are the focus of this study for 
several specific reasons. First, columnists writing in the daily newspapers in both 
countries cannot be considered as objective transmitters of news and facts to their 
reader. Instead, they produce representations of an issue based on their own 
information. Promoted with the view that columnists have access to first-hand 
information about issues that majority of the people do not have direct access to, 
their evaluations are assumed to have high credibility for the reader. This credibility 
lends weight to the information readers gain from columns and consider when 
forming their opinions about the civil-military relations in their respective countries.  
Three newspapers were selected for both Greece and Turkey, based on their 
political tendencies and circulation numbers during the first six months of military 
rule in each country. The research period is limited to the first six months of the 
militaries’ rules in Greece and Turkey, i.e. from 21 April 1967 to 21 October 1967 
in Greece and from 12 September 1982 to 12 March 1983 in Turkey. The 
assumption underlying this decision is that these six months would comprise the 
period during which the main attention of columnists would be on interpreting why 
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the officers took over the government, what the officers’ objectives were, and what 
their plans for the near future were. The Turkish dailies Cumhuriyet, Hürriyet, and 
Milliyet were selected because of their high circulation rates, based on the 
circulation data of the Turkish Press and Advertisement Institution (Basın İlan 
Kurumu), as well as on their political inclinations..Each of these papers was among 
the top five newspapers of the press market at the time the military took over the 
government, and continued to be so during the first six months of the interregnum. 
Combined together, these newspapers had dominated more than half of the market 
before the military takeover. Cumhuriyet, defined as having center-left inclinations, 
is selected because of its long history in the political communication of Turkey, 
dating back to 1924, and its leading role in the spreading of republican reforms 
since its establishment. Hürriyet and Milliyet, which are defined as centrist papers, 
were selected based on the argument that the attitudes and values of pro-system 
actors are critical for the consolidation of democracy (Heper and Demirel 1996, 
112; Linz 1978, 50). 
For the Greek case, the data from Athens Daily Newspaper Publishers 
Association (Enosi İdioktiton Imerision Efimeridon Athinon) was used for the 
selection of newspapers. Similar to the selection of Turkish newspapers, Greek 
newspapers are also selected based on their circulation numbers and political 
inclinations. As a result, Acropolis, Ta Nea, and Eleftheros Kosmos were selected. 
Akropolis had been one of the leading pro-royalist, conservative newspapers, and 
Ta Nea was one of the leading newspapers of the Greek press with its center-left 
political inclination that supported George Papandreou and his party Center Union 
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(Enosis Kentrou – EK). Eleftheros Kosmos was known for its rightist stance that 
became one of the strong supporters of the officers’ takeover and their rule.  
This study employs a qualitative content analysis method that enables the 
researcher to interpret content of the text data using a systematic classification 
process. To carry out this analysis, firstly a sample is drawn from the data using 
systematic sampling method. Of those newspapers identified above, one issue in 
every three days of publication was selected for the analysis.  
As stated, the main research question that led this study’s inquiry on 
newspaper columns is how Greek and Turkish columnists interpreted and framed 
the military takeover and the subsequent military interregnum in their respective 
countries after the takeover occurred. This question was supplemented by other 
questions that are seen valuable in explaining columnists’ interpretations of the 
takeovers and the subsequent military interregna. These questions are: What were 
the reasons for the military’s takeover? What were the objectives of the officers 
once having taken over the government? What were the expectations of columnists 
from military’s takeover and its rule? How did the columnists describe the 
military’s takeover? What did columnists think about politicians and politics in their 
countries? What did columnists think about democracy, democratic regimes, and 
military regimes? Finally, how did columnists evaluate the military’s takeover and 
the subsequent interregnum with a view to democracy?  
These questions have informed the coding of the column excerpts carried 
out in this study. In light of these questions, an inductive approach was followed in 
the coding process. That is, using the terminology of Hsieh and Shannon (2005), 
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this study conducted a conventional qualitative content analysis in which the coding 
categories were derived from the text data inductively, without a theory or relevant 
research findings to inform the coding process. Thus while the research questions 
determined the major coding themes, the coding of Greek and Turkish newspapers 
was developed during the reading of the data. In this regard, it should also be noted 
here that this approach is also the one followed in the Grounded Theory (Strauss & 
Corbin 1990) tradition.  
 
1.3.  Organization of the Study 
 
 The next chapter conducts an overview analysis of the military’s 
intervention in politics in Greece and Turkey since their founding as nation-states. 
Following a historical perspective, it demonstrates the development of military 
institutions in Greece and Turkey, and explains why previous interventions took 
place in those countries. These historical similarities and differences were expected 
to have influence on columnists’ interpretations of the 1967 and 1980 takeovers. 
 The third chapter presents a theoretical framework of how the media has 
been studied in social sciences and in journalism. It aims to briefly explain the 
different ways meaning is produced by the media and how information can be 
manipulated in the presentation of the news. The profession of journalism is not 
performed the same in every country. The economic, political, and social factors 
that differ from one country to another are argued to create different types of 
journalism and media systems across countries. These differences are reviewed and 
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the development of the journalism profession in Greece and Turkey is discussed 
from a historical perspective.  
 The fourth chapter analyzes Greek columnists’ presentations of the 21 April 
takeover and the subsequent rule of the colonels. The chapter in particular considers 
the junta’s control over the media as an important factor influencing the content of 
the newspapers and opinion columns. Additionally, it analyzes which matters were 
selected to be addressed in the opinion columns.  
           Chapter Five follows a similar pattern for the analysis of daily pieces by 
Turkish columnists. It first shows the limits of the military’s control over the press 
and then, in that light, scrutinizes the content of the opinion columns published in 
the daily newspapers. 
The concluding chapter takes up the similarities and differences in the 
presentations of the militaries’ takeovers and the subsequent military interregna in 
the Greek and Turkish opinion columns. The conclusion ties together the analysis 
conducted in this study, suggesting the probable reasons for these outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
 
THE MILITARY AND POLITICS IN GREECE AND TURKEY 
 
 
 
This chapter aims to review the military’s intervention in politics in Greece 
and Turkey since their founding as nation-states – 7 May 1832 and 29 October 
1923, respectively. Despite those studies that compare Greece and Turkey in terms 
of military interventions (Duman and Tsarouhas 2006; Gürsoy 2008, 2009; 
Karabelias 2003), the development of military institutions within the formation of 
these nation-states is mostly ignored. This study therefore pays particular attention 
to this issue to demonstrate how the two countries’ nation-states and military 
institutions differed in their processes of development. Militaries’ interventions in 
politics before the 1967 coup in Greece and 1980 coup in Turkey are analyzed to 
explain the conditions under which Greek and Turkish military decided to 
intervene. Lastly, officers’ views about their profession and military interventions in 
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politics are considered briefly to see whether their professional self-images differed 
from each other across the Greek and Turkish cases. 
 
 
2.1.  The Military and Politics in Greece 
 
Since the formation of the Modern Greek State in 1832, the military and its 
officers played a major role in Greek politics. The military retained this role until 
1974, when democracy was restored after the collapse of the military regime 
established in the wake of the colonels’ coup on 21 April 1967. Numerous 
successful coups and unsuccessful coup attempts took place during this period that 
significantly affected political life, the structure of the military, and the 
development of civil-military relations. A large majority of these attempts aimed to 
replace a group of politicians in power with another group instead of bringing the 
military to power as a ruling institution. The major coup that diverged from this aim 
was the colonels’ coup in 1967, which effectively brought colonels to power as the 
ruling actors. The successful military interventions that are examined in this chapter 
are the 1843, 1862, 1909, 1916, and 1922 interventions. In addition, several 
unsuccessful coup attempts are also considered because of their importance in 
Greek politics.  
To understand the dynamics of the modern Greek political system, a brief 
discussion of its previous religio-political predecessor is in order. Before forming 
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their own independent state, Greeks belonged to the Orthodox millet in the Ottoman 
Empire, the second largest group in the millet system after the Muslim population. 
The millet system provided a wide degree of administrative autonomy to each 
religious group under their own religious authorities. In return, religious leaders and 
authorities were expected to guarantee the loyalty of their millet to the Ottoman 
Sultan. Although the Orthodox millet of the Empire also included Bulgarian, 
Romanian, Serbian, Albanian, and Vlach Orthodox populations, the administrative 
positions were dominated by Greeks; the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople, 
who was the senior patriarch of the Orthodox Church and the head of the millet, as 
well as other upper levels of the Church hierarchy were invariably Greek (Clogg 
1992, 10).  
Turning to the modern Greek military’s predecessors, the roots of Greek 
irregular armed forces can be traced back to the formation of klefts and armatoloi, 
centuries before the Greek struggle for independence began in the 1820s. The klefts 
were bandit forces who attacked tax collectors and other officials who were viewed 
as symbols of Ottoman power, regardless of these officials were Greeks or Turks. 
Klefts were therefore perceived among the Greek reaya as defenders of oppressed 
Greeks against Muslim overlords (Clogg 1992, 15). Armatoloi, on the other hand, 
were members of the Greek militia formed by the Ottoman Empire to ensure the 
safety of trade and communication channels through mountain passes (Clogg 1992, 
15–16). However, their role in the development of national consciousness remained 
limited when compared to the role of Greek merchants and Greeks living in Europe 
for commercial and educational reasons. The latter were the ones who had 
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experienced contact with the ideas of the Enlightenment, French Revolution, and 
nationalism and supported the creation of a Greek nationalism based on developing 
awareness about ancient Greeks. An important group of educated Greeks in the 
Ottoman Empire were the Phanariots and the high clergy, who served in the central 
state administration or as governors of various provinces in European lands of the 
Empire (Legg 1969, 44). However, except for a few of them, this group lacked a 
developed national awareness, and thus did not play a leading role in the struggle 
against the Ottoman Empire for the establishment of a Greek national state. Despite 
their negative attitudes toward the struggle and even denunciations of it, the high 
clergy could not save themselves when accused of failing to ensure the loyalty of 
the Greek portion of the Orthodox millet to the Sultan. 
 The Greek uprising, which began in 1821 as unconnected outbursts in 
various places, eventually developed into a struggle for independence. The 
independent Greek state was established in 1832 as a result of the Treaty of 
Constantinople, which was signed between the Ottoman Empire on the one hand, 
and Russia, France, and Britain on the other. The Great Powers decided that the 
independent Greek state would be a monarchy and designated Otto Friedrich 
Ludwig von Wittelsbach, the second son of King Ludwig I of Bavaria, as the first 
king of the state, who would reign until 1862.  
The triumvirate regency that escorted the juvenile Bavarian King initiated a 
state-building process that aimed to establish a centralized administration system 
based on European, modern institutions that would replace those based on 
clientelistic ties. In order to break the existing chain of clientelism, the King with 
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his Bavarian regents staffed the government with foreigners and subjected the 
church to the transfer of its land to state ownership. He also appointed officials to 
provinces and districts who did not have any personal ties to other authorities, thus 
tearing major party figures from their administrative strongholds for new positions 
in Athens and abroad (Legg 1969, 53–54). Along with these strategic changes in 
personnel, the imported administration of the Greek state targeted the irregular 
armed groups to establish modern regular armed forces. In fact, the first efforts to 
form a regular army by uniting the irregulars under the central authority were 
exerted during the last years of the Greek War of Independence under Ioannis 
Kapodistrias. Kapodistrias was born the son of a notable family of the Corfu Island 
and was involved in politics from a young age. By the time he was elected by the 
first Greek National Assembly as the first head of the state in 1827, he had already 
made a name in European politics. He had served as a Russia’s diplomat to 
Switzerland where he worked toward gaining independence for Swiss people and 
establishing their unity. Kapodistrias introduced a period of reform and 
modernization in Greece that aimed at centralization and targeted various aspects of 
life, from politics to the military, economy, education, and health sectors. 
Kapodistrias’ efforts’ toward the formation of a regular state-controlled army failed 
after his death in 1831.  
For the young King, Otto, the dissolution of irregular armed groups meant a 
loss of power for chieftains and a strengthening of the central authority (Veremis 
1997, 3). The young king had arrived in the country with 3,500 Bavarian troops, 
while 5,000 Greek irregulars and 700 regulars were already present (Veremis 1997, 
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26). When the state disbanded the irregular forces, they allowed only the veterans 
who fought in the War of Independence to join the regulars. The excluded irregulars 
did not disappear immediately, however; they withdrew to countryside where the 
state’s power was weak and continued to exist, though weakened, throughout the 
nineteenth century. 
While the Bavarian troops formed the core of the regular army of the Greek 
state when it was established, Hellenization of the army was introduced through the 
Military Academy, which was established in 1828 by Kapodistrias. Despite all 
efforts to create a professional army that would show absolute loyalty to the state, in 
other words to the king himself, Otto could not succeed in this aim. He had to leave 
the post a result of the military coup in 1862. 
 With the purpose of increasing the recruitment of soldiers, the Military 
Academy expanded its socio-economic foundations. Families were sending their 
sons to the academy because they saw it as a proper choice of career (Veremis 
1997, 32). After the Balkan Wars, the dominance of middle and lower-middle 
socio-economic strata in the army was strengthened when prominent families chose 
to have their children pursue professions as brokers and dealers rather than officers 
(Veremis 1997, 78). Mouzelis (1986, 98) argues that the quantitative growth in and 
enlargement of recruited officers from lower socio-economic strata weakened the 
fusion between civilian and military elites that had been based on a shared upper-
middle class background. He views this condition of individuals lacking strong 
feelings of corporate identity as the basic reason for the officers’ interventions in 
politics during the nineteenth century. Different from the interventions of the 
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nineteenth century, Mouzelis argues that the interventions during the first few 
decades of the twentieth century resulted from officers’ acts as a relatively cohesive 
interest group with a predominantly middle-class outlook and professional demands 
(Mouzelis 1986, 98). 
 The first two involvements of Greek officers in politics occurred during the 
reign of Otto. Both involvements took place amidst wide public support; however, 
they were neither planned nor initiated by the military (Veremis 1997, 43). The first 
mobilization on 3 September 1843 was directed against the absolute rule of the 
King and dominancy of Bavarians in the political system. Traditional leaders, their 
employees, and veteran politicians of Athens were among the major actors of the 
mobilization asking for the proclamation of a constitution (Legg 1969, 55–56). As a 
result, a constitutional monarchy was proclaimed in March 1944 by the King that 
introduced male suffrage and the replacement of remaining Bavarian advisers with 
Greek equivalents. In less than two decades, however, Otto faced with another 
rebellion. Along with the growing dissatisfaction within society, the increasingly 
negative judgments of the monarchy and failures in foreign policy to accomplish the 
‘Great Idea’ – which aimed at uniting the Hellenes under the newly formed 
independent state – opened the way for mutinies and street demonstrations in 1862 
(Legg 1969, 56–57). According to Woodhouse, simultaneous revolts had occurred 
in a number of military garrisons in February of the same year when the king tried 
to hinder the implementation of a new political program by Admiral Kanaris, who 
had been designated by the King as the Prime Minister (Woodhouse 1991, 169). 
While these revolts were suppressed, a more general revolt with wider public 
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participation broke out after a few months, not only in Athens but also in other 
provincial centers. As a result, the first King of Greece Otto, who did not have an 
heir, had to abdicate. The son of the King of Denmark was proclaimed by the Great 
Powers as the new King of Greece with the title of King George I of the Hellenes. 
After the new king came to reign, a new constitution that extended democratic 
freedoms, but also preserved the king’s prerogatives and powers in matters of 
foreign policy, was produced in the Second Athens National Assembly and 
accepted by King George I (Clogg 1992, 61). 
The remaining half of the nineteenth century was filled with political and 
economic difficulties that formed the basis for a military intervention in politics in 
1909. Since 1841, the tension in Greece’s relationship with the Ottoman Empire had 
increased due to the uprisings in Crete demanding the unification of the island with 
the Greek state. The crisis in the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire drew the 
attention of the Great Powers and Greece to the Balkans. The 1877-1878 war 
between the Ottoman Empire and Russia was terminated with the involvement of 
the Great Powers. The Berlin Treaty signed at the war’s end created new 
independent and autonomous states in the Balkans, and expanded Greece’s 
territories with the annexation of Thessaly. Along with these events, another 
prominent element of the nineteenth century’s turmoil was the war between Greece 
and the Ottoman Empire, known as the Thirty Days’ War in, 1897. This war broke 
out due to Greece’s sending of troops to Crete to support the uprising in the island 
for unification with Greece. The war was terminated with the forced armistice of the 
Great Powers. Despite Greece’s defeat, the agreement granted Crete autonomous 
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status under Ottoman suzerainty and appointed the son of King George I as High 
Commissioner. In addition to these political developments, the economic situation 
of Greece was not improving. Increased external debt bankrupted the state, and 
hundreds of thousands of Greeks immigrated to the United States.  
The Ottoman Empire proclaimed a constitutional monarchy for the second 
time in 1908. A religious uprising took place in 1909 with the aim of terminating 
the second constitution era, but was quickly suppressed by the Army of Action of 
the Committee of Union and Progress. Taking advantage of this political crisis in 
the Empire and the withdrawal of the Great Powers’ troops from Crete, the island 
proclaimed its unification with Greece (Woodhouse 1991, 188). Considering the 
defeat of 1897 and existing economic problems in the country, Greece’s reactions to 
the Cretan proclamation were prudent. Prime Minister George Theotokis, did not 
officially acknowledge the proclamation and he was forced to resign from his post 
under nationalist pressure (Woodhouse 1991, 189). However, his successor 
Dimitrios Rallis did not act any differently. This situation turned into a catalyst for 
the intervention of officers who had been already dissatisfied with the royal 
patronage in the armed forces, political corruption, and failures in foreign policy. 
The Military League (Stratiotikos Syndesmos), which was formed in May 1909 by 
mostly middle-ranked officers, declared a memorandum on 27 August of the same 
year. The memorandum demanded political and economic reforms, including 
removal of the royal princes from the armed forces and members of the cabinet, and 
threatened to use force if they were not implemented. The coup enjoyed public 
support, as manifested in huge demonstrations. The officers’ demands were met by 
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the parliament and the King without a single shot being fired. This coup diverged 
from the 1843 and 1862 coups, both of which had been civilian-driven coups. In 
this regard, the 1909 intervention represented the first instance of independent 
military action against the political establishment in modern Greek history (Veremis 
1997, 87).   
The 1909 coup marked the beginning of a new era in Greek politics. As a 
result, Prime Minister Rallis resigned from his post. Officers did not have faith in 
former politicians of the old regime, but in Eleftherios Venizelos, who had 
established a good reputation in Cretan politics in the meantime. Venizelos earned 
the trust not only of the officers but also the public. In the elections of December 
1910, he secured the control of 300 out of 362 seats in the parliament with his 
Liberal Party. The situation did not change much in the 1912 elections; more than 
80 percent of the seats in the parliament belonged to Liberal Party members (Clogg 
1992, 76–79).  
According to Veremis, the military’s involvement in Greek politics during 
the inter-war years conforms largely to Huntington’s ascription of the soldier as 
guardian. According to Huntington, militaries in societies with civilian elites and 
developed civilian cultures do not act as modernizers of society or creators of new 
political orders, but rather as the guardians of the existing order (Huntington 1957, 
222–256). Thus, the Greek military acted to replace one civilian order with another 
one rather than handing the government over to officers (Veremis 1997, 89). 
Venizelos’ strong – and strongly supported –entry into the political scene 
formed a watershed in Greek politics. Disagreements between Venizelos and King 
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Constantine, who replaced his father in 1913, sowed the seeds of a political schism, 
which is referred to as “national schism” (Ethnikos Dichasmos), in Greek politics 
that was to last until the 1960s. The military did not remain detached from this 
political schism; officers, too, were divided into two camps: supporters of the 
monarchy and supporters of Venizelos who held pro-republican views against 
royalist regime.  
It is worth stating here that although most supporters of Venizelos were 
against the monarchy, not all were. Even Venizelos himself had given support to the 
monarchy before 1915 when he came into conflict with the King regarding Greece’s 
entry into the First World War. For this reason, the division between monarchists 
and republicans did not always map perfectly onto the division between Venizelists 
and anti-Venizelists. 
The roots of the decades-long political schism were grounded in the 
disagreement between Venizelos and the King about which foreign policy Greece 
should follow during the First World War. Venizelos supported entering the war on 
the side of the Entente – i.e., Britain, France, and Russia – with the expectation that 
it would bring significant territorial gains that would contribute to actualizing the 
‘Great Idea.’ King Constantine, who was married to the sister of Kaiser Wilhelm II, 
supported Greece’s neutrality during the war, believing that the Greek naval force 
would not be able to withstand the British if they entered the war with the Central 
Powers (Legg and Roberts 1997, 34–35). 
 Due to this major differing of views, the King forced Venizelos to resign 
from the premiership both in 1915 and 1916, after having been elected twice to the 
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position. Venizelos’ reaction to the King generated an uprising against the King’s 
policy and the establishment of a provisional government in Thessaloniki in 1916. 
This anti-monarchical mobilization gained support from politicians, officials, and 
military officers, including Admiral Kountouriotis, the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Navy (Woodhouse 1991, 200–201). Veremis mentions a mobilization at the same 
time by the junior officers of ‘National Defense’ (Ethniki Amyna), which was 
formed in 1915 against the neutrality policy of the King and supported Venizelos’ 
decision to enter the war on the side of the Entente powers (Veremis 1997, 53–54). 
Unable to stand against these mobilizations and existing British and French 
pressures for Greece to enter into the war, the King fled the country in July 1917. 
His son Alexander replaced him as monarch and Venizelos returned to the 
premiership.   
The schism between the King Constantine and Venizelos was reflected in 
the composition of state institutions and affected much of the population as well. 
After Venizelos’ forced resignation from the premiership in 1915 and his departure 
from Athens, individuals known to hold pro-Venizelist attitudes were purged from 
civil service and government (Legg and Roberts 1997, 35). After Venizelos return 
to power, a corresponding shift in personnel was targeted toward pro-royalists in the 
same positions. The royalist-Venizelist schism in the army also deepened after 
Greece entered the First World War on the side of Entente. The uprisings of royalist 
officers were suppressed, they were purged from their positions, and pro-Venizelist 
officers were appointed to higher ranks (Veremis 1997, 63). 
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The purges in the army according to officers’ political affiliations continued 
during subsequent coups and countercoups. This situation strengthened patron-
client relationships in the army, which in fact had already existed in other state 
institutions and Greek society. The view that only by depending on individuals of 
higher status could one achieve one’s end was prevalent not only among civilians 
but also among officers (Veremis 1997, 75). Rising to a higher rank depended more 
on officers’ personal and political affiliations than their professional development. 
For instance, officers who supported Venizelos in his decision to enter the First 
World War on the side of the Entente were rewarded with a bonus of ten months’ 
added seniority, while those who stayed neutral or supported the King found 
themselves surpassed in seniority by some of their juniors (Veremis 1997, 108). 
Power was turned over from Venizelos’ Liberal to the conservative Popular 
Party through the 1920 elections. King Constantine returned to rule and the vicious 
circle of appointments in the civil service and military happened once again, with 
royalists replacing Venizelists. The defeat of the Greeks in the Asia Minor 
mobilized another coup in 1922 by those who blamed the King and the royalists for 
the defeat. A group of officers was mobilized under Colonel Nicholas Plastiras, who 
would be one of the major figures on the political scene until the 1950s. Officers 
seized power on 11 September and forced King Constantine to abdicate. One of his 
sons ascended to rule with the title King George II. Influential individuals in the 
previous government and the Commander of the Army, who were deemed by the 
revolutionary committee of the coup to be responsible for the Asia Minor defeat, 
were tried for high treason and executed (Legg and Roberts 1997, 36). Despite the 
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installation of a civilian government, the revolutionary committee retained its 
control over politics (Clogg 1992, 100). 
During the inter-war years, officers continued to be among the main actors 
in politics. Numerous successful coups, unsuccessful coup attempts, and counter-
coups took place during the 1926-1933 period. High-ranking army officers and 
colonels such as Generals Plastiras, Pangalos, Kondylis, Gonatas, and Metaxas, as 
well as Colonels Zervas, Saraphis, Bakirdzis, and Psaros collaborated either with 
royalist or republican politicians to seize power when it was in the hands of the 
opposing political front (Woodhouse 1991, 214). General Pangalos, who was 
actively involved in the 1922 coup that forced King Constantine to abdicate, staged 
a coup in June 1925. He established a dictatorship that would last until August 
1926, when he was removed from power through another coup by General 
Kondylis. The 1928 elections brought Venizelos back to the premiership where he 
remained for four and a half years. With the 1933 elections, power was again turned 
over from the Liberal Party to the Popular Party, which was led by Panayis 
Tsaldaris. On the day of the elections, when preliminary results showed that 
royalists would be the winners, an unsuccessful coup was staged by General 
Plastiras attempting to prevent royalists from coming to power. General Plastiras 
staged another unsuccessful coup on 1 March 1935. This time, however, Venizelos 
was directly involved in the planning and organization of the coup attempt along 
with his adherents in the army (Veremis 1997, 101–129). The failure of the coup 
had significant results for both republicans and royalists. Venizelist Generals 
Anastasios Papoulas and Miltiadis Koimisis and Cavalry Major Stamatis Volanis 
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were executed. Venizelos and Plastiras, who fled the country after the failure of the 
coup, were also sentenced to death in absentia. In total, more than 1000 officers and 
civilians were tried under the martial law that was announced after the coup 
attempt. Almost 1,500 officers known to hold pro-Venizelos and republican 
attitudes were purged from the armed forces. This personnel shift brought about the 
dominance of pro-royalist officers and, from an ideological perspective, the most 
homogenous military in Greece during the twentieth century (Veremis 1997, 129–
132).  
 The general elections in June 1935 delivered an absolute victory to the 
Populist Party as a result of pro-Venizelists’ boycotting the elections. Gaining 65 
percent of the popular vote, Populist Party controlled 96 percent of the seats in 
parliament (Clogg 1992, 113). From June to October, Greek politics was pre-
occupied with the question of restoration of monarchy, which had been abolished 
following a referendum in 1924. Prime Minister Tsaldaris decided to arrange a 
plebiscite that would give the power to the people to choose between a republic or a 
monarchy. However, not wanting to risk the re-introduction of the monarchy, a 
revolutionary committee of high-ranking officers led by General Kondylis, who 
used to be a pro-Venizelist but later turned out to be a strong supporter of the King, 
staged a coup on 10 October 1935 that forced Tsaldaris to resign from premiership 
(Spyropoulos 1993, 46). Kondylis seized the post of premiership, abolished the 
republic, proclaimed a constitutional monarchy and set a referendum for the 
ratification of the constitutional monarchy to be held on 3 November (Woodhouse 
1991, 229). As a result of the referendum, constitutional monarchy was restored in 
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Greece and King George II returned to the country. A caretaker government was 
established under Konstantinos Demertzis, a law professor at the University of 
Athens, and general elections were held on 26 January 1936.  
The results of the 1936 elections were significant both for royalists and 
republicans. The number of seats the anti-Venizelist parties won exceeded those of 
the liberals and republicans by only two, while 15 seats were garnered by the 
Communist Party of Greece (KKE- Kommunistiko Komma Ellados). General 
Alexander Papagos who was the Minister of Army Affairs of the caretaker 
government visited the King on 5 March 1936 with the ultimatum that the armed 
forces would not tolerate any deal with the Communist Party (Veremis 1997, 133).  
The King’s response to Papagos’ ultimatum was to replace him with Metaxas who 
was a retired general and the leader of the nationalist and monarchist Freethinkers’ 
Party (Komma ton Eleftherofronon), which had gained seven seats in parliament in 
the last elections. During the two months following the elections while Greece still 
lacked a government based on a popular vote, Metaxas became a dominant figure in 
the caretaker government. A historical coincidence of deaths of leading figures in 
Greek politics including Venizelos, Kondylis, Tsaldaris and premier of the caretaker 
government Demertzis, boosted Metaxas’ role in politics. Despite his weak 
existence in parliament, the King appointed Metaxas as the deputy premier in April 
1936 (Woodhouse 1991, 230). Metaxas not only won a vote of confidence in the 
parliament, but also gained the right to govern by decree as a result of the 
adjournment of the parliament for five months (Papandreu 1977, 66–67). However, 
the parliament did not meet again during the next ten years.  
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The 1930s were also the years that Greek economy continued to worsen due 
to the effects of the Great Depression. The influx of refugees; the economic crisis; 
and the street demonstrations, strikes, and occasional violence led by organized 
workers and refugees all strengthened support for the KKE among disadvantaged 
groups. The massive demonstrations of tobacco workers in Thessaloniki on 9 May 
1936, which left many wounded and around thirty dead, showed how fragile the 
public authority was when faced with an organized and frustrated population 
(Spyropoulos 1993, 50). During June and July, workers’ demonstrations and strikes 
supported by the KKE broke out at different places in Greece including Athens. A 
nation-wide general strike was organized by the communist party and supported by 
worker groups, and was to take place on 5 August 1936. The day before the strike, 
under the pretext of a communist threat Metaxas, supported by the King, dissolved 
the parliament without setting a date for elections, proclaimed martial law, and 
suspended civil liberties. Thus, 4 August marked the beginning of the authoritarian 
regime of Metaxas which was to last until his death on 29 January 1941.     
As already discussed, the dominance of patron-client relationships within 
Greece’s political schism explains its officers’ interventions in politics. In addition, 
exploring officers’ views about their professions and the military’s involvement in 
politics is valuable in uncovering officers’ motivations. Interviews conducted with 
officers who served in the army during the interwar period show that officers 
highlighted the moral character of their profession, describing it as virtuous and 
heroic (Veremis 1997, 70). They viewed selecting the profession of becoming an 
officer as a decision to give up a prosperous future and embrace the hardship of 
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military life. With the perception that becoming an officer meant serving the nation, 
interviewees expressed that officers would not act according to selfish motives. 
With regard to the military’s interventions, they made a differentiation between 
military interventions for personal gains and for the good of the country in times of 
crisis (Veremis 1997, 71). Thus, while they condemned interventions in politics in 
principle, they left the door open for those they saw as necessary to restore order. 
 
 
2.2.  The Military and Politics in Turkey 
 
Studying the history of Turkey, one will quickly notice that the military in 
Turkey has been an important actor in Turkish politics since the establishment of 
the Republic in 1923, though with significantly diminished influence during the last 
decade. Not only did officers win the War of Independence, but they also took a 
leading role in the establishment of the republican regime. Since then, they acted as 
the guardians of the state and Atatürkist principles against perceived external and 
internal threats. 
The roots of the military’s involvement in politics in Turkey can easily be 
traced back to structure of the Ottoman state and the place of its military in it. The 
Ottoman state is referred to as a patrimonial state, which differed from the feudal 
structure of Western European states (Hale 1994, 304–305; Heper 1988, 5, 2006, 
38–40; Özbudun 1994, 189). Within its patrimonial structure, Ottoman society was 
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divided into two major strata: the ruling stratum, which was named as askeri to 
indicate the military, and the ruled one, reaya. The ruling stratum consisted of 
officers of the army and the ulema (doctors of Islamic Law), to whom the Sultan 
delegated executive and religious powers, whereas reaya comprised all Muslim and 
non-Muslim subjects of the Empire who were paying taxes and had no involvement 
in the government (İnalcık 1964, 44). In contrast to the feudal systems of Western 
countries, the peripheral administrations or estates in Ottoman lands were not 
structured to balance the power of the central ruling class (Heper 2006, 38). A large 
part of the land was left to benefice-holders, who were tasked with both local 
administrative and military duties. There was also no clear-cut distinction between 
the military and civilian bureaucrats of districts; the district governors, both 
sancakbeyi and beylerbeyi, were also military commanders. Janissaries formed the 
core of the military power of the Ottoman Empire. They were the slave army of the 
Sultan, which was formed based on the devsirme (conversion) system. The 
devsirme system was an organized method of compulsory recruitment based on the 
gathering of boys from the Christian communities of the Empire to be raised for the 
Sultan’s army (Hale 1994, 3). These boys were forced to convert to Islam and 
underwent special training that was not limited to just martial arts; they were 
educated in a broad range of issues, intended to prepare them not only to serve in 
the army but also in administrative posts such as senior government advisors, civil 
servants, and provincial governors (Hale 1994, 3–5).     
The beginning of Ottoman imperial decline led to the initiation of reforms 
aimed at modernizing state institutions to save the Empire from entire collapse. 
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Modernization efforts began with reforming the army and the bureaucracy, since 
corruption in these institutions was seen as the main reason for the decline of the 
Empire. Education and the training of Ottoman soldiers were reformed on the basis 
of the Western European model. The Western form of education eventually created 
a new generation of soldiers who believed that the salvation of the state lay in its 
modernization and stood against the absolute rule of the Sultan. Thus, the military, 
which had been once the object of reforms in the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, became subject of change in the last quarter of the nineteenth century 
(Heper and Güney 1996, 619). Officers had a determining role in the declaration of 
a constitutional monarchy in the Ottoman Empire, first in 1876 and again in 1908. 
The idea of the constitutional monarchy was developed by the Young Ottomans, 
and its declaration came along with the officers’ intervention (Karpat 2010, 10). 
Similarly, military officers led activities of the Young Turks organized in the 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which brought about a re-declaration of 
the constitutional monarchy in 1908 by ending the absolutist regime of Abdülhamid 
II (Duman and Tsarouhas 2006, 410).  
During the Turkish War of Independence, the role of officers was not 
limited to the battles they fought; they played a dominant role in decision-making 
processes by taking part in the Ankara government (Harris 1965, 55). According to 
Harris, the reason for this participation arose both from the particular conditions of 
the war and from the narrowness of the base of leadership (Harris 1965, 55). 
Officers’ involvement in day-to-day politics changed after the war was won and the 
republican regime was proclaimed. A law that necessitated the resignation of active 
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duty officers before they run in elections to become a deputy was introduced in 
December 1923. This also meant that those already in parliament had to make a 
choice between the parliament and army. The main reason for introduction of this 
law was Atatürk’s aim to keep the army away from the influence of political 
opposition and loyal to the republican regime and to himself, rather than to keep 
politics away from the influence of officers (Hale 2011, 192–194; Harris 1965, 56–
60). 
During single-party era, the relationship between decision makers and the 
military was free of problems; top figures of the state shared a common military 
background. For Atatürk, the military was the ultimate base of power for the 
regime, source of progressive practices, guardian of the ideals of the nation, and the 
intelligentsia, which would lead the spread of modernization reforms all over the 
country  (Harris 1965, 55–56).  
The military, which played a vanguard role in the introduction of 
modernization reforms during single-party rule, became the most prominent 
guardian of these reforms and Atatürkist principles after 1946 when a multi-party 
political system was introduced. Officers attached particular importance to 
secularism among Atatürkist principles as forming an indispensable dimension of 
modernization and the republican regime. For them, the main reason behind the 
demise of the Ottoman Empire was Islam, which had prevented rational judgment 
and formed the basis of opposition to modernization efforts (Heper and Güney 
2000, 636). Along with secularism, the military perceived democracy as another 
important component of modernization. As Cizre (1997, 153) notes, despite its high 
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level of political autonomy, acceptance of democracy and civilian rule has been one 
of the most defining  features of the Turkish military. However, it is important to 
note how the Turkish military perceived democracy. The military favored “rational 
democracy,” which is defined as a system that enables enlightened debate among 
the educated with the purpose of selecting the best policy among alternatives (Heper 
and Güney 1996, 620). Thus, for the military democracy was an end, i.e., rational 
policy making, rather than a means for popular representation (Heper 2000, 74). 
Officers and the rest of state elites believed that rational democracy would not serve 
the personal and party interests of politicians who were preoccupied with short-term 
populist policies, but rather the long-term interests of the state and nation. 
With the importance attached to pursuing Atatürkist principles, particularly 
secularism and rationalist version of democracy, the Turkish military intervened 
directly in politics in 1960, 1971, and 1980 to safeguard the secular-democratic 
state (Heper and Güney 2000, 636). The most prominent common characteristic of 
these three interventions was military’s reluctance to establish indefinite military 
dictatorships. Each time the officers took power, they formed a transitional 
administration or supported a civilian transitional government (as in1971), to save 
and restore a secular democratic regime. Each period was concluded by the 
military’s returning to its barracks by its own volition and leaving power to civilians 
through democratic elections.   
Along with the basic and overarching reason of saving a secular-democratic 
regime from itself, each intervention also had particular reasons that need to be 
considered for a better understanding of the military’s intervention in politics in 
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Turkey. The year 1946 marks a turning point in Turkish politics with transition to 
multi-party system after the unsuccessful experiences of Atatürk’s period. The first 
experience with a multi-party system took place in 1924 with the establishment of 
the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası). This party 
was formed by deputies who had resigned from the Republican People’s Party 
(CHP – Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası) and led by former officers such as Ali Fuad 
Cebesoy and Rauf Orbay (Ahmad 1993, 57). The party did not last long; it was 
dissolved in June 1925 under the Law for the Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sükun 
Kanunu). This law was proclaimed as a result of Şeyh Sait Rebellion in 1925, which 
had a strong Kurdish nationalist element but was launched and sustained in 
religious terms (Ahmad 1993, 58).The second experiment with a transition to a 
multi-party regime came in 1930, this time with Atatürk’s specific support for the 
establishment of an opposition party led by Fethi Okyar. The new party was named 
the Free Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası), which diverged from the 
CHP by supporting liberalization in economy. However, in a short time the party 
became the center of criticism and opposition to republican reforms – in particular, 
secularism. Three months after its establishment, the party dissolved itself on 17 
November 1930.  
The Democratic Party (DP) was founded in January 1946 by Celal Bayar, 
who had replaced İsmet İnönü as prime minister in 1937 and served until 1939, 
along with Refik Koraltan, Fuad Köprülü, and Adnan Menderes. These individuals 
had all been former deputies of the CHP,1 but had become distanced from it mainly 
                                                          
1
 The name of Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası was changed to Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi in 1935. In their 
English translations, there is no difference; both names are translated as Republican People’s Party.  
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because of its economic policies. The establishment of the DP did not cause any 
concern in CHP circles, since its leaders were perceived to share the common 
political philosophy based on Atatürkist principles (Ahmad 1993, 103–104). The 
party program emphasized a commitment to Atatürkist principles and cited 
advancing democracy as the main goal. According to Celal Bayar, there were no 
ideological differences between the DP and the CHP, but they differed in their 
methods for developing a modern and prosperous Turkey. He even made an 
analogy to explain the absence of difference between the two political parties, 
likening the DP and the CHP to chefs who were preparing helva (a traditional 
Turkish dessert) with different recipes (Ahmad 1993, 109).     
In the first, and highly controversial, multi-party national elections held in 
July 1946, the DP entered parliament by gaining 65 of the seats. The 1950 elections 
became a victory for the DP, which was to stay in power for the next ten years. The 
second half of the 1950s became a period plagued not only by economic problems 
but also political ones. Economic development in the first half of the decade left in 
its place problems arising from increasing inflation rates and state debts due to the 
change in balance of payments with increased imports, as well as a shortage of 
foreign currency and goods in the market. The government’s discontent with the 
increasing opposition from the CHP, public bureaucracy, universities, and different 
parts of society led it to extend undemocratic measures. These were manifested in 
increasing control over the press and suppression of opposition in the last three 
months before the military’s intervention (Özdağ 2004, 55–62).  
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The military’s intervention in politics took place on 27 May 1960, and 
resulted from an initiative taken by colonels to restore democracy and support 
Atatürkist principles in reaction to the DP’s increasing authoritarianism. Officers 
made their intention clear that they would hand power over to civilians “once the 
mess created by politicians was cleaned out” (Duman and Tsarouhas 2006, 411). 
Cleaning out the mess meant the creation of a new constitution by the Constituent 
Assembly that involved military-civilian cooperation.  
The 1961 Constitution, which is referred as the most liberal constitution in 
Turkey’s history, produced an institutional configuration in which it would be 
difficult to establish an authoritarian, partisan regime based on parliamentary 
majorities (Tachau and Heper 1983, 22). Instead, by introducing a proportional 
representation system, the constitution supported a more just distribution in the 
parliament in accordance with the votes parties won in the elections. Thus, the new 
electoral system enabled the representation of minor parties in the parliament. This 
representation served to restrict the power of the CHP and the Justice Party (AP – 
Adalet Partisi), which was founded in February 1961 and acted as an extension of 
the DP. The new constitution also produced a distribution of power between elected 
and non-elected bodies with the aim to restrict the power and actions of the elected. 
In this regard, the Grand National Assembly was comprised of two chambers: the 
National Assembly, which consisted of 450 popularly elected members, and the 
Senate, composed of 150 popularly elected senators and fifteen senators who were 
appointed by the President. In addition to these senators, members of the National 
Unity Committee and former presidents were lifetime members in the Senate. 
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Along with the Senate, the Constitutional Court was created with the main function 
of reviewing legislation according to the Constitution.   
As stated, the 1960 intervention aimed to restore a liberal system in which 
the power of the elected executive was to be balanced with non-elected state 
institutions. Along with it, broadened rights and liberties that were provided to 
universities, professional chambers, associations, and clubs strengthened organized 
civil society against the state. Within the newly created system, the members of the 
National Unity Committee (NUC), were provided with ‘exit guarantees’ for 
themselves and for the military as a whole, which enabled them to maintain an 
element of control over politics. Firstly, each member of the NUC was guaranteed 
to become a member of the Senate for life, while all other members of the Senate 
(except former presidents) were to serve for six years. Secondly and more 
importantly, the National Security Council (NSC) was created to provide an 
institutionalized channel for the military’s access to the topmost political authority 
(Tachau and Heper 1983, 22). As stated in Article 111 of the Constitution, the 
Council was composed of ministers to be determined by law, the Chief of the 
General Staff, and representatives of the armed forces. The main function of the 
NUC was determined in the same article to be assisting the Council of Ministers in 
making decisions on issues of national security. The Constitution did not define 
what was meant by ‘national security’ and thus the concept was left to so unspecific 
that anything could be considered as an issue of national security by the military. 
For instance, the broadness of the interpretation of national security was noted by 
Orhan Erkanlı, who had joined the colonels’ takeover as a staff commander, in an 
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interview years after the coup. He stated that every problem in Turkey could be 
considered as related to national security; issues ranging from the price of the rice 
and the maintenance of roads and touristic sites to the works of intellectuals could 
all constitute matters of national security (Ahmad 1993, 130).  
The 1960s witnessed the establishment of new political parties on the right 
and left sides of the political spectrum as well as a religiously-oriented one. The 
decade was also characterized by an increase in the number of labor unions and 
student clubs, whose members led street mobilizations and acts of violence 
including bank robberies, kidnappings of foreigners, and murders. By 1971, in 
addition to all these events, Islamist organizations and the religiously-oriented 
National Order Party had started to openly reject Atatürkist principles, in particular 
secularism. Perceiving the secular-democratic regime at danger once again, the 
military intervened in politics for the second time on 12 March 1971. Different than 
the 27 May takeover, this time the military intervened by maintaining the chain of 
command. However, instead of a direct takeover, the military’s intervention came 
via a “communiqué,” which demanded the formation of a strong and credible 
government that would be able to implement the reforms envisaged in the 
constitution and threatened that the military would step in if these measures were 
not taken (Ahmad 1993, 147). Under these conditions, the AP government resigned 
and a caretaker government was appointed under the leadership of Nihat Erim, a 
former deputy of the CHP. Amendments to the constitution were introduced to 
strengthen the executive (Duman and Tsarouhas 2006, 411) and State Security 
Courts were established. The military also strengthened its place in the NSC by 
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changing the wording of the relevant constitution article. Thus, the NSC, which was 
established to assist the Council of Ministers in the formulation of national security 
policies, was now to advise the Council of Ministers in the same task (Özbudun 
2012, 82). After two and half years, democratic elections were held and a new 
civilian government was formed in accordance with the results of the elections. 
However, the transitional administration under the technocrat government 
supported by the military did not guarantee the consolidation of democracy. The 
second half of the 1970s turned out to be years of political instability, increasing 
violence, and economic crisis. One more time, with the same reason of saving the 
secular-democratic regime, the military intervened in politics on 12 September 1980 
– this time, by taking power into its hands.  
As stated above, despite lacking the intention to establish a permanent 
military regime, the military intervened in politics three times. In all these 
interventions, the military acted as an actor above politics. In other words, the 
armed forces intervened in politics as a rule-maker rather than to become a player of 
the game. Scholars have explained the Turkish military’s intervention as deriving 
from its self-imposed mission, which developed in the wake of the declining years 
of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, as also noted above, the military did not see its 
mission as limited to defending the country against external threats, but also held 
the perception that it was the ultimate protector of the republican regime and the 
legacy of Atatürk (Cizre 2004, 107; Demirel 2003, 4; 2004, 128). Birand 
demonstrated the formation of this particular self-perception of officers in his study 
on education in military high schools. In one of the meetings he had with students in 
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their last year at the military academy, he asked whether they believed that the 
military should intervene when they see that it is necessary. Surprised to be facing 
this question, students answered (Birand 1989, 51):   
[W]e are the army of the regime. We are entrusted with protecting 
this homeland. It is always our duty to keep the state strong and the 
regime away from destruction. (…) We are against everyone who 
intends to attack Atatürkist principles. We have the right to do so 
[to intervene to politics] for the good of our people.  
 
 
Along with the internalization of the guardianship role of the regime and 
Atatürkist principles, Birand also revealed military high school students’ belief in 
democracy in ideal terms and how this belief changed when it came to its actual 
practice in Turkey. The same group of students expressed that democracy was the 
best regime type. However, when they were asked about politicians, they responded 
with a negative point of view in the Turkish context. For these students, politicians 
were self-centric individuals who could deceive people to save their own interests, 
while the general public was illiterate and would believe the lies of politicians 
(Birand 1989, 51–52). Nevertheless, the negative perceptions about politicians did 
not create a view that soldiers should be governing the country instead of politicians 
(Birand 1989, 52). While the education in military high schools strengthened their 
view that the military was entrusted with the task of protecting the republican 
regime and the legacy of Atatürkist principles, students’ statements showed that 
their negative views about politicians did not arise from the education they had at 
the military school, but from what they read in newspapers and heard in their close 
social environments (Birand 1989, 52–53).  
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Military’s guardianship role was not simply self-imposed but instead was 
expected, waited for, and supported by large segments of civilians at all levels – but 
particularly by some academics and journalists – at times when they perceived that 
the country was in a form of danger with which civilians would not be able to deal. 
There was no consensus among civilians, in particular political elites, to resist the 
military; neither was there any denial of the military’s guardianship role after 
transition to democracy. As stated by Demirel (Demirel 2005, 246), there was a 
positive perception of military interventions in Turkey among a significant number 
of people. The military’s interventions were rarely seen as repressive or as failures 
in political, economic, or military terms. Instead, they were viewed as result-
oriented moves that offered quick, clear-cut, and less costly solutions to existing 
problems rather than trying to solve crises within a democratic regime in a longer 
and more costly period of time. Along with this positive perception of military 
interventions, the military also experienced cooperation with civilians during 
transition periods.  
 The 1960 intervention had the support of the political elites of the CHP, as 
well as “intellectuals” (Cizre Sakallioğlu 1997, 154). The Constituent Assembly – 
comprised by the National Unity Committee and the House of Representatives, 
which itself was composed of representatives from various institutions such as the 
judiciary, universities, bar associations, and the press demonstrated the 
collaboration among officers, state, and political elites, and such “intellectuals” 
during the drafting of the 1961 constitution.   
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The intervention in 1971 also had civilian support, but with a much 
narrowed-down version when compared to support for the 1961 intervention. This 
discrepancy in levels of support can be explained by the changing political context, 
i.e., the existence of political parties on the left and right of the political spectrum; 
differences in political parties’ evaluations of political developments and their 
expectations from the interventions; and the timing and type of the intervention. 
Acceptance of the military’s intervention in politics at times of crisis is 
demonstrated by the criticisms of a CHP representative for the inaction of the 
military before 12 March (Birand, Dündar, and Çaplı 1994, 171; also cited in 
Demirel 2003,13): 
I had made such reproaching statements [to commanders] as “the 
homeland is falling apart (…) [Y]oung patriots are dying in the 
streets. And you are watching. Do you know any other solution that 
we do not know? Will you not do anything?” We thought it was 
beneficial to involve the army in the process. Not only was the law 
convenient for such an interpretation, but also there was a 
precedent. 
 
 
The first reactions to the 12 March intervention from individuals from the 
left wing were positive, but they quickly changed when it was made known that the 
intervention was not the one that they expected to occur; officers who were known 
with their pro-leftist ideas were purged from their active duties. The center-right 
was displeased with the intervention, as it was the second time that its faction had 
been removed from power through undemocratic methods. The majority of the CHP 
did not show any reaction against the communiqué other than Bülent Ecevit and a 
few of his supporters. These individuals who represented the left-of-center, 
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perceived the military’s intervention to be targeted against themselves (Sunay 2010, 
166). The communiqué included the warning that the military was ready to perform 
its duty of protecting the Republic by taking power unless an impartial government 
was established to take the necessary measures. This explicit statement left 
politicians no option other than to carry out the military’s demands if they wanted to 
keep the parliament functioning and political parties open. As a result, Prime 
Minister of the AP government Süleyman Demirel resigned from his post, the 
government was dissolved, and a non-partisan government was formed with 
deputies and bureaucrats under the premiership of Nihat Erim as noted above. 
Also noted above, one of the important characteristics of both transition 
periods, i.e., 1960-1961 and 1971-1973, was the creation and strengthening of ‘exit 
guarantees’ for the military. With regard to civilian views about these exit 
guarantees, there was no solid resistance against their creation. In fact, civilian 
resistance to their creation and strengthening might have been difficult when the 
power was in the hands of the military. However, after power was handed over to 
civilians in each time, civilians neither showed any strong criticism of such exit 
guarantees nor took any initiative to block them. 
It is clear that civilian attitudes and behavior toward the military’s 
guardianship role, its intervention in politics at times of crisis, and its exit 
guarantees cannot be considered independent from historical and cultural factors, 
including the construction of national narratives containing concepts such as “the 
military-nation,” “the nation on horse,” and “every Turk is born a soldier.” As 
Heper (2006, 41) states, Turkey inherited from the Ottoman Empire a strong state 
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and a weak society. Like in the Ottoman Empire, society in Turkey looked up to 
state elites, including military officers, as the leaders of progressive steps toward a 
better future. Modernization reforms were introduced by this stratum, which was 
comprised of the most educated people of the nation and therefore considered by 
society to know what the best was for the good of the country. 
Education in military high schools and in the Military Academy was one of 
the factors strengthening the popularity of and long-held respect for the military in 
society. Students who wanted to go to a military high school had to pass written, 
oral, and athletic skills entrance exams. Military high schools and the academy 
offered conditions and facilities that were lacking in most public schools and 
universities. Students in these schools were not only taught courses related to the 
military profession, but also those such as Political Science, International Relations, 
World Politics, History, International Law, and Sociology (Birand 1989, 60–70).   
The discourse of the “military-nation” concept is reproduced in various 
aspects of daily life by multiple actors in addition to its reproduction in military 
schools. The popular saying “Every Turk is born a soldier,” (Her Türk asker doğar) 
is repeated not only in military service but also in civilian school textbooks, daily 
conversations, and the speeches of public officials and intellectuals (Altınay 2004, 
13). Turkey’s conscription is spiritually glorified as the hearth of the Prophet 
(peygamber ocağı) as well as service to the nation. Serving in the military also 
constitutes an important experience in the lives of Turkish men, for whom 
conscription is perceived in the society as a step to become “real man.” 
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 To sum up with a few concluding remarks, this chapter reviewed the role of 
the Greek and Turkish militaries in the politics of these countries since their 
founding as nation-states. It paid particular attention to the state-building processes 
of Greece and Turkey, the development of the military institution as an institution, 
and the relationships between officers and politicians with a focus on their influence 
on the development of civil-military relations. In light of this view, military 
interventions in the politics of those countries before the 21 April 1967 takeover in 
Greece and the 12 September 1980 takeover in Turkey are analyzed. It is seen that 
although the two countries resembled each other in terms of their respective 
militaries’ interventions in several ways, they diverged from each other in terms of 
the role of the military in politics as well as officers’ motivations and goals 
regarding military interventions. These similarities and differences in the 
development of the civil-military relations in those countries are expected to 
influence the way Greek and Turkey columnists evaluated the 1967 and 1980 
takeovers.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
NEWSPAPERS, POLITICAL COMMUNICATION, AND THE 
GREEK AND TURKISH CASES  
 
 
 
A huge literature exists regarding the development and characteristics of the 
media in different countries, their roles in political communication, and the extent 
and limits of their influence on opinion formation. This chapter presents a 
theoretical framework for understanding how the media has been studied in social 
sciences and in journalism to-date. It first discusses how meaning is produced in the 
media through different methods of manipulation of information, and then identifies 
several classifications of media systems. It concludes by analyzing the development 
of the journalistic profession in Greece and Turkey from a historical perspective.  
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3.1. Media and Opinion Formation  
 
In media studies, the media are considered to produce meanings, realities, and 
truths. While conveying a message, the media provide a representation. In this 
representation, they create a reality – a truth by means of what is included, what is 
excluded, and the way what is included is framed (Bainbridge 2008a, 187–189). 
The structural parts of a text – i.e., the words, accompanying pictures, and typeface 
– produce a particular meaning. The reader is exposed to the structural parts that 
lead to abstractions in the minds of the audience. Thus, the meaning that is 
produced depends on the relationship between the media text and the resultant 
abstraction. The link between the text and the abstraction is not natural; it is socially 
constructed. Therefore, there is always more than one possible abstraction of the 
same media text. However, among the possible abstractions there exists a more 
likely one, depending on the context in which these physical parts appear, the  
framing of the text, the relationship between the text that is being studied and other 
texts, and also the nature and background of the audience (Bainbridge 2008b, 160–
167).  
Various empirical studies have shown that the media influence and shape 
public opinion particularly in terms of what is known and what is valued as 
important. In addition, there are studies that demonstrate that the media can 
influence what people think about particular issues. However, it should be noted 
here that the influence of the media on its audience is not always at the same level; 
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other factors such as the political and historical context, background information of 
the audience, and reliability of the source of information also make a difference.  
In addition, empirical studies show that people are particularly vulnerable to 
persuasion when dealing with subjects in which they do not have direct experience 
(Curran and Seaton 2003, 326). It has also been demonstrated that people’s trust in 
the source of the message increases their willingness to believe what is presented 
(Druckman, 2001). With regards to politics, about which very few people have first-
hand information and experience, it is assumed in the literature that the media’s 
effects on opinion formation is strong since the media are considered by many as 
authoritative and reliable sources of information on political issues (Curran and 
Seaton 2003, 326). It is also known that political persuasion is more successful 
when it is used to reinforce the public’s preferences rather than to alter them 
(Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder 1982, 848). That is, people’s views may get stronger 
when they are reinforced by the media. With regards to situations when the views of 
people are not supported by the media, there can be a negative effect; in this way, 
people’s views that are not reinforced may diminish or disappear completely 
(Curran and Seaton 2003, 326). 
              Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann’s (1974) “theory of spiral of silence” is also 
worthy of consideration in explaining the role of the media on people’s 
(re)formation of their opinions. Noelle-Neumann stresses how public opinion 
affects individual behavior and thinking, and how the individual who is influenced 
contributes to the (re)formation or maintenance of public opinion in turn. According 
to the theory of a spiral of silence, the assumption is that society threatens 
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individuals with isolation and exclusion if they deviate from the consensus. 
Therefore, individuals constantly check to see which ideas and forms of behavior 
are on the rise or decline in society, with the fear of being isolated or excluded. 
People’s assessments of which ideas and behaviors are rising or declining affect, in 
turn, their own willingness to express their views and the manner in which they act. 
Thus, if they believe that their opinions are shared within the general public 
opinion, they feel confident to express their opinions in both public and private 
spheres. If they believe the situation is the reverse, they will be more cautious about 
making their opinions known and may even keep silent.  
With regards to the role of the media in this spiral relationship, Noelle-
Neumann (1992, p. 80) bases her argument on existing empirical research 
investigating the role of the media as a major source of information. She argues that 
the media demonstrate to people what is accepted or acceptable, and what majority 
and minority opinion are. Thus, in addition to providing information, the media 
become an actor in the (re)formation and maintenance of public opinion by making 
some opinions more salient, and thus reflecting them as the majority or the 
consensus, and overlooking some others, which contributes to their being perceived 
as the minority and forces them into silence.     
As stated above, it is difficult to measure precisely the media effect on 
people’s opinions and behaviors, due to the influence of other various factors. 
Therefore, most empirical research aims to control the independent and intervening 
variables also affecting behavior as much as possible in order to highlight the 
media’s effect. Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan (2009), for example, aimed to explore 
48 
 
the effect of being exposed to newspapers on people’s political behavior and 
opinions. They discovered that even short exposure to one of two main newspapers, 
such as The Washington Post or The Washington Times, meaningfully changed 
people’s voting behaviors.  
The influence of the media on creating a sense of what is more important 
among issues on the agenda as a result of their news coverage has been another 
question researchers tried to tackle. Defined as “agenda-setting,” it is argued that 
people learn from the media not only about issues but also how much importance is 
attached to them based on the amount of information provided in news stories, 
columns, and editorials (McCombs and Shaw 1972). In their research, McCombs & 
Shaw compared the key issues highlighted by American voters to the content of the 
mass media during the 1968 presidential campaign. They discovered that there was 
a strong relationship between the campaign issues that the media emphasized and 
the issues judged by voters as the important issues of the elections.  
Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder (1982, 182) discuss the “priming effect” of the 
media. They argue that by highlighting some issues at the expense of others, the 
media not only change what people see as an important issue on the agenda, but 
also they may affect the standards by which people evaluate their governments and 
candidates. Scholars see agenda-setting and priming as being interrelated; in fact, 
they view priming as an extension of agenda-setting. They make the assumption 
that people’s attitudes are formed based on those pieces of information that are 
more salient and more accessible to them when they make decisions (Hastie and 
Park 1986). Thus, the media make some issues more accessible and salient in 
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people’s mind through an agenda-setting effect, which may in turn have a priming 
effect by shaping what people take into account when making judgments about 
political issues (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007, 11).    
Social scientists also investigated the media’s “framing effect” on its 
audience. The concept of a framing effect is based on the assumption that the 
presentation of an issue can influence the way it is understood by the audience 
(Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007, 11). Entman (1993, 52) defines the framing effect 
as selecting some aspects of a perceived reality of an issue and making them more 
salient than other aspects. The framing effect also entails promoting a particular 
definition, causal interpretation, evaluation, or recommendation for the described 
item (Entman 1993, 52). Thus, different than agenda-setting and priming effects – 
which stress the influence of the media’s attention to an issue, i.e., how the quantity 
of information they present and the amount of time/space they allocate for particular 
issues, affects the audience’s views about what is important – framing emphasizes 
the influence of the media’s presentation of an issue in a particular way on the 
audience’s opinion about it. In their experimental study, Sniderman & Theriault 
(2004) found that individuals’ support for government spending for the poor varied 
according to how that spending was framed. They discovered that when government 
spending for the poor was framed as enhancing the chance of the poor to advance, 
individuals tended to support increased spending. However, when government 
spending for the poor was framed as increases in taxes, individuals tended to oppose 
it.  
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It is also important to note that framing differs from persuasion, though in 
practice it may become very difficult to differentiate the two from each other. 
Framing influences the range of considerations the audience takes into account 
when forming opinions. It is information weighting that aims to alter the importance 
an audience attaches to different information about an issue. Thus, framing effects 
can be seen as a change in belief importance (Druckman, 2001, p. 1044). 
Persuasion, on the other hand, aims to bring about a change in the belief content of 
an audience. In other words, the source of information attempts to convince the 
audience by “replacing or supplementing favorable thoughts with unfavorable ones” 
(Nelson and Oxley 1999, 1041). It is assumed that, in persuasion, information 
provided by the source is new to the audience; it has not been part of audience’s 
existing constructed knowledge base. In framing, however, it is assumed that it is 
not a process of providing new information but rather activating the information 
that is already at the audience’s disposal (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997, 225).  
 
 
3.2. Different Media Systems 
 
In their study Four Theories of the Press (1963), Siebert, Peterson, and 
Schramm ask why different press systems appear in different countries around the 
world. They see a close relationship between the press and the social and political 
structures within which the press operates. They argue that the press evolved within 
these social and political structures, and thus reflect the control mechanisms of 
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these structures that shape the relationships among institutions and individuals 
(1963, pp. 1–2). Considering the social and political structures, Siebert et al. 
introduced four types of press systems: the authoritarian model, the libertarian 
model, the social responsibility model, and the Soviet communist model. 
The authoritarian model is the oldest press system, which functioned in 
authoritarian political regimes during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In 
these regimes, the press was seen as a servant of the ruling power (the king, 
emperor, pope, etc.). It was seen as a tool to inform people about issues that the 
ruling power thought people should know about. While there could be private 
ownership of the press, this did not mean that they were outside of the control of the 
ruler. All newspapers, regardless of who owned them, were subject to the close 
control of the ruling power. Obviously, the press functioning in these societies did 
not have a watchdog function over the ruling power. 
Siebert et al. argue that a new type of the press, the libertarian model, started 
to emerge in the eighteenth century when the development of political democracy, 
religious freedom, laissez-faire economics, and the expansion of free trade and 
travel began to undermine authoritarian regimes and societies. The press was no 
longer seen as a tool in the hands of the ruling power to be used for its own 
interests. Instead, the press was now freed from such control. It became a free 
market place in which different views and arguments were presented. The press 
served people in their search for truth, influencing their choices and forming their 
opinions. This type of press also served as a watchdog that served as a check on 
governments. According to Siebert et al., the presses functioning in the United 
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States and United Kingdom for approximately the last two hundred years are 
examples of the libertarian model.  
As Mancini (2000, 285) has noted, at the heart of the Anglo-American 
model of journalism lies objectivity. The entire process of news-making from 
information collection, processing, and dissemination is based on the principle of 
neutrality (McQuail 1994, 145; Papathanassopoulos 2001a, 507). According to 
McQuail (1994, 145), objectivity necessitates adopting a position of detachment in 
reporting, attachment to accuracy, lack of partisanship, and avoidance of hidden or 
obvious service to a third party.  
The objectivity in question does not develop independently from the socio-
historical developments of societies (McNair 1998, 64). Thus what is understood 
from objectivity may change from one society to another, since it will reflect a 
particular historical and social reality. Professional journalism, a significant 
characteristic of which is objectivity, is viewed by a large majority of journalists 
around the world as the ideal form of journalism; in reality, however, the actual 
practice of journalism varies from country to country.  
Siebert et al. have labeled the authoritarian and the libertarian models as 
fundamental models, and considered the other two models to be their developments 
or modifications. In this sense, the social responsibility model of the press is a 
modification of the libertarian model and the Soviet communist model is the 
development of the authoritarian model. The social responsibility model delineates 
for the press the same functions that the libertarian theory envisaged. However, the 
former is a product of twentieth-century political and social developments, as well 
53 
 
as and the communication revolution. Different than the era when libertarian press 
systems were functioning and there was a multiplicity of small media units 
representing different political viewpoints, the ownership of media units in the 
twentieth century became concentrated in the hands of a few powerful people. This 
situation eliminated the press’ characteristic of being free market-place of ideas, 
because it was now the owners and managers of the media units who determined 
what should reach the public. Siebert et al. argue that it was these circumstances 
that led to the development of the social responsibility model. One of the 
outstanding characteristics of social responsibility theory is that the near-monopoly 
conditions it envisages imposes on the media the social responsibility of behaving 
fairly to all sides in their presentation of different ideas. In this way, it would act as 
the fourth estate – as a watchdog – by providing people the necessary information 
they need to make informed choices and form independent preferences. The social 
responsibility model was not simply a demand and expectation created by the 
public; instead, these functions of the press were promoted by media publishers and 
editors themselves who believed that the freedom of press and its privileged 
position in societies concomitantly carries the obligation of being responsible to 
society while also carrying out the functions of mass communication. 
Similar to the social responsibility model, the Soviet communist model also 
came into existence in the twentieth century. Similar to the authoritarian model of 
the press, the Soviet communist theory also saw the press as an instrument of the 
ruling power, i.e., the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. One of the 
differentiating characteristics of the press in the Soviet system was its ownership. 
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While the press was almost entirely privately owned in other authoritarian systems, 
it was state-owned in the Soviet system. This situation eliminated the market-based 
profit motive behind newspaper publishing and competition for high circulation 
rates. In addition, the major mission of the Soviet press was to increase political 
awareness of the people, to promote their support for leaders and the party program 
(Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm 1963, 140–141). According to Siebert et al., one of 
the ways the Soviet system differed from the Anglo-American system is in terms of 
its view of mankind. The Soviet system saw its audiences as needing cautious 
guidance from caretakers, whereas the American system saw its audiences as free, 
rational human beings who were able to make their choices and preferences based 
on differentiating between truth and falsehood (Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm 
1963, 5–6).  
Siebert et al.’s categorization of press systems formed a starting point for 
other scholars to explain the existence of different media systems in various 
countries. Hallin and Mancini (2004, 8–9) criticized Siebert et al. for adopting a 
normative approach toward press systems. That is to say, they considered the 
libertarian theory of the press as the ideal type and evaluated other systems in 
comparison to that theory. Moreover, they emphasized that Siebert et al. considered 
the press as a dependent variable that reflected a system of social control. In recent 
studies, the tendency has been to treat the press less as reflective of social structures 
and more in terms of their effects on them (Daniel C. Hallin and Mancini 2004, 8–
9). 
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Similar to Siebert et al., Hallin and Mancini (2004), also ask why media 
systems vary across different countries. They too argue that the media systems of 
various countries are linked structurally and historically to the development of their 
economic, political, and social, systems. However, Hallin and Mancini limited their 
research to media systems in European and Northern American countries. They 
argued that Four Theories of the Press was inadequate to understand the European 
experience because the press systems in European countries were in some ways 
combinations of the libertarian, authoritarian, and social responsibility models 
(Hallin and Mancini 2004, 10). They introduced three models to classify the media 
systems in Western and Central European as well as Northern American countries: 
the liberal (North Atlantic) model, the democratic corporatist (Northern and Central 
European) model, and the polarized pluralist (Mediterranean) model.2 
Hallin and Mancini considered the media systems functioning in the United 
States, Britain, Ireland, and Canada as the liberal models of the media.3 
Accordingly, these countries experienced the early development of press freedom 
                                                          
2
 Hallin and Mancini introduced these models as a result of comparing media systems in Western 
European and Northern American countries according to the four dimensions of media system 
characteristics and five dimensions of political system characteristics they determined. The four 
dimensions of media system characteristics are: The development of a media market (development 
of strong or weak mass circulation press), political parallelism (the links between the media and 
political parties and the extent to which the media system reflects the major political division in the 
society), development of journalistic professionalism, and the role of the state in the media system. 
Political system characteristics considered in the study are: Development of political history 
(patterns of conflict and consensus, e.g. early or late democratization, polarized or moderate 
pluralism), existence of a consensus or majoritarian government, development of individual or 
organized pluralism (e.g. individualized representation like in the United States, organized pluralism, 
weak or strong political parties), role of the state in the economy, and development of a rational legal 
authority or clientelistic relationships). For more information about these dimensions, see Hallin and 
Mancini, 2004, pp. 22-65.  
3
 Hallin and Mancini explained how these three models of the press were related to each other with a 
triangular schema. While each edge represented one press model, the countries were placed within 
this triangular schema according to their closeness to the three models. The triangular method of 
presentation is helpful to see that not all countries considered under the same model have the same 
distances to the edges of triangle; media systems in countries, even if categorized under the same 
model, did not completely resemble each other.  
56 
 
and enjoy a high mass circulation of newspapers. Neutral commercial newspapers 
dominate the market and there is strong journalism professionalism, which reveals 
itself as information-oriented journalism. Journalists’ autonomy is more likely to be 
limited by commercial and market pressures rather than political manipulation or 
state control. There is low political parallelism between newspapers and existing 
major political groups in society. Instead, there is internal pluralism in media 
institutions, meaning that these organizations maintain their neutrality either by 
avoiding institutional ties to political groups or by balancing their content by 
allocating equivalent space to the views and news of different groups.    
Hallin and Mancini considered the media systems functioning in Greece, 
Spain, Portugal, Italy, and France as cases of the polarized pluralist model. In these 
countries, freedom of the press and the commercial media developed relatively late. 
Mass circulations of newspapers are low and there is high political parallelism 
between media institutions and political groups in society. Therefore, there is 
manipulation of the media institutions by the government and political parties. 
Clientelistic relations in political and social relations influence the media system. 
Commentary-oriented or advocacy journalism is prevalent rather than neutral 
commercial journalism. The development of the professionalization of journalism 
has been weak, journalism in these countries not being strictly differentiated from 
political activism. The state plays an important role in the media system as an 
owner –for many years, radio and television were state-owned in these countries–
regulator, and also as a funder.   
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Hallin and Mancini consider the media systems functioning in Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and 
Switzerland to fit the democratic corporatist model. They argue that in these 
countries there was a synchronous development of characteristics of the liberal and 
polarized pluralist models, a situation which set their media systems apart from the 
ones considered under both of those models. Like the liberal model, these countries 
experienced an early development of the newspaper industry and press freedom. 
They are characterized with a higher level of mass circulation when compared to 
the mass circulation rates in countries classified under the liberal and Mediterranean 
models. Influential party newspapers coexisted with the commercial press during 
most of the twentieth century, while the neutral commercial press was the rising 
trend. Political parallelism was historically high but has been diminishing. While 
professionalization of journalism is high and there has been a shift towards 
information-oriented neutral journalism, commentary-based journalism still exists.  
With regards to the role of the state in media system, a strong welfare tradition 
brings the state in. State interventions in the media of these countries take place 
through regulations and the provision of subsidies.  
As already stated, the media system in Greece is included in the study of 
Hallin and Mancini and defined as a case of the polarized pluralist model. With 
regards to the media system in Turkey,  Mine G. Bek (2011, p. 173) argues that it 
resembles the South European and Latin American media systems. Like Bek, 
Stylianos Papathanassopoulos (Interview, Athens, 12.01.2013) and others (Kaya 
and Çakmur 2010; Özcan 2007) also argue that the media system in Turkey shows 
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similarities with the Mediterranean countries and that it too may be categorized 
under the polarized pluralist model.  
 According to Hiebert, Ungurait, and Bohn (1982, 40–43),  the press (and the 
media in general) in any country do not develop independent from political, social, 
and economic conditions; population; and cultural traits of that country. As a result, 
they develop different characteristics influenced by the interplay of multiple factors. 
From this perspective, the next two sections take up development of newspapers 
and journalism in Greece and Turkey and their place in political communication in 
both countries.  
 
 
3.3. Greek Newspapers and Political Communication 
 
Since the first appearance of newspapers, the print press has been an 
important medium of expression of opinion in Greece. Its history dates back to the 
nineteenth century, to the years of struggle for independence from the Ottoman 
Empire. The first papers were published by rival individuals and competing 
organizations to promote their causes (McDonald 1983, 15). The development of 
political parties in Greece in the late-nineteenth century affected the development of 
the modern press. Newspapers became an important medium of communication for 
political parties to reach wider groups. Each party had its own paper and the party 
leader was often the editor of party’s newspaper (McDonald 1983, 15). A gradual 
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separation of political parties and newspapers had occurred by this time. However, 
the press’ division along party lines continued under the heavy influence of the 
political schism that split the country into two camps as republicans and royalists. 
The situation started to change in the 1980s when partisan journalism started to 
decline as more market-oriented newspapers have come to dominate the market, 
privatization was introduced in television and radio, and ownership of the press was 
transferred from journalist families to entrepreneurs and ship owners.4 
Advocacy journalism developed and remained dominant in practice in 
Greece for decades. In advocacy journalism, the news-making process is dominated 
by interpretation and value attribution. Newspapers represent distinct political 
tendencies and their journalism tends to emphasize opinion and commentary (D. C. 
Hallin and Papathanassopoulos 2002, 177). Political affiliations of Greek 
newspapers are good predictors of their interpretation of political issues 
(Papathanassopoulos 2001b, 118); the same event could easily be presented with 
entirely different narratives in newspapers that supported different political parties.   
The partisanship of Greek newspapers was reflected in different ways. The 
major opinion article was generally written either by the owner of the newspaper or 
the editor-in-chief, and was published on the first page of the newspaper. This 
article presented an evaluation of the daily political developments in line with the 
political tendency of the paper. These political leaning were not only evident in the 
                                                          
4
 However, research shows that commentary journalism was still the dominant type of journalism in 
practice, despite many journalists citing professional journalism as the ideal type 
(Papathanassopoulos 2001a; Tılıç 1998) . 
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editorial, in other columns as well. Further, the headlines, narratives, pictures, and 
illustrations all reflected the political inclination of the newspaper.  
In this regard, the dominance of advocacy journalism in practice will 
become clearer with an example relevant to this study that is drawn from the 
presentation of the same event in different newspapers on the same day. A few 
weeks before the military’s takeover on 21 April 1967, the King asked Panagiotis 
Kanellopoulos, the leader of the conservative party ERE (National Radical Union) 
to form a new government. This happened after the caretaker government resigned 
when the coalition in the parliament collapsed during the voting to lift the 
parliamentary immunity of Andreas Papandreou. This lifting would have enabled 
charging him for the Aspida affair, which erupted surrounding allegations of the 
existence of a left-wing secret group in the army led by George Papandreou’s son 
Andreas Papandreou (Athenian 1972, 59). The conservative and pro-royalist 
newspaper Akropolis set aside the entire front page to the establishment of the new 
government. The news about the new cabinet was supplemented with a photograph 
of its members. The unsigned column that appeared on the front page also evaluated 
the new government, criticizing George Papandreou and the EK (Center Union) and 
explaining why the King asked the second party of the parliament – the ERE, the 
first one was the EK – to form the government. The column defined the members of 
the ERE as not only politicians but also statesmen with high political morals and 
democratic consciousness, and argued that the new period would be one of political 
evenness (Akropolis, 4.04.1967). 
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To Vima, a center-left, pro-Papandreou paper that belonged to the Lambrakis 
family informed its readers about the new government with a completely different 
story. It presented the establishment of the government by the ERE with the 
headline of “the ministers of the King.” The news about the new cabinet consisted 
of a two columns, taking up half a page. The King was stated in the columns’ 
narrative to be acting like a party leader by appointing the leader of the second party 
in parliament to form the government. No pictures of the members of the new 
cabinet were printed, but an image of George Papandreou was quite in large size, 
drawing the attention to his criticism of the situation. The unsigned column 
published on the front page defined the establishment of an ERE government as a 
coup by the King and the right-wing against the popular will (To Vima, 
04.04.1967).  
Research based on interviews conducted with Greek journalists and 
newspaper editors generated interesting insight regarding journalists’ views about 
objectivity (neutrality) and journalistic professionalism. First, Greek journalists 
believe in theory that journalism should be neutral, objective, and independent from 
political, social, and economic influences so that it can perform its watchdog 
function. However, in practice their methods of performing journalism diverge from 
these ideals (Papathanassopoulos 2001a, 513). Papathanassopoulos (2001a, 513) 
argues that, like many journalists in various countries, Greek journalists did not 
have a clear and a common definition of neutral journalism and a clear 
understanding of the notion of objectivity. According to Papathanassopoulos 
(2001a, 513), many Greek journalists believe objectivity in journalism to be closely 
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linked to freedom of expression and accountability in news reporting, rather than 
factuality.  
Tılıç, too, (1998, 176) states that objectivity in journalism seem to be an 
abstract concept that is not reflected in the practice of journalism in Greece. He 
highlights that Greek journalists were critical of the feasibility of achieving 
objectivity in practice. A senior Greek reporter whom Tılıç interviewed refuted the 
concept of objectivity in journalism. S/he argued that the journalist may come close 
to being objective by openly expressing his/her subjectivity and stance toward issue. 
The reporter argued that the important thing in journalism was to write the facts as 
they are and not to bring them together in a way to support the journalist’s own 
views (Tılıç 1998, 176–177). Another Greek reporter stated that it was difficult for 
the journalist to be neutral or objective, particularly because of the relationship 
between the source of information and the fact itself, and difficulties in information 
gathering. S/he argued that different sources of information may generate a different 
story. The reporter elaborated that it would not be possible for the journalist to 
check each source and that there is no measure to decide on which one to trust (Tılıç 
1998, 176–177).  
Researchers view the non-existence of objectivity in journalism in Greece as 
closely related to the weak development of a separate journalistic profession. As 
stated, newspapers appeared and developed as important tools of communication 
and propaganda in the hands of political actors. This meant that the mass media in 
Greece have been supply-driven rather than consumer-demanded; since the early 
times of the modern state, there have always been more newspapers, television 
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channels, and radio stations than such a small country can support 
(Papathanassopoulos 2001b, 113). In 1979, the population of Greece was less than 
ten million, while three and a half million of the population was living in the Athens 
metropolitan area. The same year, the total number of newspapers published daily 
was 120, while there were almost 900 non-daily newspapers. The Athens 
metropolitan newspapers were comprised of40 dailies and approximately 600 non-
dailies (Paraschos 1983, 338).  
One of the main characteristics of journalism in Greece that negatively 
affected the development of journalistic professionalism is the late establishment of 
media schools; they were established at the university level only in 1991. This 
meant that, up until that point, journalists in Greece did not have formal education 
about and training in journalism, unless they obtained it abroad. After 1991, private 
schools of journalism began to appear. However, this situation did not produce a 
consensus among journalists about the necessity of having formal education to 
become a journalist. Instead, during the 1990s and 2000s, many Greek journalists 
still thought that journalism was a profession that was closely related with the 
personality of individuals, and that it was learnt on the job rather than at school 
(Tılıç 1998, 120–124). 
It would be a shortcoming of this discussion if the influence of clientelistic 
relations on journalism in Greece is not mentioned. In fact, extreme politicization of 
the press on the one hand increased the press’ vulnerability to clientelistic 
relationships and, on the other hand, negatively affected the development of a 
separate journalism profession. In this regard, Papatheodorou and Machin (2003, 
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35) describe newspapers as political enterprises rather than economic ones. They 
point out that the national newspapers were published by the powerful families of 
Greece who had close ties with political parties and a long tradition in publishing as 
their major activity (Papatheodorou and Machin 2003, 35).  
Hallin and Papathanassopoulos argued that the situation did not change after 
the newspapers’ ownerships were transferred from journalist families to 
industrialists with interests in the shipping, travel, construction, telecommunication, 
and oil industries (D. C. Hallin and Papathanassopoulos 2002, 178). Patron-client 
relationships continued to rule the media in Greece. 
 
 
3.4.  Turkish Newspapers and Political Communication 
 
The history of newspaper printing in Turkey dates back to nineteenth century. 
The first Turkish newspapers, Takvim-i Vekayi (Calendar of Events) was published 
in 1831, which in fact happened long after the French started publishing the Gazette 
Française de Constantiople in 1797 (Karpat 1964, 257). Like other reforms and 
progressive steps taken within the Ottoman Empire, the first Turkish newspapers 
were published as a result of the state’s initiative (Gürkan 1997, 26).  Thus, 
Takvim-i Vekayi was published by the Ottoman state authorities as a result of Sultan 
Mahmut II's request, which was based on his view that publishing a newspaper was 
necessary to inform Ottoman society about particular issues (Altun 2006, 22). It was 
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in fact like an official bulletin rather than a newspaper in the modern sense; it 
included the information about issues such as trade and domestic affairs that the 
Ottoman sultan wanted the people of the Empire to know about. The newspaper was 
succeeded by Ceride-i Resmiye (Official Newspaper), which began to be published 
by the Ankara government in 1920 and was renamed as Resmi Gazete (Official 
Gazette) in 1927.5 
 The real beginning of newspaper publishing and journalism in the Ottoman 
Empire is commonly said to commence with the publication of Tercüman-ı Ahval 
(Interpreter of Events) in 1860. The paper was published by Agah Efendi without 
any financial support from the government, and represented the first case of 
advocacy journalism. Unlike the previous two papers, Tercüman-ı Ahval aimed “to 
express opinion and educate the citizenry” (Karpat 1964, 258). Both Agah Efendi 
and İbraim Şinasi, who played a significant role in the publication of the newspaper, 
were among the Young Ottomans. Members of this group saw the salvation of the 
Empire in the establishment of a constitutional monarchy that would limit the 
absolute rule of the Sultan (Şapolyo 1971, 115–117). Şinasi started to publish his 
own paper in 1862, Tasvir-i Efkar (Mirror of Opinion). Like Tercüman-ı Ahval, it 
also represented a case of advocacy journalism. Some other Young Ottomans 
followed in the tradition started by Agah Efendi and Şinasi, publishing newspapers 
in which they interpreted current events and advocated the proclamation of a 
constitutional monarchy. However, journalists in the Ottoman Empire did not 
                                                          
5
 The second Turkish paper, Ceride-i Havadis, began to be published in 1840 by William Churchill. 
Although it was a commercial enterprise, it was financially supported by the Ottoman government. It 
reached a small readership since it mainly provided translations, news, and discussions of the 
Western parliamentary system (Karpat 1964, 258).  
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always perform their profession in a free atmosphere. During the despotic rule of 
Abdülhamid II (1878-1908), the press was censored and the freedom of speech of 
journalists was suspended. Most leading journalists escaped arrest and went to 
Europe, where they continued publishing newspapers. After the proclamation of a 
constitutional monarchy for the second time in 1908, they were able to return to the 
Ottoman Empire and continued their work.  
 Journalists of the nineteenth century were predominantly Young Ottomans. 
As leading thinkers, they assigned to themselves a particular role: the creation of 
public opinion that would reflect public morality. Namık Kemal, a leading Young 
Ottoman thinker, novelist, and journalist, defined public morality as an aggregation 
of feelings for liberty, justice, and patriotism – the last of which was defined as 
one’s loyalty to the fatherland instead of the sultan, his ministers, or the Islamic 
community (Heper and Demirel 1996, 109). In the creation of such public opinion, 
journalists viewed themselves as “didactic intermediaries” between an idealized 
West and “a backward society” that accordingly needed reform (Groc 1994, 200; 
Heper and Demirel 1996, 109). This self-assigned role of both journalists and 
newspapers in educating people and forming public opinion continued during the 
War of Independence and early years of the Republican regime. However, 
newspapers were not always monotonic: opposition newspapers were published but 
advocacy journalism did not change.  
 During the War of Independence (1919-1922), the press was divided into 
two groups. There were newspapers that supported the War of Independence and 
those which were against, the latter of which were mostly the Istanbul papers. The 
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newspapers in support of the War of Independence became fundamental tools for 
propaganda and information sharing to create a national, united spirit (Altun 2006, 
30). Accepting the newspapers’ role of educating and informing the people, 
Mustafa Kemal established another newspaper, Hakimiyet-i Milliye, to spread the 
ideas of the Association for the Defense of the National Rights Groups (Müdafaa-i 
Hukuk Cemiyetleri). Hakimiyet-i Milliye, which was renamed as Ulus in 1934, 
became an important tool at the disposal of the government during the War of 
Independence, and later in the introduction and dissemination of republican reforms 
(Şapolyo 1971, 197).  
During the single-party years, the press continued to fulfill its role of 
educating the people and popularizing the republican reforms. A large majority of 
journalists who had witnessed the establishment of the new Republic ardently 
supported it (Özcan 2007). Cumhuriyet, which was established in 1924, and Ulus 
were the leading papers of the period that ardently defended republican ideology 
and reforms. Not unexpectedly, the press’ positive role in the dissemination of 
republican reforms was not only a self-assigned responsibility; but it was also one 
that was more than welcomed by the political leaders of the time including Atatürk 
and İsmet İnönü. Both Atatürk and İnönü, at least for the long term, acknowledged 
the importance of having a free press for the development of the country. But their 
emphasis was mostly on the mission of the press to consolidate republican reforms 
rather than on press freedom. In this regard, Atatürk stated in several speeches that 
the press should act to enlighten people and guide them; journalists should be 
careful about what they write, keeping in mind the high interests of the state and the 
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nation. He also emphasized that they had the mission of contributing to the progress 
of Turkey (Gürkan 1997, 75).  
Although the press that had ardently supported the republican reforms 
dominated the press market, it did not mean that there was no opposition press. The 
Istanbul press of the time, as opposed to the Ankara press, continued to criticize the 
republican reforms, particularly the abolition of the Caliphate (Demir 2012, 126). 
The opposition press supported the short-lived Progressive Republican Party (1924) 
and then Free Republican Party (1930) against the Republican People’s Party 
(CHP). The opposition press, however, was seriously weakened by introduction of 
various laws that forbade any activities in conflict with “state interests” and 
“common good of the people.” For instance, the Law for the Maintenance of Order, 
which was introduced in 1925 after the Şeyh Sait Rebellion, enabled the 
government to close six newspapers that were considered to have supported the 
rebellion (Gürkan 1997, 43). The control of the government over the press 
continued during the Second World War with the aim of preventing the publication 
of materials that could damage Turkey’s non-belligerence policy of these years. 
However, it did not prevent the opposition press from acting as supporters of the 
Allied powers and those that supported closer relations with Germany (Gürkan 
1997, 51). 
The transition to a multi-party system in 1945 with the establishment of the 
Democratic Party (DP) also marked the beginning of a new period for the 
newspapers. Advocacy journalism continued to split the newspapers into those that 
supported the DP government and others that followed a critical approach toward 
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DP policies. An interesting point regarding advocacy journalism and their readers 
was that the reader did not want to see newspapers’ associations with a particular 
party; when they did, the circulation of those papers dropped immediately (Karpat 
1964, 280). For instance, Vatan was one of the newspapers that mainly supported 
the DP. Its circulation reached high numbers when the DP was in opposition during 
the 1946-1950 period. The newspaper lost readers when Ahmet Emin Yalman, the 
publisher and editor-in-chief, continued to support the DP after it came to power. 
Vatan regained its readers after 1954, when the newspaper started to criticize the 
DP government because of the restrictions it introduced over press freedoms and 
associations (Karpat 1964, 280).Taking a critical approach towards the DP 
government, Yalman described the forthcoming elections of 1957 as a national 
struggle for freedom and modernization. Exaggerating the situation, he likened the 
importance of the elections to the Gallipoli Battle War in 1915 and the War of 
Independence (Karpat 1961, 440). 
 While advocacy journalism continued, a new type of press also appeared 
with the establishment of Hürriyet and Milliyet, in 1948 and 1950, respectively. 
These newspapers are defined as a new kind of commercial press that had the sole 
aim of making money rather than serving a particular political cause (Kaya and 
Çakmur 2010, 524). They targeted a wider readership base in order to obtain high 
circulation rates. As a result, their content, printing style, and marketing policies 
were all formed to draw the attention of the average reader (Altun 2006, 80). They 
are defined as neutral papers that aspired to represent the general public (Şapolyo 
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1971, 242). In addition, they held sympathy towards business individuals and 
groups rather than the intelligentsia.  
The dominance of advocacy journalism in Turkey prevented the 
development of the Anglo-American type of journalism until recent years. This 
latter form, which demands objectivity in the practice of journalism, has been 
weakly developed in Turkey under the influence of close relationships between 
politicians and newspaper owners, as well as the legal and illegal (informal) 
restrictions over the press. The particular way in which the press and journalism 
developed in Turkey also influenced how Turkish journalists view their profession. 
When journalists were asked to define their profession, most of them made a 
distinction between the ideal-type of journalism they had in mind and the 
journalism in Turkey. Most of the journalists emphasized the social responsibility of 
journalists. They noted that the journalist’s mission was to guide society, inform 
and educate the people, and contribute to the ongoing transformation of society. 
They had to do all this by adopting a critical approach to the course of events (Tılıç 
1998, 101–109). These journalists were skeptical about being neutral conveyors in 
political communication. One of them, the chief editor of a news agency and of a 
newspaper, stated that practicing journalism as a neutral conveyor of a message 
would not differentiate journalism from the press office of a governmental ministry 
(Tılıç 1998, 103). On a different note, a large majority of the journalists who were 
interviewed by Mine Gencel Bek, professor of journalism at Ankara University, 
questioned the possibility of objectivity in journalism. They argued that, like other 
people and many other things, journalists, the news, and their production processes 
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were under the influence of economic, political, and social systems (Bek 2011, 
172). According to a journalist of Hürriyet, evaluations always exist in the news; 
the selection of the words, questions asked, even the decision of what is news and 
what is not all reflect the views of the journalist and his/her institution (Bek 2011, 
172). 
 The relatively early emergence of media schools in Turkey did not help the 
flourishing of the journalistic professionalism. The first instruction in journalism at 
the university level was established at Istanbul University in 1950. It was followed 
by Ankara University, which introduced education in the field of communication in 
1965. Despite their decades-long existence and the opening of journalism 
departments in various universities and, in later years, in private institutions, a 
majority of the journalists interviewed by Bek thought that university education did 
not prepare students for practicing the profession. They argued that the curricula of 
the journalism departments did not prepare the students for the journalistic 
profession in Turkey (Tılıç 1998, 123), seeing a large gap between teaching and 
practice. For this reason, there was no major difference in practice between 
journalists who had formal education and those who learned the profession in 
practice (Tılıç 1998, 123). 
 Finally, the journalist-columnist (non-)differentiation is also important to be 
considered, both for their place in political communication and for this study. There 
is not a separate literature that particularly focuses on newspaper columnists in 
order to understand their role in the political communication of various countries. 
However, columnists who represent cases of advocacy journalism have a particular 
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role in the transmitting of messages, shaping of public opinion, and informing 
people not only about facts but also how to interpret them. Regarding the Turkish 
case, Andrew Finkel, who has worked in Turkey for many years as a columnist and 
journalist in different newspapers, has made a distinction between being a columnist 
and a journalist in Turkey. He states the main difference between the two as the 
former’s rare subjection to editing by the chief editor. Columnists make a name for 
themselves with their commentaries and aim to sustain their reputation. According 
to Finkel, in Turkey commentary, rather than reporting, has far more prestige and 
status in the press and other circles (Finkel 2000, 155).  
 In conclusion, this chapter first aimed to develop a theoretical framework of 
how the media create meanings through various ways of manipulating information. 
In assembling this framework, agenda setting, priming, and framing effects have 
been discussed. The following chapters will analyze Greek and Turkish columnists’ 
evaluations of the military takeovers in their countries and the subsequent military 
interregna through the lens of this framework.  Secondly, this chapter discussed 
classifications of media systems that vary across countries.  In terms of these 
classifications, this chapter demonstrated that media systems in Greece and Turkey 
are best explained through the polarized plural model (Mediterranean model). In 
this regard, the two countries shared important similarities in the development of 
journalistic profession and the place of newspapers in political communications in 
both countries.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
THE 21 APRIL 1967 TAKEOVER IN GREECE AND 
 GREEK COLUMNISTS  
 
 
 
This chapter aims to conduct a thorough analysis of the daily columns of 
Akropolis and Eleftheros Kosmos in terms of how columnists writing in these 
dailies evaluated the 21 April 1967 takeover. As explained in Chapter One, Ta Nea 
had initially been selected as the third Greek newspaper to be considered in this 
dissertation, in addition to Akropolis and Eleftheros Kosmos. However, due to the 
termination of the columns’ publication after the junta’s takeover, Ta Nea could not 
be included in this chapter. Nevertheless, its situation provided important insights 
for various ways of displaying the opposition to the takeover and the military’s rule.  
Before analyzing columnists’ views about the takeover and the junta 
administration, a short analysis of the period from the Second World War to the 
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junta’s takeover on 21 April was deemed to be necessary in understanding the 
conditions under which Greek colonels took over the government, and the reasons 
those examining the topic have highlighted as being behind the intervention. After 
this discussion, the junta’s control over the press, which formed the framework for 
what columnists could write about, is elucidated. The evaluations of columnists are 
analyzed in three subcategories that were seen to be important in understanding the 
way columnists viewed the takeover and their expectations from it.  
 
 
4.1.  Historical Background of the 1967 Takeover  
 
The Second World War marked the beginning of a new era in Greece. 
During the war, Greece was occupied by German, Italian, and Bulgarian forces; the 
legitimate government and the King were in exile; the resistance to occupation was 
organized by guerilla forces led by communist leaders; and the regular armed forces 
was divided between the officers who left the country and those who stayed and 
joined the resistance movement. Liberation of the country from occupation started a 
new armed conflict – i.e., the Greek Civil War, this time between Greek 
communists and anti-communists – for the post-war political order. The Civil War, 
lasting from 1946 to 1949, was the most disastrous and the bloody armed conflict 
Greece had experienced. Fighting was terminated with the victory of the anti-
communist forces, which had obtained US assistance in its own fight against the 
spread of communism.  
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 The schism in Greek politics between monarchist and Venizelists continued 
after the Civil War, assuming a new dimension under Cold War conditions. While 
the polarization between monarchist-conservatives and republicans continued, 
communists, although they were militarily defeated in the Civil War and their party 
was outlawed, became an important actor in the political arena through the EDA 
toward the end of the 1950s.  
 Thanks to the single-member district electoral system, which was introduced 
in 1952 with US pressure to replace the proportional representation system, the 
conservative political parties controlled the government during the 1952-1963 
period (Legg and Roberts 1997, 45–46). First the Greek Rally (Ellinikos 
Synagermos –ES), established by former Marshal Alexandros Papagos, and then the 
National Radical Union (ERE) formed governments during the period. The ERE 
was in fact are named version of the Greek Rally under the leadership of 
Constantine Karamanlis, who replaced Papagos after his death in 1955. The 
composition of the parliament started to change with the elections in 1958, 
challenging the palace and the right-wing. The EDA emerged from the elections as 
the second party by gaining 24 percent of the popular vote. It became the main 
opposition party in the 300 seated-parliament with 79 seats.  
The parliament’s make-up continued to change in the 1961 elections to 
ERE’s disadvantage, even though the party increased its votes by 9 percent and 
seats in parliament from 171 to 176. This was the case because the elections made 
the newly established Center Union (Enosis Kentrou– EK) the main opposition 
party with 100 seats in parliament. EK was formed by George Papandreou, who had 
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been a strong supporter of Venizelos since the First World War. The 1963 elections 
were the preview of Papandreou’s coming victory in 1964. In this election, none of 
the parties could attain a majority; the new government was formed by the EK and 
supported by the EDA, which had come in third in the elections. Not pleased with 
the fact that he depended on communist votes to sustain the government, 
Papandreou resigned from the premiership (Woodhouse 1991, 285).  The ERE, 
which was led by Panagiotis Kanellopoulos after Karamanlis resigned from the 
leadership, failed to form a government. King Paul then dissolved the parliament, 
appointing a caretaker government until new elections would be held.  
The 1964 elections marked the beginning of a new period in Greek politics. 
Gaining both the majority of the popular vote and the majority of parliamentary 
seats, Papandreou’s EK came to power and thus ended the decade-long period of 
conservative governments. According to Danopoulos (1992, p. 41), the reason 
behind the success of Papandreou was the support of the rising middle-class and 
workers living in the big cities of Athens and Salonika who demanded greater 
participation in decision-making processes and a more equitable distribution of 
wealth. However, the government entered a new crisis in May 1965, which would 
be ended with the military’s takeover in April 1967.  
The crisis broke out in the wake of rumors circulating about the existence of 
a left-wing secret group, Aspida (Shield), within the army. According to 
Woodhouse(1985, p. 5), this was a group of radically-minded officers, mostly 
majors and captains, who aimed to promote their own careers given the frustrating 
circumstances of the time. However, it was alleged at the time that the group aimed 
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to take over the army, depose the King, and install a dictatorship in Greece (Legg 
1969, 223). More important for Prime Minister Papandreou was the fact that at least 
three ministers in his government including his son, Andreas, were claimed to be 
associated with Aspida. Andreas Papandreou, who had worked in the United States 
for years as an economics professor and then returned to Greece to pursue a 
political career, was a minister in his father’s government. It was alleged that he 
was the secret leader of the group (Woodhouse 1991, 287).  
George Papandreou’s reaction to the allegations was to ask for the 
replacement of the Chief of Defense Staff, General Ioannis Ghennimatas, whom he 
considered as the main person responsible for the negative atmosphere generated by 
the rumors. Papandreou’s demand was met with opposition from Defense Minister 
Petros Garoufalias, who also refused to resign from his position(Athenian 1972, 52–
53). As a result, Papandreou dismissed Garoufalias and sought to assume the post of 
Defense Minister himself. Papandreou’s move increased suspicions on the part of 
right-wingers and conservatives that he was trying to cover up the investigation of 
the Aspida affair. 
The crisis deepened with the active involvement of 23-year-old King 
Constantine II. Constantine had succeeded his father Paul, who had been on the 
throne since 1947 and died just after the EK government was formed in 1964. In a 
step that revitalized the historical schism between royalists and republicans, the 
King approved the dismissal of the Defense Minister but did not appoint 
Papandreou to the post, on the grounds that to do so would be improper when the 
latter’s son was under investigation for the Aspida conspiracy (Woodhouse 1972, 
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12). A period of instability started with the withdrawal of Papandreou from the 
premiership. After two failed attempts, the new government was formed by 
Stephanos Stephanopoulos, who resigned from the EK, with the support of the 
right-wing ERE. This government was short-lived; it fell in December 1966 when 
ERE leader Kanellopolos declined to support to it.  A caretaker government was 
formed under the leadership of Ioannis Paraskevopoulos, who was the governor of 
the National Bank of Greece, and new elections were proclaimed to be held on 28 
May 1967. Before these elections could be held, however, the colonels intervened 
to take power on 21 April 1967.   
Regardless of whether the Aspida rumors arose from reality, at that time 
they strengthened the belief of right-wing and conservative people, including the 
young King himself, that the country was threatened by a formidable conspiracy 
that included hundreds of officers led by the Prime Minister’s son (Athenian 1972, 
52). Along with the Aspida affair, policies of the short-lived EK government 
favoring the left-wing had increased the concerns of the palace and conservative 
officers. The release of some prisoners of the jailed due to communist activities 
during the Civil War, a partial thaw in the frozen relationships with Eastern Bloc 
countries (Clogg 1992, 160), the entrance of an EDA member into the government, 
and rumors that Papandreou accepted an invitation from Moscow (Woodhouse 
1991, 287) were the leading issues that concerned officers as indicators of a 
communist threat.  
As briefly discussed in Chapter 2, secret organizations in the army formed 
under patron-client ties had a long history that dated back to 1909 coup. Indeed, 
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Aspida was not the only secret group in the army. Another well-known secret group 
was IDEA (Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon– Sacred Bond of Greek Officers). 
IDEA was organized soon after the Second World War by officers who, on the one 
hand, had strong loyalty to the King and supported conservative nationalist political 
leaders and, on the other hand, aimed to fight against communism (Zaharopoulos 
1972, 24–25). IDEA fell into inactivity during Karamanlis’ premiership but was 
revitalized after the 1958 elections through Colonel George Papadopoulos, who 
would be the leader of the 1967 junta. As stated above, as a result of the 1958 
elections, the leftist EDA had become the main opposition party in parliament. This 
situation made IDEA officers reconsider communism as a major threat that was still 
alive for Greece (Zaharopoulos 1972, 25).  
The existence of this threat and the possibility of communists’ seizing of 
power after the elections in May 1967 were cited among the main reasons for the 
colonels’ move on 21 April. In interviews conducted with 100 middle- and upper-
ranking army officers in 1968 and 1969, the majority of the officers saw the 
communist threat, political decay, and social decadence of society in general as the 
main reasons behind the takeover (Kourvetaris 1999, 138). Research has also found 
that regardless of whether there was a real threat of a communist takeover or it was 
only the perception of officers and right-wingers, the idea of such a threat formed 
one of the main reasons for the intervention (Woodhouse 1972, 11; Zaharopoulos 
1972, 27–29). In this regard, for instance, the takeover was described by the first 
Prime Minister of the military regime, Constantinos Kollias, as a “counter-
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revolution” intended to prevent a communist revolution, which was considered 
imminent, from taking place (Roufos 1972, 148).  
The military announcement made on the morning of 21 April, however, did 
not include an open reference to a communist threat. It pointed out that an abnormal 
situation had developed after midnight that endangered the internal security of the 
country, and that the army had therefore taken over the government (Vlachos 1970, 
27). The first communiqué of the junta, which was broadcast the same day, did not 
make reference to a communist threat either. The text referred instead to the 
following as reasons for the intervention: Great disagreement between political 
parties, an onslaught against institutions, the moral decline of Greek youth, 
widespread confusion, demagogues, and collaboration with destructive hooligans 
had all disrupted the calm of the country and produced a climate of anarchy and 
chaos, hatred and division (Clogg 1972, 37–38). The communist threat that Greece 
had allegedly faced before 21 April began to be mentioned only several days later. 
Officers published a statement in newspapers on 24 April explaining what had 
prompted the takeover. They stated that large numbers of communists had been 
gathering in Thessaloniki to cause disturbances in conjunction with the opening of 
Papandreou’s electoral campaign (McDonald 1983, 42). Following this statement, a 
propaganda campaign was initiated to demonstrate the severity of the communist 
threat prior to the takeover. Allegations against the Aspida group in the army and its 
relationship with the younger and elder Papandreous were presented to strengthen 
this argument.  
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The timing of the intervention, less than a month before the elections, 
supports the claim that one of the main aims of the colonels was to prevent the elder 
Papandreou from coming to power. According to Zaharopoulos, there was a strong 
suspicion among right-wing politicians and conservative officers that Papandreou’s 
victory would push Greece towards a ‘neutralist’ foreign policy that would threaten 
its relationships with the US and the wider Western bloc (Zaharopoulos 1972, 23). 
Other scholars also draw attention to the colonels’ aim to prevent an election 
victory for Papandreou’s EK, but for corporate reasons rather than foreign policy 
concerns. Sharing this view, Danopoulos (1992, p. 41) stated that during 1950-1963 
period, the parliament acted like a puppet institution, with the palace and the 
military standing behind and holding the strings of the ruling conservative political 
parties of the Greek Rally and the National Radical Union. Legg and Roberts’ also 
supported this argument. They stated that the colonels aimed to prevent 
Papandreou’s victory because it would change the balance of power between extra-
parliamentary institutions, namely the palace and the military, with the parliament 
favoring the latter (Legg and Roberts 1997, 52). The EK government had cut the 
defense budget by ten percent to finance its increased expenditures on social 
services and education (Woodhouse 1991, 285). This situation strengthened the 
perception that the EK’s coming to power would continue to damage the corporate 
interests of the army. 
The possibility of intervention was also being considered by the generals at 
the time the colonels took over. The generals were worried that no matter whether 
the ERE or the EK would win the elections in May, there could be violent 
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disturbances that could lead to a breakdown of public order (Woodhouse 1972, 14). 
Chief of the General Staff Grigorios Spandidakis met with senior generals to 
discuss the possibility of an intervention. The generals agreed that, before 
formalizing the decision to intervene, Spandidakis would ask for the consent of the 
King (Woodhouse 1972, 14). Within twenty-four hours of this meeting, however, 
the colonels had taken over the government. Woodhouse argues that one of the 
generals in the meeting presumably informed Papadopoulos about the decision of 
the meeting (Woodhouse 1972, 14), which, in turn, must have speeded up the 
colonels’ timetable and immediately precipitated their intervention. 
The 21 April takeover, which was in fact an army undertaking while the 
navy and air force played a very limited role, marked the start of the seven-year 
military dictatorship in Greece. From the very beginning there were both strong 
support and opposition to the takeover. The King initially unwillingly cooperated 
with the junta, but later attempted to bring it down on 13 December 1973 in 
cooperation with some army generals. The failure of this attempt forced him to 
leave the country; the King remained in exile for the duration of the junta regime in 
Greece.6 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 In fact, the King could not return to Greece even after the collapse of the junta regime in July 1974.  
Following this collapse, in addition to a transition to multiparty politics, a referendum was held in 
December 1974 on the future of the monarchy. At the polls, the majority of Greek people 
demonstrated their preference for the republican regime. As a result, the monarchy was dissolved.  
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4.2.  The 21 April Administration’s Control over the Press 
 
As explained in Chapter Three, the press in Greece was an important 
medium for expression of political opinion. Before the takeover, the deep-rooted 
cleavage in the political life of the county was also present in the press sector; the 
newspapers were largely divided into two main camps, as pro-Papandreou papers 
supporting the center-left and pro-Karamanlis papers supporting the conservative 
policies of the National Radical Union (Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis – ERE). In 
addition, there were also pro-communist papers that supported the extreme-left 
EDA (Eniea Dimokratiki Aristera –United Democratic Left), which became the 
representative of communists in the political arena after the Communist Part was 
outlawed in 1947. The 21 April takeover terminated this situation with the 
censorship it introduced.  
After taking over the government, the junta immediately imposed martial 
law, suspended key sections of the constitution, and froze all political activity. The 
press was a particular focus of attention for the officers since the first days of their 
rule. They were brought under strict control of the junta and claimed by the military 
to play a particular role within its rule.  
When the colonels seized power on 21 April, one of the first things they did 
was to assert their own control over the media. This in fact did not much bother the 
newly emerging television and radio stations, which had already become state 
mechanisms through governmental interventions aimed at using them as 
instruments of propaganda before the takeover occurred (Stratos 1995, 20). 
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Newspapers, which had acted as an open podium for the expression of different 
political views, were the main target of the officers’ control. On the night of the 
takeover, officers seized the publication houses of newspapers, terminated printing, 
and collected morning copies from the kiosks, which had already been distributed. 
The military administration prohibited publication during the first two days of its 
rule. Newspapers’ publications and circulations began again on 23 April 1967.   
Before the colonels seized power, 14 newspapers were being circulated 
nation-wide in Greece.7 On the third day of the junta’s rule, when publication was 
allowed to restart, nine newspapers appeared at kiosks. Of these, three were 
morning papers –To Vima (Tribune), Akropolis, and Eleftheros Kosmos (Free 
World) –and six were afternoon papers – Apoyevmatini (Afternoon Paper), Ta Nea 
(The News), Vradyni (Evening Paper), Ethnos (Nation), Estia (Hearth) and 
Athinaiki (Athenian). Extreme leftist papers Avgi (Dawn) and Dimokratiki Allaghi 
(Democratic Change) were closed down by the junta in the first hours of its rule. 
Some of their publishers were arrested, while others went underground where they 
started publishing “illegal” papers. The centrist paper Eleftheria (Freedom) stopped 
publication based on the decision of its publisher Panos Kokkas. The center-left 
paper Athinaiki continued to be published until June 1967 by a group of its 
journalists, after its publisher escaped arrest in the first hours of military rule 
(McDonald 1983, 24–25).Two leading conservative, pro-royalist, and pro-
                                                          
7
 These newspapers were Ta Nea (News), Ethnos (Nation), To Vima (Tribune), Akropolis, 
Kathimerini (Daily), Mesimvrini (Noon Paper), Apogeymatini (Afternoon Paper), Vradyni (Evening 
Paper), Athinaiki (Athenian), Avgi (Dawn), Dimokratiki Allaghi (Democratic Change), Eleftheros 
Kosmos (Free World), Estia (Hearth), and Eleftheria (Freedom). 
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Karamanlis papers, Kathimerini (Daily) and Mesimvrini (Noon Paper), stopped 
publication as a result of their owners’ decisions.  
On the morning of 23 April, when newspapers resumed publication, they 
were all four pages in length and identical in content. This was mainly comprised of 
the statement of the new government, the Prime Minister’s message to the country, 
and a list of the new cabinet members (McDonald 1983, 41–42). Newspapers’ 
content was put under censorship review by a designated committee, which was 
transformed into an official Press Control Service (PCS) in the first days of the 
military’s rule. The PCS, headed by an officer, was tasked with the preventive 
control of newspapers’ content including news reports, headlines, pictures, and 
opinion columns (McDonald 1983, 44). As stated in the Mandatory Regulations of 
the government dated 29 April 1967, the PCS’ mission aimed to prevent publication 
of all information, comments, illustrations, and cartoons that would defame the 
general policy of the military administration and constitutional institutions, or harm 
the internal or external security of the country.  
This censorship review process was important in the sense that it 
necessitated the control of a newspaper’s copy before it went to press. All materials 
had to obtain approval from the controller of the PCS order to get published. The 
PCS had the authorization to prevent publication of any materials that were 
considered as violating the instructions of the junta. In the case that some materials 
were prohibited from publication, the regulations forbade leaving blanks in place of 
the banned content. This was seen as a measure that could remind the reader of the 
existence of censorship and indicate that the newspaper had attempted to publish 
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some form of sensitive or critical material. Moreover, blank spaces could easily be 
manipulated by newspapers to display their opposition to the takeover and its 
censorship (Interview 8, Athens, 14.02.2013).  
In addition to restrictions on the materials newspapers could publish, there 
were also some materials that they were required to publish. As stated in the 
Mandatory Regulations of 29 April, newspapers had to publish the speeches of the 
King (while he held office) and statements from the palace; speeches, declarations, 
and communiqués by government members; and photographs distributed by the 
PCS regarding the work of the government.  
During the first days of the military administration, the PCS was given the 
complete texts for some issues. This situation produced content in center-left 
newspapers that completely differed from that published during the pre-21 April 
period. For instance, the PCS provided newspapers with texts about the relationship 
between Aspida, George Papandreou, and his son Andreas Papandreou that included 
the accusation that they had aimed to seize power and establish a communist regime 
(McDonald 1983, 44–45). However, this overt propaganda for the 21 April takeover 
and the subsequent military administration was abandoned in late May 1967,based 
on the idea that it might have had a negative effect on the audience. The PCS then 
started to prepare detailed notes for publication of information about particular 
issues. The notes determined what should be written for particular subjects, but did 
leave a tiny amount of room for interpretation in the news.  
Under the censorship review introduced by the junta, and given the 
perceptions about the role of the press during the military’s rule, the most shocking 
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situation was created by the cessation in publication of conservative newspapers 
Kathimerini and Mesimvrini as a result of the decision of their owner, Helen 
Vlachos. Vlachos was reacting against the censorship review and the mandatory 
publication of texts prepared by the junta (Vlachos 1970, 37). Vlachos’ papers not 
being published actually generated a significant loss of support for the junta, 
because they were both respected conservative papers and together formed the 
strongest center-right standing in the market. For officers, this kind of reaction 
could have been expected from leftist and pro-Papandreou papers but not from 
Vlachos’ publications, which had supported the monarchy and Karamanlis in the 
pre-21 April period and expressed positive views about a military intervention led 
by the generals and consented to by the King (McDonald 1983, 27).  
Not only for the officers but also for the readers of Kathimerini and 
Mesimvrini, the removal of their papers from circulation was an unexpected 
situation. Vlachos let it be known that she was criticized by readers siding with 
colonels against communism, and evaluated the censorship as coming from the 
right-wing direction. They argued that the censorship would not do much harm to 
right-wing papers, and that it was not meaningful not to publish when the center-left 
papers Ta Nea and To Vima maintained publication (Vlachos 1970, 37–40). 
The colonels in fact evaluated the situation as a temporal one that would be 
terminated with Vlachos’ resuming publication of her two papers. In this regard, 
officers including Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos, who was the leader of the 
junta’s takeover and became the Minister of the Presidency for the junta’s rule, and 
Brigadier Stylianos Pattakos, who was appointed as the Minister of Interior, visited 
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Vlachos at her apartment to persuade her to re-initiate publication. According to 
Vlachos, when the issue of censorship was brought up in his visit, Pattakos 
exclaimed (Vlachos 1970, 41): 
Censorship?.. What censorship?.. There is not going to be any 
censorship for you. You are good Greeks. You will be allowed to write 
what you wish. We know that you will write the right things. You will 
not be treated like the others. You will help us, guide us! We will 
create a new Greece together! 
 
None of the officers could persuade Vlachos to resume publication of her 
papers. Vlachos not only refused this request but also become a strong anti-junta 
person, giving interviews to foreign press outlets to call the attention of European 
countries to the situation in Greece. These anti-propaganda efforts of Vlachos lasted 
until 4 October 1967, when she was put under house arrest.8 
Although Ta Nea continued its publication after the colonels took over the 
government, its content and the way news was presented changed completely when 
compared with the pre-21 April period. The main opinion column of the newspaper, 
written by Dimitris Psathas disappeared and no columns evaluating political 
developments were added. Ta Nea continued publication only by giving place to the 
obligatory content as designated by the officers, along with news from other 
countries, and social and cultural news. Because of its pre-21 April stance, Ta Nea 
was controlled by the PCS line by line leaving no room for any evaluation that 
could imply opposition to or criticism of the existing government (Interview 2, 
Athens, 06.02.2013). 
                                                          
8
 Vlachos escaped to London from house arrest and continued her propaganda there against the 
military regime in Greece. Her papers resumed publication in 1974 after transition to multiparty 
politics. 
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While Greek newspapers were under strict control, foreign newspapers did 
not face any restrictions, except the newspapers of Cyprus. Since Cypriot 
newspapers were published in Greek, the junta did not allow their entry to Greece. 
Newspapers published in foreign languages were not banned from entering to 
Greece. However, their arrival was often problematic. Most of the time foreign 
newspapers arrived with delays, only becoming available for sale in Greece several 
days after publication (Interview 12, Athens, 25.02.2013). Journalists working for 
the foreign press were also operating in a safer and freer environment when 
compared to their colleagues working for Greek newspapers. The main reason for 
the junta’s allowance of foreign newspapers and magazines was their view that 
censorship of foreign language publications would do more harm than their 
unrestricted circulation in Greece (Roufos 1972, 155). This was particularly the 
case because only a small number of Greeks could afford to buy them and would 
understand them. Most of these Greeks were highly educated people who did not 
count among the targets the colonels thought could be persuaded with propaganda 
(Roufos 1972, 155).  
Along with the introduction of the censorship review, the military 
administration clearly defined the role it foresaw for the press during its rule. The 
junta viewed the press as an extension of the government that would contribute to 
the “national mission” rather than an independent medium of information and 
communication. In this regard, the mission of the press was to disseminate the 
thoughts of the executive, shape public opinion, monitor state activity, and criticize 
administrative action (McDonald 1983, 31). George Georgalas, the Undersecretary 
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at the Ministry to the Prime Minister detailed the mission envisaged for the press by 
the junta, stating that the press was an integral part of the state’s machinery, an 
instrument for instilling ethics into society (McDonald 1983, 36). He argued that the 
average individual could not make his/her way through the plethora of news 
available, and it was therefore the responsibility of the press to filter the news in a 
way to allow him/her to become a responsible citizen (McDonald 1983, 36–37). 
 The mission set by the junta for the press was approved by some columnists, 
who took up the censorship in this context in their daily columns. For instance, 
Savvas Konstantopoulos, who was the publisher and editor-in-chief of Eleftheros 
Kosmos and one of the strong supporters of the colonels’ takeover, argued that the 
newspapers should be acting to serve the ultimate goals of society (Eleftheros 
Kosmos, 01.06.1967). Although he accepted that the suspension of press freedom 
was an unpleasant situation, he emphasized that the power of the press could be 
destructive when manipulated, and that some precautions were thus needed to 
prevent abuses of the press so that it could serve the national mission (Eleftheros 
Kosmos, 19.07.1967). Nikos Tsiforos, who had a column in Eleftheros Kosmos, was 
the only columnist who displayed criticism of the censorship. Tsiforos stated that 
although censorship could be seen as necessary during the military’s rule, the limits 
of it extended too far. This included, for example, the prohibition of compound 
words that contained prohibited words within them, regardless of whether the 
overall meaning of the compound word was related to the prohibited word’s 
meaning (Eleftheros Kosmos, 10.06.1967). 
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 The censorship review stayed in force until October 1969. There was no 
longer censorship after that date, but the press law was still in effect. This therefore 
commenced a period in which journalists and columnists practiced self-censorship 
to avoid being caught in violating the law. As a result, during the first six months of 
the military’s rule, columnists’ pieces were previewed by the officers before they 
were published. This censorship prevented the existence in newspapers of criticisms 
about the takeover and the junta administration, which thus drew the framework of 
what columnists could write about.  
 
 
4.3.  Representation of the 21 April Takeover in Newspaper Columns 
 
 
4.3.1. Reasons for and Objectives of the Takeover and Expectations for the 
Military Administration  
 
This study’s research on newspaper columns in Greece that were published 
during the first six months of the junta’s rule shows that columnists presented the 
communist threat as the main reason for the colonels’ takeover on 21 April. They 
wrote long passages regarding the pre-coup period to prove that the communist 
threat was real and serious, and that the army had been considered to be the last 
hope the people had to save the country from falling under communist rule. 
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 The Communist Party (KKE –Komunistiko Komma Ellados) had been 
outlawed in Greece after the Civil War, from1946 to 1949, and could function again 
after democracy was restored in 1974. Most of its prominent members, however, 
had left Greece after the war. Those remaining in Greece were either prosecuted and 
jailed, or went underground during the 1950s. The left wing was re-organized in 
1951 under EDA, which became an important actor in Greek politics toward the end 
of the 1950s. EDA was represented in newspaper columns after the military 
takeover as the political organization of communists who could not be organized 
under the Communist Party. Along with EDA, George Papandreou, Andreas 
Papandreou, and EK were evaluated as abettors of the EDA, who wittingly or 
unwittingly collaborated in reaching the party’s aim of seizing power.  
Konstantopoulos explained why colonels took over on 21 April in eight 
bullet-points, four of which were directly related to the perceived communist threat. 
According to Konstantopoulos, communism was not only an external threat to 
Greece but also an internal one. This threat was organized under the EDA, which 
had infiltrated into the state machinery and aimed to bring communist tyranny to 
Greece. EK was seen to be acting like a bridge for the EDA to realize this aim 
(Eleftheros Kosmos, 25.04.1967). In addition to the communist threat, 
Konstantopoulos pointed out that the “ERE did not comprehend the seriousness of 
the situation; political parties and politicians had focused on their own interests, 
ignoring the economic problems of the country; people no longer respected the 
parliament; and there was an ethical crisis in the country that included the press, 
which was not reflecting reality” (Eleftheros Kosmos, 25.04.1967). He argued that 
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the army’s intervention took place when the country was at a critical point. If the 
army had not intervened and that critical line had been crossed over, the 
independence and territorial integrity of Greece and its democracy would have been 
in danger (Eleftheros Kosmos, 04.06.1967). Konstantopoulos also described the 
course of events that would have led to a communist takeover had the army not 
intervened. He stated (Eleftheros Kosmos, 01.08.1967): 
[Ioannis] Paraskevopoulos [Prime Minister of the interim government] 
came to power as a result of a change in government on 22 December 
1966. (…) It was announced that the elections would be held in May 
1967. The nationalist camp was worried about the issue [of elections]. 
The polls in May 1966 showed that the left-wing parties would win the 
elections. The EDA announced that it would support the EK. The 
sustainability of the regime was left to the Communist Party. The 
extreme left had found a way to pursue its own interests. Who would 
have saved [us from] this situation? Of course, the army.9 
 
Ioannis Athanasoulias defined the pre-21 April period as a process 
approaching a deadlock, with communists and center-leftists agitating for a 
revolution (Eleftheros Kosmos, 25.04.1967). He stated that communism in Greece 
had infiltrated into one of the biggest parties and continued its activities under it, 
hiding its true face and real objectives (Eleftheros Kosmos, 17.10.1967). He argued 
that the military would not even think of intervening if communists had not taken a 
central place in politics and dragged the country into a deadlock (Eleftheros 
Kosmos, 19.07.1967). Athanasoulias argued that communism was at the heart of all 
the other problems Greece faced. He stated (Eleftheros Kosmos, 05.05.1967): 
Even if communism did not directly threaten Greece, its existence and 
activities caused problems. They created psychological pressure over 
the society and created fear, led people to pessimism about their 
                                                          
9
 All translations of excerpts from Greek columns belong to the author unless otherwise specified. 
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future, and created hatred among people. [Communists’] support for 
strikes did not support the workers but contributed to creating 
uneasiness in the society, stopped production, and weakened the 
economy. Because of these reasons, [the communist threat] should 
have been suppressed much earlier but political parties could not 
produce efficient policies in order to not end up being anti-democratic. 
Under these circumstances, intervention of the army became a 
necessity; the army did what the parties could not do.     
 
Columnists paid particular attention to the relationships between the EDA, 
the EK, and the Communist Party KKE– which did not officially exist at that time 
due to being outlawed– to strengthen their arguments that Greece faced a real 
communist threat at the time of the takeover. According to Athanasoulias, the 
archives of the EDA, which were publicized after the takeover, showed that by 
holding the aim of spreading communist ideas across Greece, EDA did not have an 
identity that was separate from the KKE; in fact it was the KKE merely organized 
under another appearance (Eleftheros Kosmos, 30.08.1967). The anonymous 
column in Akropolis titled “Lakonika” spared the widest space among all columns 
to mention the relationships between the EDA, the EK, and communism. It referred 
to confessions of parliamentarians, but didn’t explain who these parliamentarians 
were, nor what they confessed. It was expressed in Lakonika that the confessions 
showed that the EDA, which worked to establish a one-party communist system in 
Greece, was like a disguise of the KKE (Akropolis, 30.08.1967). It was indicated in 
the same column that the relationship between the EDA and the EK was not at the 
grassroots level, as argued by the EK’s claim that the same people were voting for 
the EK and the EDA. Rather, this relationship was at the institutional level, which 
was understood with the publicizing of the EDA’s secret documents and archives 
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after the takeover (Akropolis, 12.07.967). The column argued that these secret 
archives demonstrated the EDA’s negotiations with EK ministers, showed how EK 
was used as a step to reach power, and proved that George Papandreou and his son 
Andreas Papandreou were involved in the secret organization of the EDA as leading 
figures for increasing youth support for the party (Akropolis, 17.05.1967; 
16.07.1967).  
Although columnists shared the view that Greece faced a serious communist 
threat in the pre-21 April period, and that the army’s intervention saved the country 
from falling under communist rule, they reflected different views about the strength 
of the communist threat – i.e., whether it was powerful in quantity or in quality. 
According to Konstantopoulos, the Communist Party had infiltrated every aspect of 
life; their members and supporters were everywhere, from state institutions and 
political parties to commercial activities (Eleftheros Kosmos, 27.08.1987). 
Athanasoulias pointed out the numerical data regarding EDA’s members to depict 
how serious the communist threat was before the takeover. He stated that the 
members of EDA totaled around 92 thousand in 1965, and increased to 120 
thousand in 1967 (Eleftheros Kosmos, 28.05.1967). According to Konstantopoulos, 
numerical proof for the power of the Communist Party could be found in the youth 
organization of the EK, which was under the influence of communists (Eleftheros 
Kosmos, 17.09.1967). The column Lakonika argued that the power of the 
communist threat in Greece was more than mathematical calculations, however 
(Akropolis, 17.05.1967). The column accepted that the number of communists in 
Greece was in fact few, but emphasized that this should not be considered as they 
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did not pose any danger to the regime. It argued that communists differed from 
other small groups in terms of their strong internal organization and methods, which 
enabled them to reach their target quickly and confidently (Akropolis, 17.05.1967). 
Columnists did not refer to the worsening economic situation of the country 
as a reason for the military’s intervention. Only Konstantopoulos referred briefly to 
the tough economic situation in the pre-coup period, and even then not as a reason 
for the takeover. He argued that the results of the non-programmatic, ad hoc 
policies of Papandreou government had begun to take effect during the 1966-1967 
period, and that the situation would have become worse had the elections been held 
(Eleftheros Kosmos, 09.08.1967).  
 The objectives of the junta’s rule as expressed by columnists were broader 
than the elimination of the communist threat. In fact they did not make much 
reference to this objective when compared to the space spared for other goals. This 
was mostly because they evaluated the communist threat as having been largely 
eliminated with officers’ takeover on 21 April. According to Athanasoulias, the 
military aimed to restructure political life along with the aim of preventing Greece 
from drifting towards communism again in the future (Eleftheros Kosmos, 
22.07.1967). 
Emphasizing the goals of drafting a new constitution and taking the first 
steps for the restructuring of the state, the column Lakonika also cited the 
elimination of a communist threat and eradication of political and state mechanisms 
that supported communism among the objectives of the junta administration 
(Akropolis, 16.07.1967). The column expressed that the first objective of 
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eliminating the communist threat had already been realized. The second objective, 
namely the eradication of political and state mechanisms that supported 
communism, was about to be completed; the constitution-making and restructuring 
of the state were the objectives the junta administration was working on (Akropolis, 
16.07.1967). Lakonika referred to the junta’s successes within a short time in terms 
of transforming the structure of the state structure to produce efficiently functioning 
institutions. It expressed that the military government had shouldered the 
responsibility of solving the inefficiency and lethargy of state institutions, and that 
the first steps had already been taken by closing down useless working groups in 
different state institutions (Akropolis, 22.07.1967).   
Athanasoulias, too, mentioned the inefficient functioning of state institutions 
due to lacks in control mechanisms and discipline, and that this was targeted by the 
military’s rule. He indicated that the military administration considered this 
situation seriously and was fighting against the snails’ pace of state institutions with 
the aim of modernizing them to prevent any return to old habits (Eleftheros Kosmos, 
14.10.1967).  
Columnists also expressed that the military administration aimed to improve 
the economy. They allocated a large amount of space to report the successes of the 
economic policies of the military administration, which began to be observed in a 
short time. The column Lakonika stated that the ultimate aim of the junta was to 
improve the living standards of Greeks, and it expressed that the realization of this 
objective was important in securing public support for the junta’s rule (Akropolis, 
05.05.1967). Athanasoulias saw the transformation of state institutions as necessary 
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to improve the economy. He stated that transforming backward state institutions 
was a prerequisite for economic development (Eleftheros Kosmos, 09.05.1967) and 
referred to the economic program of the junta as an indication of how seriously the 
government considered economic issues (Eleftheros Kosmos, 25.07.1967).   
The objective of economic improvement came to forefront in columnists’ 
evaluations of the successes achieved by the military administration in the short run. 
According to Athanasoulias, the government immediately took steps to increase 
trade activities and laid the foundations of a long-term program (Eleftheros Kosmos, 
23.09.1967). He emphasized that the trade deficit had begun to narrow and that the 
continuation of increases in exports was closely related to political developments 
(Eleftheros Kosmos, 05.10.1967). Lakonika stressed the improvements in the 
economy as an indication of the junta reaching its objectives, noting that relations 
with the European Economic Community were continuing on good terms 
(Akropolis, 01.08.1967), an increase in foreign investment, and improvements in the 
industry and construction sectors (Akropolis, 20.09.1967) in the economic situation 
of farmers (Akropolis, 17.10.1967).   
The expectations of columnists from the 21 April government stayed in line 
with the objectives they had identified; they, too, included but were not limited to 
the elimination of the communist threat. Konstantopoulos, for example, stated that 
neither the communist party nor its alternative should be tolerated in the new 
regime that was being established (Eleftheros Kosmos, 14.05.1967). He suggested 
that all communist activities be outlawed and communists should not be cooperated 
with on any account (Eleftheros Kosmos, 17.05.1967). Konstantopoulos, however, 
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perceived the takeover as the beginning of broader changes in Greece (Eleftheros 
Kosmos, 03.05.1967). The takeover obliged the military administration to deal with 
economic problems of the country, work for the prosperity of the people 
(Konstantopoulos, Eleftheros Kosmos, 03.05.1967; 20.09.1967), and make a clear-
cut distinction with the pre-21 April period’s actors and organizations if officers 
wanted to be successful (Eleftheros Kosmos, 04.06.1967). Athanasoulias 
emphasized the importance of education for the sustainability of the changes that 
the colonels aimed to bring, noting that fundamental changes should be enacted in 
the education system (Eleftheros Kosmos, 01.06.1967). The column Lakonika 
brought the Greek Church under scrutiny, suggesting that an intervention of the 
government in the Church was necessary if the 21 April revolution was to build a 
new spirit (Akropolis, 11.05.1967). Both officers and conservative columnists 
emphasized religion as an important component of Greek identity. Konstantopoulos 
argued that religion was one of the fundamental points that united Greeks, but that 
Greeks’ religious values had started to weaken after 1961 (Eleftheros Kosmos, 
26.04.1967). This situation of raising a generation of youth that was distanced from 
Orthodox-Christian values was believed to have made them vulnerable to 
communist propaganda. Thus, both for the elimination of the communist threat and 
the building of a new spirit for the Greek nation, regulations were seen as necessary 
for the Church, which was portrayed in columns as having degenerated 
(Athanasoulias, Eleftheros Kosmos, 11.05.1967).The expectations of columnists 
from the 21 April government and the objectives they saw for it become more 
meaningful when we consider the characteristics columnists attributed to the 
takeover and the military regime.  
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4.3.2. Columnists’ Representation of the Characteristics of the 21 April 
Administration 
 
Konstantopoulos defined the colonels’ takeover as a revolution that aimed to 
bring about profound changes in Greece and was not merely limited to the political 
life (Eleftheros Kosmos, 25.04.1967; 03.05.1967; 14.05.1967). He likened the 
intervention to a surgical operation that would help Greece get rid of its wounds and 
sins in order to make significant progress (Eleftheros Kosmos, 03.05.1967). He 
referred to the junta government mostly as a “revolutionary government.” The 
column Lakonika defined the military government mostly as a “national 
government” in discussing its policies and activities. Athanasoulias, on the other 
hand, did not use distinguishing adjectives or descriptions for the military 
government; he referred to it as the “21 April government,” “today’s government,” 
or the “new government.” 
 According to Konstantopoulos, the intervention of the military was seen as 
inevitable by every rational person (Eleftheros Kosmos, 29.09.1967). In his view, 
the intervention did not overthrow a healthy functioning democracy; instead, 
officers prevented a total collapse of the democratic regime through their 
intervention (Eleftheros Kosmos, 01.06.1967). Officers were seen as the last hope of 
the people to save the country from such a collapse (Konstantopoulos, Eleftheros 
Kosmos, 07.06.1967). Konstantopoulos drew attention to the impartiality of the 
intervention, arguing it did not take place to preserve the interests of any particular 
classes or groups. In this regard, he stated that the 1967 takeover differed from 
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previous military interventions in Greece. He mentioned that the military’s 
intervention on 21 April was not to support individual interests of officers or party 
interests (Eleftheros Kosmos, 23.06.1967). For him, the objectives of the leaders of 
the takeover were not personal objectives but the ones that were in the hearts of the 
Greek people (Eleftheros Kosmos, 04.06.1967). He likened the political situation in 
Greece to a condition of gangrene that was expanding rapidly throughout a body, 
stating that the army, as the protector of the country from external and internal 
enemies, had no other choice but to intervene (Eleftheros Kosmos, 23.06.1967). 
Konstantopoulos argued this was because politicians had been in neither the 
position nor the mood to make a move toward preventing political collapse 
(Eleftheros Kosmos, 01.08.1967). 
Athanasoulias evaluated the takeover as a “preventive” move. He stated that 
every country that faced a communist threat would consider using force to obstruct 
its own deterioration (Eleftheros Kosmos, 28.07.1967). He compared the situation 
of officers in Greece to American police who were authorized by defusing leaders 
of rival groups to prevent fighting between whites and blacks (Eleftheros Kosmos, 
09.08.1967).  
Columnists rarely referred to the temporality of the junta’s rule. This may 
have resulted from the conditions of censorship, since officers did not want to an 
emphasis to be placed on a quick transition to democracy. In this context, 
Konstantopoulos stated that the existing administration was a preparatory period in 
which to formulate enduring principles for a functioning democratic regime 
(Eleftheros Kosmos, 14.05.1967). He also referred to junta administration Prime 
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Minister Konstantinos Kollias’ statement that the junta’s rule aimed to form a 
functioning parliamentarian system (Eleftheros Kosmos, 11.06.1967). 
Konstantopoulos expressed that the military’s rule was not a totalitarian regime, nor 
did it aim to establish such a regime (Eleftheros Kosmos, 07.06.1967). He stated 
that the junta’s rule cannot be considered anti-democratic in essence, because it 
suspended the democratic regime only temporarily to prevent its entire collapse 
(Eleftheros Kosmos, 03.08.1967). He compared the situation in Greece with 
Germany when Nazis came to power. He argued that Germany should have 
considered military intervention to save the country from National Socialism. He 
stated (Eleftheros Kosmos, 03.08.1967): 
[Germany] needed to act in an illegal manner for a while to prevent 
Nazis from coming to power. (…) I do not support military 
dictatorship but if German officers had come to power in 1933, 
Germany could have overcome the economic crisis. If German officers 
had come to power, there would have been dictatorship on the surface 
but the Germans would have continued their lives. In my view, a 
return to democracy can be guaranteed with these kinds of interim 
regimes. 
 
With regard to a transition to democracy, the column Lakonika highlighted 
the junta’s plan to review the constitution and hold a referendum for its acceptance. 
The column argued that these plans were strong indicators that the transition to 
democracy would produce a regime stronger than the previous one (Akropolis, 
23.05.1967). However, in none of the columns was a date for such a transition 
mentioned.  
Nikos Tsiforos used metaphors to describe the 21 April takeover and the 
subsequent military administration. The interesting aspect of his daily pieces was 
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that he almost never referred openly to the existing government or other political 
issues. The way he considered and narrated non-political issues at the time, 
however, gave rise to the idea that he was giving implicit messages. In one of his 
pieces in May, for example, he wrote about Easter and people’s preparations for 
vacation. He mentioned that people were considering the possibility of rain when 
making their preparations. He wrote (Eleftheros Kosmos, 03.05.1967):  
In fact the rain is always a possibility and it should be expected. It is 
good for nature and for plants. We pay attention to our short-run 
happiness and goodness but we do not consider what is good for us in 
the long-run. The rain might upset you at that moment but if it is to 
bring better situations, is that moment so important? What might 
happen with April rain? It does not last long: one day or two days, then 
it will leave its place to the sun, having increased the fertility of the 
soil. 
 
 Because of the political context and the time the piece was published, this 
passage can be considered as Tsiforos’ description of how he perceived the 21 April 
administration. Implicitly likening the military’s takeover and its rule to April rain, 
he evaluated the junta’s rule as a temporary one that was expected to have positive 
effects in the long run for the country even if it did not have pleasant outcomes for 
that particular moment. In another piece, Tsiforos wrote about the earthquake that 
hit Greece on 1 May 1967 and caused damage in numerous villages.10 He stated that 
it was a big earthquake that had caused a deep crack, but that it was time to grow 
flowers from that crack. He wrote that people knew the promises of the government 
would not turn into empty promises and that flowers would emerge from the 
destroyed villages (Eleftheros Kosmos, 12.05.1967). Like his previous piece, he 
                                                          
10
 The earthquake was 5.9 in magnitude. It caused 9 deaths and damage costs totaling around 5 
million US dollars.  
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referred to neither the takeover nor the military government, but the earthquake can 
be seen as a metaphor used to signify the takeover. Thus, like an earthquake 
destroys a village, the takeover is portrayed as having destroyed the existing 
political system, but Tsiforos assures his readers that a new system will be 
established in the place of the one destroyed. When his other pieces are considered 
from this perspective, one additional text attracts attention. In this piece, Tsiforos 
wrote about the illegal parking in Athens that blocked roads and caused problems 
for other people. He expressed how towing agencies removed these cars and thus 
provided continuation of the traffic (Eleftheros Kosmos, 17.05.1967). From the 
same perspective, it can be argued that the towing agencies’ provision of order, 
facilitated by removing the cars that blocked the roads, can be thought as metaphors 
used by Tsiforos to describe the 21 April takeover. Tsiforos’ tactic of making 
implicit arguments through metaphor did not last long. After 10 June 1967 when he 
wrote a piece criticizing the country’s censorship, his pieces no longer carried any 
hidden meanings.  
One of the ways Athanasoulias and the column Lakonika used to define the 
characteristics of the junta’s rule was to compare it with the pre-coup situation. 
Athanasoulias pointed out that the military administration differed from the 
previous ones in terms of being impartial and serving the good of the whole nation. 
He mentioned that the military administration did not have to garner votes of the 
people and therefore it did not need to pursue interests of particular groups and 
individuals (Eleftheros Kosmos, 26.04.1967). In this regard, he pointed to instances 
from economic life and the public sector to show how the government was working 
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for national interests. He gave the example of Greece’s signing of an agreement 
with the Litton Company for the economic development of Crete and Western 
Peloponnesus after the officers come to power. He mentioned that negotiations with 
the company had started three years ago but could not be completed because the 
issue had become politicized for partisan reasons (Eleftheros Kosmos, 17.05.1967). 
He argued that the junta, which had an objective attitude to work for the good of the 
country, completed these negotiations with the signing of an agreement a short time 
after it came to power, an achievement that the previous governments could not 
accomplish in three years (Eleftheros Kosmos, 17.05.1967). 
Athanasoulias also mentioned the changing situation of the municipalities 
and local governorships with the junta’s rule. He argued that the municipalities and 
local governorships had become tools of political parties to pursue their own 
interests rather than serving the people (Eleftheros Kosmos, 25.04.1967). The public 
sector was so corrupted that people had to pay bribes to get their work done 
(Eleftheros Kosmos, 26.04.1967). Athanasoulias indicated that the new 
administration was not a partisan government and did not have the characteristics of 
the previous administrations. He pointed out that the military administration 
developed a public sector program that aimed to rectify its bad habits and 
reestablish a functioning system (Eleftheros Kosmos, 05.05.1967). The column 
Lakonika contrasted the 21 April administration with the previous administrations 
in terms of the efficiency and development it brought to economic life. It argued 
that the success of the military administration in the economy arose from the fact 
that it took decisions for the development of economic conditions, while previous 
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governments had taken decisions for their own interests (Akropolis, 27.05.1967). It 
mentioned that the positive atmosphere and the stability created by the junta’s rule 
would break the unwillingness of business people, including foreigners, to invest in 
Greece. The columns emphasized that private investments had already tripled those 
of 1965 in just a few months under the junta’s rule (Akropolis, 22.08.1967), and that 
the government took tangible steps to solve the problems of the construction sector 
and facilitate people’s acquisition of loans to buy apartments (Akropolis, 
30.08.1967). 
Columnists paid particular attention to reactions to the takeover from 
abroad. More than the support for and positive evaluations of the 21 April takeover 
abroad in general and in foreign newspapers specifically, columnists presented 
foreign criticisms of and demonstrations against the takeover and the military 
administration in Greece. They not only expressed that there were reactions abroad 
to the takeover and the junta’s rule but also outlined specifically what was 
criticized. These depictions were important in the sense that the censorship review 
did not prevent their publications. This is mainly because these criticisms were 
presented to show that they were wrong and did not reflect reality. Nevertheless, 
these depictions formed important sources of information for those Greeks who 
were critical of the takeover and the military administration to learn about reactions 
from abroad to the situation in Greece (Interview 9, Athens, 18.02.2013). 
Columnists displayed different reactions to criticisms according to the 
source of the criticism. The first group of sources was composed of communist 
states and communist people living in the Soviet Union, other communist countries 
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and, European countries. They indicated that protests and mobilizations in different 
countries condemning the 21 April takeover and the military’s rule in Greece were 
organized by communists and their collaborators. In this regard, Konstantopoulos 
argued that the mobilizations were organized by communists and included crypto-
communists, whom he defined as humanists, democrats, emotional people, and 
others who were easily influenced by communist propaganda because of their 
superficial knowledge about what had been going on in Greece (Eleftheros Kosmos, 
05.05.1967). He mentioned the reactions from the communist countries neighboring 
Greece and argued that the takeover upset them by terminating their plans in Greece 
(Eleftheros Kosmos, 26.05.1967).  
The other group that was considered by columnists because of its criticisms 
of the takeover and the military’s rule was comprised of non-communist European 
states. For example, when Denmark recalled its ambassador from Athens because of 
the takeover, Konstantopoulos criticized Denmark for this move. He evaluated 
Denmark’s policy as a way of intervening in Greece’s domestic politics, noting that 
such selective targeting was particularly uncordial given that Denmark did not 
intervene in any other state’s domestic politics (Eleftheros Kosmos, 20.10.1967). 
The column Lakonika also criticized the negative stance of European states toward 
the 21 April government’s policies. It argued that these states were intervening in 
the domestic affairs of Greece through unethical means under the pretext that there 
were violations of human rights and undemocratic practices (Akropolis, 
14.05.1967).  
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Columnists argued that the reactions from abroad were formed in order to 
mobilize reactions to Greece, and were mostly based on falsified news and 
disinformation that did not reflect the real situation in Greece. The news from 
abroad aimed to present Greece as an unsafe country with continuing clashes and 
street conflicts (Konstantopoulos, Eleftheros Kosmos, 16.07.1967), armed soldiers 
in the streets ready to shoot down the ones who refused to obey commands 
(Konstantopoulos, Eleftheros Kosmos, 13.06.1967), and violations of human rights 
including the right to live (Lakonika, Akropolis, 20.05.1967). As already noted, the 
main aim of columnists here was to criticize foreign news media for not reflecting 
reality and to emphasize that law and order had been restored in Greece with the 21 
April takeover. However, they also significantly contributed to the dissemination of 
these foreign reports across the Greek public in Greek, most of whom did not have 
access to foreign resources to learn about the reactions abroad and the reasons for 
their criticisms.  
According to Konstantopoulos, the reactions of business people and capital 
holders were the true indicators of the existence of law and order, and that from this 
perspective things were going well in Greece. He argued that their reactions 
significantly differed from those of the communists, because these members of the 
business community investigated the developments in Greece from close quarters. 
In doing so, they saw that the reality was totally different than what communists 
and their supporters were arguing (Eleftheros Kosmos, 05.05.1967). 
As stated, columnists stressed that the military took over on 21 April to save 
the country from full collapse for the common good of the country. They did not 
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perceive it to be related to group or political interests, nor to derive from officers’ 
personal or corporate interests. In this regard, columnists referred to the public’s 
support with the argument that people had supported the takeover from the very 
beginning because it was for the common good of the country. Developing this 
view, columnists came up with the army-nation unity argument within the Greek 
context. According to Konstantopoulos, the army had been gaining the sympathy of 
the people since the first moments of the takeover (Eleftheros Kosmos, 16.06.1967); 
people were pleased with the army’s intervention because they had expected to see 
widespread change in political life, and the army responded to this demand by 
taking over (Eleftheros Kosmos, 14.05.1967). He also argued that the lack of serious 
opposition to the takeover and military rule also demonstrated that the intervention 
responded to a societal need (Eleftheros Kosmos, 28.06.1967). Konstantopoulos 
explained why people did not react to the military’s takeover and its rule 
subsequently by emphasizing structure of the army. He stated (Eleftheros Kosmos, 
16.06.1967): 
Principally, the social structure of the army is important. Before, the 
aristocratic class was dominant in the army. Generals were coming 
from old and well-known families of Greece. With social 
developments, the middle class people replaced the aristocracy and the 
bourgeoisie [within the army]. The ones coming from the poor 
families can now reach higher status in the military schools. In other 
words, generals coming from the people of Greece know the pain of 
the people since they also had lived through the same poverty. They 
were away from politics and role-playing. For this reason, when the 21 
April [takeover] took place, people knew that those who were of 
themselves obtained power, and supported them blindfolded. In other 
words, the revolution had a populist structure. 
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In addition to the social structure of the army and people’s trust that the 
army would act for the good of the people, Konstantopoulos also argued that people 
did not react to the takeover not because they did not have the power to do so but 
because they did not want to do so – aware as they were of the pre-21 April 
situation that was leading the country toward a collapse (Eleftheros Kosmos, 
06.08.1967).  
Athanasoulias, too, drew attention to the support for the military’s rule. He 
demonstrated people’s support during public speeches of officers as an indication of 
the people’s contentment with the existing situation and their acceptance of the 
military administration’s plans (Eleftheros Kosmos, 30.05.1967). The column 
Lakonika drew attention to people’s support for the 21 April government by 
demonstrating that Papandreou and his supporters were not as powerful as they 
once had been thought to be. For example, a “silent protest” was organized against 
the 21 April takeover that demanded people stay in their apartments on Sunday, in 
order to show their reaction to the military government. The column Lakonika 
expressed that the protest failed; Athenians were all out in the streets, cafes, and 
beaches displaying their support for the 21 April government (Akropolis, 
30.05.1967). Konstantopoulos also mentioned the silent protests as a failure. He 
stated that people who were against the takeover were very few and the majority of 
the people wanted to see the military’s rule reach its targets (Eleftheros Kosmos, 
30.05.1967). 
The column Lakonika demonstrated that the military government was 
inclusive in that it did not exclude anyone for supporting Papandreou in the pre-21 
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April period and acted as the national government for the whole country. In addition 
to the inclusiveness of the military administration, the column emphasized that 
people who had supported Papandreou in the pre-21 April period also displayed 
their support for the 21 April government. It mentioned the support of Cretans, who 
were seen to be a traditional stronghold for Papandreou and the EK, for the 
members of the 21 April government that had visited the Crete. The column stated 
(Akropolis, 04.06.1967): 
[Before 21 April] Cretans would have even held their guns in order to 
keep Papandreou in power. This is what the [EK] was stating. But 
Cretans showed that it was not as argued [by the EK]. The warm 
welcoming of Cretans [for the military government members] is 
exactly its indication. Cretans showed that their feelings were 
nationalist but not partisan. When the members of the [military] 
government that represented the whole country visited Crete, Cretans 
were also aware of [that the government was a national one]. 
 
In addition to analyzing how Greek columnists perceived the 21 April 
takeover and the military administration, columnists’ evaluations of politicians, 
their definitions of democracy, and where they situated the takeover and the 
military’s rule within the democratic tradition of Greece will contribute to a better 
overall understanding of columnists’ perceptions of the 21 April takeover and 
subsequent military rule. The next section will therefore focus on these elements.  
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4.3.3. Democracy, Politicians, and the Transition Period in the Newspaper 
Columns  
 
The main attention of columnists following the 21 April takeover was 
focused on explaining the magnitude of the communist threat Greece had faced 
before the takeover, and demonstrating that the military’s rule as the “national 
government,” or the “revolutionary government,” started working for the common 
good of the country by emphasizing the effectiveness of the policies they pursued. 
Although the reason for the takeover was stated as saving the democratic regime 
from total collapse, and the ultimate aim as the restoration of democracy, 
columnists, as analyzed above, did not discuss when and under what conditions the 
transition should take place or how long the military government should stay in 
power. In this regard, Tsiforos hinted that, like the spring rain, the military 
government was expected to stay in power for a short time, but did not clarify what 
he meant by short (Eleftheros Kosmos, 03.05.1967).  
Konstantopoulos mentioned several times that the 21 April administration 
was an interim one that did not aim to establish a totalitarian regime, but rather 
restore a stronger democratic regime (Eleftheros Kosmos, 07.06.1967; 03.08.1967; 
08.10.1967). He also referred to the words of Karamanlis, who had left the country 
after the takeover. Karamanlis stated that the officers should not forget that they 
were leading a transition period and the 21 April administration was an interim 
government if they wanted to be successful in reaching their objectives (Eleftheros 
Kosmos, 08.10.1967). The column Lakonika indicated the temporality of the 21 
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April administration by referring to the constitution-making process. As stated, it 
expressed the junta’s will to review the constitution and hold a referendum for its 
acceptance as important indicators for the transition to democracy (Akropolis, 
23.05.1967). However, it did not present any opinion about what the content of the 
constitution should be.   
Konstantopoulos allocated much space in his column to discussing the 
situation of politicians whom he saw as the main guilty party for the creation of the 
political crisis in the pre-21 April period. According to him, politicians from the 
pre-21 April period therefore had no place in the political system that was being 
established (Eleftheros Kosmos, 14.05.1967). He argued that these politicians were 
not aware that Greece was going through a major change; they thought that the 
current situation would last for a few months and then power would be handed back 
to former politicians (Eleftheros Kosmos, 14.05.1967). He stated that some 
politicians could not even imagine a situation in which all the deputies in parliament 
would not be reinstated, but emphasized that none of these 300 deputies was 
irreplaceable (Eleftheros Kosmos, 04.06.1967).  
In addition to former politicians, Konstantopoulos argued that the new 
political system should not allow the existence of the Communist Party – either in 
its form at the time or in a proxy party – if one wanted Greece to sustain its 
existence in the future (Eleftheros Kosmos, 14.05.1967). He made a clear distinction 
between the communist parties and politicians and all the rest with the argument 
that communists were against democracy in essence and supported tyranny; they 
were governed by external powers and therefore did not consider the national 
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interests of Greece (Eleftheros Kosmos, 26.04.1967).  He explicitly referred to the 
EDA as the proxy party of communists and argued that Papandreou’s EK had 
become a servant of the communists. Konstantopoulos also referred to the religious 
factor while he was differentiating communists from the rest of Greeks. He stated 
that communists, as non-believers who fought against the church, did not realize 
that religion was a uniting power among Greeks (Eleftheros Kosmos, 26.04.1967).  
He argued that communists aimed to divide Greek society into democrats and 
nationalists in order to strengthen their position in Greek politics. He argued, 
however, that they could not calculate that Greeks as believers and nationalists, 
regardless of whether they had supported Karamanlis’ ERE or Papandreou’s EK, 
would act together when the territorial integrity and the interests of the country 
were in danger (Eleftheros Kosmos, 16.04.1967).   
In conclusion, this chapter analyzed how Greek columnists writing in 
Akropolis and Eleftheros Kosmos evaluated the 21 April takeover and the 
subsequent military administration in their pieces published after the takeover 
occurred. It demonstrated that colonels’ control prevented publications from taking 
a stand against their takeover and rule, but that opinion columns still contained 
evaluations of the takeover and the junta’s rule. In their evaluations, columnists 
discussed their interpretations of the reasons for the officers’ takeover as well as 
their objectives, and defined the takeover and the junta’s rule in particular ways. 
The next chapter will analyze Turkish columnists’ evaluations of the 12 September 
takeover and subsequent military rule.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
THE 12 SEPTEMBER 1980 TAKEOVER IN TURKEY AND  
TURKISH COLUMNISTS  
 
 
 
This chapter aims to conduct a thorough analysis of the daily columns of 
Cumhuriyet, Hürriyet, and Milliyet in terms of how columnists evaluated the 12 
September coup. It starts by constructing an overall framework with the main 
arguments that highlight different reasons for the 12 September takeover. The 
chapter continues by analyzing the military administration’s control over the press 
to provide an understanding of the borderline drawn by officers in terms of what 
newspapers could and could not write about. Next, Turkish columnists’ evaluations 
of the takeover and subsequent military rule that were published after the takeover 
occurred are analyzed in three subcategories, which were deemed to be important to 
this study’s understanding of how columnists formulated their evaluations.  
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5.1.  Historical Background of the 12 September Coup 
 
There are numerous studies that explain why the 12 September coup 
happened. Some of these studies highlight macro-level reasons such as Cold War 
conditions and the socio-economic reasons, while others focus on micro-level 
explanations that particularly highlight the military and political actors (Demirel 
2001, 47). Explaining in detail why the military took over the government of 
Turkey on 12 September 1980 is beyond the scope of this paper. It does not aim to 
construct a narrative for the developments leading towards the takeover in order to 
support or deny existing arguments. Instead, this chapter seeks to draw an overall 
framework of those dominant arguments in the literature highlighting different 
factors, ranging from macro-level reasons to micro-level ones, as motivations 
behind the generals’ decision to assume power on 12 September.  
Methodological concerns necessitated following this approach in this paper. 
Although many primary and secondary sources of information have become 
available during the time that has passed following the coup, specifying crystal 
clear explanations for the coup remains difficult. This situation is closely related to 
the difficulty of revealing how the relevant actors had been affected by the complex 
interactions among the developments before 12 September. Memoirs, biographies, 
autobiographies, and books written by politicians, journalists, and officers to 
highlight the developments preceding the coup constitute important sources of 
information for researchers in their efforts to understand its origins. However, 
issues of concern about the objectivity of these sources arise for researchers due to 
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their authors’ selective memories and reevaluations of the developments with the 
intention of justifying particular acts. Researchers may overcome this handicap by 
referring to various primary and secondary sources. In these studies, however, the 
researchers themselves cannot refrain from bringing another representation which 
presents the researchers’ own valuing of the interactions between pre-coup 
developments and their influence on the actors. Despite these challenges, the 
question of whether the coup was in fact the outcome of a more complex or a 
simpler interaction of the developments making the actors behave in particular ways 
continues to stay in the agendas of the researchers.  
As stated above, there are arguments in the literature that explain the 12 
September coup with particular emphasis on structural reasons. Some of these 
arguments highlight Cold War conditions – in particular, American interests in the 
Middle East (Arcayürek 1989; Güldemir 1986; Sunay 2010; Yetkin 1995) – while 
others emphasize the change in macroeconomic policies, namely the transition from 
the import substitution industrialization to an export-oriented economy (Kaya 
Özçelik 2011; Özkazanç 2005). According to structure-based arguments, regime 
change in Iran and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan increased the importance 
of stability in Turkey for securing America’s Middle East interests (Sunay 2010, 
226–227). In this regard, short-term coalition governments of the 1970s and 
increasing economic problems were hindering Turkey from being a stable ally in 
the region for the United States. In addition, policies of the National Front coalition 
government of the center-right and right-wing political parties, such as the usage of 
the military bases in Turkey by American soldiers and Turkey’s insistence on 
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maintaining its veto regarding Greece’s turning back to the military wing of NATO, 
were not in harmony with US interests (Sunay 2010, 234–235). Within the 
challenging security conditions, it is argued that retaining Turkey as an ally of the 
West became more important for the United States than preserving the democratic 
regime (Demirel 2003b, 257). The possibility of a military intervention had begun 
to be discussed within American decision-making circles in 1979. Military rule was 
seen as a quick and a certain way of establishing stability and making Turkey a 
more promising ally in the Middle East. Although the signals from the United States 
could be evaluated to have been favoring the military’s intervention and that it 
would support military rule, it would be a weak argument to state that the United 
States planned the coup, or was even notified before the takeover (Birand 1986, 92–
102). However, this view is not meant to imply that the attitude of the United States 
did not have any influence on generals’ decision regarding intervention; indeed, 
knowing that they would not face any serious reaction from the Western world, 
particularly from the United States, might have easily strengthened the generals’ 
motivations.  
Researchers who consider the root causes of the 12 September coup to be 
US discontent with the developments in the Middle East and the need to ensure its 
regional interests by keeping Turkey closer explain the escalation of violence and 
anarchy in the second half of the 1970s as the outcome of Americans’ behind the 
scenes provocations (Demirel 2001, 47–48; Mumcu 1993, 139). The aim of such 
provocations was explained to be bringing the military to power. The logic 
underlying this assumption is that the United States considered that working with a 
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military government would be much easier than working a democratically elected 
one, since the military would not be accountable to the public and could thus 
prioritize issues of security and stability at the expense of democracy, individual 
rights, and freedoms (Demirel 2001, 49). Along with these explanations, politicians 
from both right- and left-wing political parties, including Bülent Ecevit and 
Süleyman Demirel, expressed that they believed that the United States played a role 
in the military takeover (Birand, Bila, and Akar 1999, 70; Yetkin 1995, 198–199).   
One of the main characteristics of the second half of the 1970s in Turkey 
was the worsening economy, which was manifested both in statistical abstractions 
and in the daily lives of the people. The American embargo after Turkey’s 
intervention in Cyprus in 1974, the international oil markets crisis, and the increase 
in the prices of oil-based products negatively affected Turkey’s international trade 
and balance of payments, and decreased GDP growth rates in the last years of the 
1970s. People were struggling with high inflation rates while at the same time 
wages remained stagnant, fuel shortages and power cuts were frequent and 
widespread, and vital commodities including medicine, cooking oil, bottled gas, and 
light bulbs disappeared from shops only to appear on the black market (Hale 1994, 
223–224). The government saw the solution to economic problems in bringing 
fundamental change in the economy, which took shape as a transition from import 
substitution industrialization to an export-oriented model. Popularly known as the 
24 January 1980 decisions, the National Front government announced the economic 
program, which aimed to diminish the state’s role in and support of the economy to 
create a more open market economy, on 24 January 1980.  
120 
 
Some researchers argue that the reason for the 12 September coup was the 
24 January decisions, because only a regime like a military one would be able to 
implement this program (Kaya Özçelik 2011, 77; Şenses 1991, 214). Evren, too, 
made reference to the implementation of the 24 January decisions in his memoirs. 
He accepted that the implementation of these decisions would not be easy with a 
democratic government (Evren 1995, 12). However, he did not point to the 24 
January decisions as the reason for the takeover, stating instead that the 
implementation of these decisions was a pragmatic policy rather than the major aim 
of military rule. Evren stated that economic reforms had the support of international 
financial entities and that military rule did not run the risk of dealing with deeper 
economic problems that would have resulted from failing to implement the reforms 
(Evren 1995, 12).  
Turkey’s economic crisis was not denied by most of the researchers in their 
assessments of the reasons for the 12 September coup. However, this did not mean 
that they considered the implementation of the 24 January decisions as the basic 
reason for the takeover. According to Demirel (2001, p. 48), the fact that the 
military rule facilitated implementation of the 24 January decisions was not enough 
evidence to assume a causal relationship between the military’s takeover and the 
implementation of these decisions. Hale considers increasing economic problems in 
the last years of the 1970s as being among the basic reasons for the coup, along 
with political reasons, but he does not emphasize the 24 January decisions and their 
implementation in this context (Hale 1994, 222).  
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Increasing tension in the political and social arenas – manifested in the 
uncompromising attitudes of politicians; weak coalition governments; ideological 
cleavages within society as well as in state institutions such as schools and 
universities, the police, and the bureaucracy; escalating street violence between 
rightist and leftist student groups as well as different factions of the left; mass 
killings; bombings; robberies; and kidnappings – defined life in Turkey in the last 
three years of the 1970s. In light of these events, Hale states that reasons for the 
coup were more related to the internal developments in Turkey than to its foreign 
relations and other external factors (Hale 1994, 239). While Hale does not ignore 
socio-economic and external explanations of the escalation of violence, he 
highlights state’s failure to end the violence as the major contributor to the 
worsening of the situation (Hale 1994, 227). Similar to Hale’s point of view, 
Itzkowitz-Shifrinson and Heper  (2005, 238) argue that the main reason for the 12 
September coup was the failure of the civilian governments to respond to political, 
ethnic, and religious violence. 
Besides different explanations in the literature regarding why the military 
took over on 12 September, it is also particularly important for this study to 
consider the reasons the generals have given to explain why they decided to take 
power. Birand (1986, p. 69) states that the generals did not begin to consider the 
necessity of an intervention or discuss when and how this intervention should take 
place before 1979. Before the 12 September takeover, the Turkish Armed Forces 
conveyed their discontent with recent developments to politicians in a letter signed 
by Kenan Evren as Chief of General Staff and the four force commanders and 
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handed to President Korutürk on 27 December 1979 (Evren 1990, 332). The letter 
was important in terms of reflecting an institutional standing, bearing the signatures 
of the top generals, and referring to the internal service law of the armed forces as 
the legal basis of this warning. Though the letter contained no explicit mention of 
the possibility of a military takeover, it expressed the armed forces’ insistent 
demands that politicians take the necessary measures in order to end the violence 
and restore peace and safety.  
The content of the first public statement of military’s rule, which was read 
on the radio during the early hours of 12 September, did not differ substantially 
from its letter of warning; the same issues were expressed as the reasons for the 
military’s decision to takeover. Domestic and external threats to the existence and 
unity of the state and nation, the malfunctioning of state institutions and the 
incompatibility between them, the ideological cleavages in society and state 
institutions threatening to bring the country to the brink of civil war, and the 
uncompromising behaviors of rival politicians that prevented them from taking the 
necessary steps to get the country out of deadlock were all factors cited by the 
military in its first public statement in power (Milliyet, 12 September 1980). Similar 
to the warning letter, Evren referred to the responsibility that arose from the internal 
service law of the armed forces to protect the unity of the country and the 
republican regime. It was also expressed that the takeover was carried out in chain 
of command, which was important in displaying that it was the military institution, 
rather than individual officers, who took the initiative.  
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Evren’s evaluations of the reasons for the takeover did not change during the 
years following the coup. He consistently referred to the officers’ increasing 
concerns caused by the armed clashes between leftist and rightist groups, inability 
of politicians to deal with the problem, and the possibility of civil war (Evren 1990, 
1995). The possibility of the creation of a parallel army, given the deepening of 
ideological cleavages that had already divided state institutions and the 
bureaucracy, was also a point of concern for officers. Factors such as the increasing 
number of students who were expelled from military schools because of their 
involvement in political activities and the escape of Mehmet Ali Ağca, who was 
charged with the killing of journalist Abdi İpekçi, from a military prison were 
perceived by high ranking officers as indicators of this possibility (Demirel 2003b, 
259). In addition, Evren also referred to the discontent and uneasiness of junior 
officers and the possibility of another colonel-led intervention, if higher ranking 
officers did not take the initiative to represent the entire institution (Evren 1990, 
276). 
 
 
5.2.  The 12 September Administration’s Control over the Press  
 
Birand et al. states that the generals of the 12 September administration 
believed that the press should act in unity, just as they did during the national soccer 
team’s international matches despite their intra-national rivalries, when presenting 
news and their views about the 12 September administration (Birand, Bila, and 
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Akar 1999, 214). In fact, however, the generals did not retain this belief in their 
hearts. Since the first day of the military’s rule, the press was brought under the 
generals’ strict control, both through the written statements of the Martial Law 
Command and through informal methods of warnings such as telephone calls to 
editors and visits to newspaper offices.  
Martial law and the public statements proclaimed by the Martial Law 
Command formed the legal basis of military’s control over the press. Martial law 
commands had the power to control the press, ban publications of newspapers and 
their circulations, censor the content of publications, and close down publication 
houses. A separate statement for the press was proclaimed on 25 September 1980 
by the İzmir Martial Law Command. With this statement, the press was banned 
from writing criticism against the government; stating negative views about the 
armed forces; and publishing news and caricatures that did not reflect an objective 
point of view, conflicted with statements proclaimed by the National Security 
Council and the Martial Law Command, or contradicted Atatürkist principles 
(Cemal 1992, 70). 
Three daily newspapers Demokrat, Aydınlık, and Hergün were closed down 
permanently on the first day of military rule (Çağdaş Gazeteciler Derneği 
[Association of Modern Journalists] 1984, 150). Cumhuriyet, Hürriyet, Günaydın, 
Güneş, Milli Gazete, Milliyet, Tan, and Tercüman were all newspapers that were 
banned from publication or circulation in some cities for certain periods, because of 
particular presentations of the news or columnists’ opinions found to conflict with 
the martial law or Atatürkist principles. After Milli Gazete, Cumhuriyet was the 
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newspaper that stayed closed for the second longest time, between 12 September 
1980 and 12 March 1984; it was banned from publication four times for a period of 
41 days in total (Kabacalı 1990, 219). During the first six months of the military’s 
rule, Cumhuriyet was banned from publication twice, for a period of 15 days in 
total. The first ban lasted for 10 days and was introduced because of İlhan Selçuk’s 
column on 11 November 1980, and also because of news about economic life in 
Istanbul published on the same day. The Martial Law Command deemed Selçuk’s 
piece to be insulting Atatürk and the economic news to be groundless and causing 
needless worry among the people (Cemal 2000, 140). The second ban prohibited 
circulation of Cumhuriyet in the six major cities of Southern and Southeastern 
Turkey for five days because the Martial Law Command similarly assessed that the 
newspaper published groundless news that might have provoked people. Milliyet 
stayed closed for 10 days in August 1983 because of Metin Toker’s column in 
general. Hürriyet was banned from publication for seven days in total in 1982 and 
1983 for similar reasons  (Kabacalı 1990, 216–219).  
Along with the martial law articles and statements proclaimed by the Martial 
Law Command, commanders’ warnings made via informal methods of 
communication formed alternative ways to sustain control over the press. As noted 
earlier, commanders consistently expressed their discontent with columns published 
via telephone calls, by visiting the columnists and the editors at their offices, and 
inviting them to the Martial Law Command. Through these informal channels, 
commanders reminded columnists that they were closely watched by the military 
administration. That these warnings came after opinions and the news had been 
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published was important, as the aim of such informal warnings was to prevent 
publication of similar news and opinions in the following days. As an example of 
commanders’ warnings to columnists, then-editor of Cumhuriyet Turhan Ilgaz 
received a call from one of the martial law commanders before Cumhuriyet was 
banned from publication on 12 November 1980. The commander expressed to Ilgaz 
the discontent caused by the way news was presented in Cumhuriyet and by İlhan 
Selçuk’s column. The call concluded with the warning that the newspaper might be 
closed down if its publications continued in the same manner (Cemal 1992, 89–90).  
An important number of columnists and editors received similar kinds of 
warning calls from commanders during military rule that would hinder the 
publication of content similar to what had been already published. Just as these 
warnings could pertain to censorship of news and opinions about general subjects, 
they could also be very specific for non-usage of particular words and concepts. The 
word ‘blue’ forms an interesting example of this situation, which is referred to in 
memoirs of different columnists to explain the extent of the military’s control over 
the press. Before the constitutional referendum held on 7 November 1982, the 
Martial Law Command banned the publication of any news and any opinions in 
support of voting against the constitution. As the color of the ‘no’ voting paper in 
the referendum was designated to be blue, its usage became an issue of concern for 
the commanders. Any news and columns that included the word ‘blue’ were 
deemed by commanders to be declaring, however covertly, support for a ‘no’ vote 
in the referendum. Thus, columnists and editors were consistently warned by 
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commanders whenever the word ‘blue’ was used in their publications, and even 
when the color blue was used in illustrations (Cemal 2000, 9–24). 
 The commanders’ warning not only took into consideration what the 
columnists published but also those individuals and groups with whom they had 
personal relationships. In this regard, columnists’ relationships with former 
politicians were an issue of discontent for the commanders. Mehmet Barlas was one 
of the columnists who was directly warned by a general of the National Security 
Council about his visits to Süleyman Demirel. He was notified that he must 
terminate those relationships that were perceived as unfavorable to the military 
administration (Birand, Bila, and Akar 1999, 215).  
This control over the press via martial law and warnings did, in fact, push 
the columnists to self-censor both how they behaved and what they wrote. As there 
was no systematic mechanism to preview the content of the newspapers before 
publication, columnists and editors had to pay particular attention to what they 
published, since the closing down of the newspapers depended on the commanders’ 
reading and evaluation of the printed materials. Columnists could not know whether 
their pieces were evaluated as violating martial law until they were warned by 
commanders or the newspaper was banned from publication. Further, it was also 
difficult for columnists and editors to believe that the reason for the publication ban 
was really as the commanders had stated (Yıldırım 2006, 9). In some instances, 
columnists pointed out that the real reason for the commanders’ decision to ban the 
newspaper from publication differed than the proclaimed reason. For instance, 
Günaydın was closed down on 30 October 1983, ostensibly because it did not attach 
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enough importance to the 60th anniversary of the Republic. According to Cemal, 
however, the real reason for this punishment was the publication of a public poll 
about the forthcoming elections that was not welcomed by the commanders (Cemal 
2000, 449–450).   
 
 
5.3.  The 12 September Takeover in Newspaper Columns 
 
 
5.3.1.  Reasons and Objectives of the Takeover and Expectations for the 
Military Administration  
 
As noted above, generals publicized the reasons for their takeover in the first 
public statement made on 12 September. This section demonstrates that reasons 
highlighted by columnists did not differ from the reasons stated by the generals. 
This was an understandable situation not only because the columns considered in 
this paper were written under military rule and thus columnists’ criticism of the 
head of the operation would be impossible, but also because the reasons cited 
included developments that columnists had addressed in their daily pieces before 12 
September as well. 
These reasons given by columnists for the intervention can be organized 
under the categories of a lack of personal safety due to street violence and terrorist 
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acts, the possibility of a civil war erupting, the lack of a dialogue between 
politicians and other irresponsible behaviors including legal and constitutional 
violations, and the weaknesses of state institutions including the malfunctioning of 
the bureaucracy. Along with highlighting these reasons for the generals’ move, 
columnists were of the same opinion on two points. Firstly, they saw no solution 
within the existing political system; 12 September and the generals’ takeover thus 
came as the only way to resolve the political deadlock. Secondly, they perceived the 
takeover as a situation forced on the generals’ shoulders, i.e., the generals felt that 
they had to act under the obligation of protecting the country from total collapse.  
 Örsan Öymen was one of the columnists who drew attention to street 
violence and death casualties in the pre-12 September period within the framework 
of the right to live as an inalienable human right. Öymen stated that personal safety 
and the right to live had been taken away from society and thus the 12 September 
operation became inevitable (Milliyet, 25.10.1980). İlhan Selçuk also emphasized 
the priority of personal safety in human life. He wrote that if personal safety had not 
existed, everything else would have lost importance (Cumhuriyet, 28.09.1980). 
Selçuk argued that on 11 September Turkey was at a point where anarchy and 
terrorist acts had threatened its citizens’ personal safety, and the state could not 
guarantee it because the constitutional order had crumbled (Cumhuriyet, 
28.09.1980; Cumhuriyet 25.10.1980). Some columnists drew attention to the 
possibility of a civil war as a next step after street violence had the takeover not 
happened. Mümtaz Soysal, a professor of constitutional law, stated that the army 
took power because people had been no longer able to walk in the streets and 
130 
 
Turkey had been at the brink of civil war (Milliyet, 04.10.1980). Milliyet’s editorial 
also drew attention to the possibility of a civil war because of anarchy and terrorism 
in the streets. It stated that democracy in Turkey would not be able to survive the 
ongoing violence, and that the armed forces undertook the 12 September operation 
to prevent civil war and save democracy from anarchy and terrorism (Milliyet, 
27.11.1980; Milliyet, 25.02.1981).  
In the first public statement, General Kenan Evren, the leader of the 
operation and the military administration, mentioned the weakness and 
malfunctioning of state institutions and the uncompromising attitude of political 
parties as the main reasons behind the increase in destructive and separatist 
activities that threatened people’s lives and properties. Columnists, too, expressed 
that the power of violent groups arose not solely from the groups themselves but 
from the ineffectiveness of state institutions. Columnists also mentioned 
international links of violent groups as another source of their strength. Milliyet’s 
editorial piece also argued that the reason for the country-wide spread of violent 
acts was not because terrorists were very powerful but because the government was 
weak and the terrorists were externally supported (Milliyet, 03.11.1980). In 
emphasizing the international links of violent groups, Bedii Faik pointed to the 
Soviet Union as the external center of anarchy and terrorism in Turkey (Hürriyet, 
28.09.1980).  
Despite Faik’s mentioning of the Soviet Union as an external sponsor of 
violent groups, none of the columnists held any political group or a particular 
politician as the responsible for the takeover. In fact, columnists were careful not to 
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accuse any ideology or single personality as the reason behind the coup. Selçuk 
particularly emphasized that it would be a mistake to consider one political group or 
political view as responsible. He stated (Cumhuriyet, 07.02.1981): 
It might be said that anarchy and terrorism developed because some 
“extreme ideas, dangerous books, views against our customs” were let 
free. Is this argument valid? We see the shadows of all kinds of 
thoughts behind anarchy and terrorism. Some with traditionalist, some 
with nationalist, some with communist, some with fascist, some with 
sectarian, some with rightist, some with leftist, some with centralist, 
some with ideas of vandalism, and some with liberal ideas were 
incited into an adventure. One thought cannot be seen as the sole 
reason of anarchy and terrorism. (…) A historical delusion will emerge 
if we see anarchy and terrorism in Turkey as the product of one 
thought.11 
 
While no particular ideology or politician was accused, columnists saw 
politicians and their behaviors as one of the main reasons for military’s takeover. 
They instead emphasized the lack of dialogue between politicians in bringing the 
regime to a deadlock situation (Milliyet, 18.12.1980). Öymen stated there was no 
dialogue before 12 September in Turkey; people were grumbling all the time 
instead of talking to each other, precipitating the takeover (Milliyet, 03.12.1980). 
Politicians both in power and in opposition were seen as the main actors responsible 
for the malfunctioning of democracy in the pre-12 September period. Haldun Taner 
asserted that since 1950 when the multi-party regime was introduced, political 
traffic was obstructed because of politicians who did not play the democracy game 
according to its rules, and necessitating the army’s intervention every ten years 
(Milliyet, 16.10.1980). Müşerref Hekimoğlu’s column quoted an assessment from 
Luxembourg radio and television broadcasts whose commentators argued that the 
takeover had not toppled the government since there had not been a government to 
                                                          
11
 All translations of excerpts from Turkish columns belong to the author unless otherwise specified.  
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speak of (Cumhuriyet, 19.09.1980). She stated that the same was true for the 
opposition before 12 September.  
The weak, inoperative condition of state institutions was also highlighted by 
different columnists in bringing about the military’s move. Oktay Ekşi stated that it 
was common to hear the outcry that the state was not functioning – indeed, that had 
been dissolving and decaying in the five to six years prior to the coup. He argued 
that this outcry was not heeded by politicians and thus the 12 September 
intervention had taken place (Hürriyet, 09.11.1980). Öymen argued that almost 
everyone shared the view that democracy was not functioning on 11 September; it 
existed only on paper (Milliyet, 07.02.1981).  
There is no reference to any economic reasons for the military’s takeover in 
the first public statement of the military regime. While the second statement, which 
was read by Evren on the radio on the same day, did mention economic problems. 
Evren did not state any detailed information about what these problems were. The 
main focus of the second statement was on political threats, ideological cleavages, 
and the high level of violence threatening people’s lives in the pre-12 September 
period. In line with the statements of the military’s rule, columnists – except Ali 
Sirmen – did not refer to economic factors in the military’s takeover.12 
As stated in Chapter Two, the military in Turkey intervened to politics for 
the first time in 1960. After the 1960 coup, a new constitution was implemented 
under military rule. The 1961 constitution aimed to prevent the re-emergence of an 
                                                          
12
 Sirmen was the only columnist who referred to economic factors in the military’s takeover. 
Without going into details, he counted poor economic conditions and the economic depression as 
among the reasons for military’s takeover (Cumhuriyet, 01.02.1981). 
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authoritarian partisan rule (Itzkowitz-Shifrinson and Heper 2005, 238) and 
attempted to install a more liberal political regime in Turkey. Columnists of 
Cumhuriyet, Hürriyet, and Milliyet did not accuse the 1961 constitution of the 
anarchy and the malfunctioning of the state institutions; to the contrary, they 
defended the 1961 Constitution against such accusations. Columnists stressed that 
the army’s concern was not the freedoms assured in the constitution but the 
terrorism and anarchy that resulted from abuses and irresponsible behaviors. Selçuk 
argued that Turkey came to 11 September not because the constitution was 
implemented but because it was not implemented (Cumhuriyet, 03.11.1980), and 
that the 12 September intervention was not against the constitution but against 
terrorism (Cumhuriyet, 25.10.1980). Similarly, Uğur Mumcu also defended the 
1961 constitution against criticisms. Mumcu wrote that the 1961 constitution should 
have been praised because of its democratic characteristics. He pointed out that 
practices that contradicted the soul, essence, and goals of the constitution had 
occurred in the last 20 years; the constitution had thus become alienated from its 
original philosophy and grown different (Cumhuriyet, 17.01.1981).   
Columnists shared the view that the political system had come to a deadlock 
by 11 September and that there was no civilian way to resolve the situation. They 
argued the military’s intervention happened at a time when it was seen that civilians 
were not able to solve this problem. This justification of the coup was important in 
the sense that it was seen as one of the major characteristics that distinguished 12 
September from military interventions that took place in other countries. The 
absence of a civilian solution by 12 September was also cited by columnists as the 
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main reason for why they did not see the takeover as a military coup. Oktay Akbal 
detailed the deadlock by 12 September on the first day of the military’s rule. He 
wrote (Cumhuriyet, 13.09.1980): 
A parliament that could not elect a president in six months… A 
minority government that was approaching a dead end…An 
unsuccessful political leader who had been tried many times…A main 
opposition that has been busy with internal controversies… Two 
retrogressive parties, one close to fascism and the other one close to 
religious fanaticism, and both with unreliable leaders… Small parties 
on the left fighting each other… Apart from them, many self-ordained 
“factions”… Daily increasing numbers of casualties. [Several] 
“rescued” neighborhoods, towns. A state that had degenerated along 
with all its institutions… We were heading towards somewhere. The 
place we were approaching was where we arrived today.     
 
 According to Teoman Erel, all civilian methods had been wasted by 11 
September. He stated that the military’s intervention happened at a time when it 
became obvious that the parliament was not able to elect a new president and early 
elections were off the agenda (Milliyet, 25.02.1981). Erel expressed that the 
deadlock situation was also accepted by former parliamentarians. He referred to the 
answer by a former parliamentarian whom he had asked whether there had been any 
civilian methods for solving the deadlock. The parliamentarian said to him 
(Milliyet, 25.02.1981): 
To tell you the truth there was no solution. There was no hope. 
Previously, we had had hope when a candidate for presidency got 303 
votes and only needed 15 more votes to be elected as president. But if 
it had not been completed at that point, then it was our fault, not the 
armed forces.  
 
135 
 
Çetin Altan wrote in his column that he was abroad on 12 September and his 
first reaction when he heard that the military took over in Turkey was that ‘there 
was no other solution’ and military’s intervention was an expected situation 
(Milliyet, 20.01.1981). Similar to Altan, Akbal mentioned that the military’s take 
over had been expected. He wrote that given this possibility, journalists, writers, 
intelligentsia, and some prudent politicians had expressed their concerns that all 
these developments were heading towards the military’s intervention (Cumhuriyet, 
16.10.1980). 
Öymen expressed the inevitability of the 12 September takeover by referring 
to Turan Güneş. He wrote (Milliyet, 07.02.1981):  
It is impossible to disagree with Turan Güneş’s identification: “the 
things that were missing in the political and social life of Turkey until 
the night of 11 September were living together, respecting each other 
and each other’s existence, and tolerance.” Institutions turned into the 
ones that could not tolerate each other’s existence and attempted to 
abolish others. 
 
Similar to the reasons for the military’s actions, the goals of the takeover 
were declared in the military’s first public statement on 12 September. It was stated 
that the Turkish Armed Forces took over in chain of command to provide national 
unity and to protect the integrity of the country, to prevent a possible civil war, to 
reestablish state authority, and to eliminate the reasons that obstructed the 
functioning of the democratic system (Birand 1986, 288). Columnists too wrote in 
this way, confirming the goals stated by the military.  
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Although columnists highlighted street violence and terrorism among the 
major reasons for the coup, they did not pay similar attention to them in terms of its 
goals. This situation is understandable in the sense that columnists did not feel the 
need to restate the goal of bringing safety to the streets because of two reasons. 
First, they were sure that anarchy and terrorism would be terminated under the 
extraordinary security measures taken by the military administration. Thus it was 
out of question to consider whether safety could be brought or not. Second, 
terminating street violence was a goal of the military rule but it was not an ultimate 
goal. In this sense, Burhan Felek and İlhan Selçuk stated that eradicating anarchy 
and terrorism were the primary responsibility of the military rule (Burhan Felek, 
Milliyet, 28.09.1980; İlhan Selçuk, Cumhuriyet, 28.09.1980). Other columnists 
mentioned ending anarchy and terrorism as a short term success of the military’s 
rule. For instance, Altan Öymen wrote that acts of terrorism had significantly 
decreased in the previous few months and that suspects of terrorism were arrested 
rapidly (Cumhuriyet, 27.12.1980). 
The main attention of columnists was on the military administration’s 
restoration of a functioning democratic system as the ultimate goal of the coup. The 
editorial in Milliyet stated that the parliament was shut down in order to remove its 
malfunctions and install a better working system (Milliyet, 16.09.1980). Akbal 
evaluated 12 September as the beginning of a new era that was to establish new 
concepts of the state and democracy that would rely on a new constitution 
(Cumhutiyet, 22.09.1980). Ekşi drew attention to the abuses of the 1961 
constitution and stated that the new rule committed itself to doing away with such 
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abuses and establishing a liberal rule of law that would respect the necessities of a 
democratic parliamentarian system (Hürriyet, 13.10.1980). Altan Öymen implicitly 
mentioned his discontent with the intervention by referring to a piece written by 
Abdi İpekçi in 1977. In this piece, İpekçi was criticizing the developments in 1977 
by stating the possibility of a military intervention similar to the one that took place 
on 12 March 1971. In this sense, Öymen stated that the only consolation for the 
events of 12 September was the junta’s stated goal of reestablishing a democratic 
regime (Cumhuriyet, 01.02.1981).  
While columnists were stating their views about the goals of the military’s 
rule, they underlined that the military’ rule was a temporary one; it had come to 
power to achieve certain goals and it would return to its barracks by restoring power 
to civilians after these goals were achieved. Örsan Öymen indicated the 
temporariness of the military’s rule by referring to Evren’s statements. Öymen 
pointed out that Evren, as the head of the junta and also head of the state, had 
expressed that the Turkish Armed Forces came to power to bring democracy back 
on track and would leave power to civilians via elections (Milliyet, 17.01.1981). 
Milliyet’s editorial column emphasized this characteristic of the 12 September 
administration by linking it with the previous interventions. It stated that all 
interventions by the military were to bring democratic regime back on track 
(Milliyet, 19.09.1980).  
 Along with the reasons and the objectives, columnists also expressed their 
expectations from military rule. This study anticipated that columnists’ expectations 
would be parallel to their explanations of why the military took over and what the 
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generals were aiming to achieve during their stay in power. However, the 
interesting point with the expectations of columnists was that they varied widely, 
from very abstract and broad ones to concrete and minor ones. Furthermore, the 
columnists displayed contradictions in their expectations and criticized each other 
for the differences they had.  
Erel expressed that the major issue pending was the creation of a climate in 
which everyone would be able to talk to each other, discuss with each other, and 
understand each other. He stated that reinstalling democracy and resolving other 
problems depended on the creation of this in particular (Milliyet, 16.02.1981). 
According to Hekimoğlu, the work of the generals was a difficult task because it 
would not be easy to transform a decayed and fossilized structure into a healthy 
entity (Cumhuriyet, 19.09.1980). Mehmet Kemal attributed a difficult mission to the 
12 September administration. Expecting to see a settling of accounts with the 
former government’s damages, Kemal expressed that files needed to be taken down 
from their dusty shelves, and that everyone should be accountable for corruption 
and political abuses in their personal interests (Cumhuriyet, 19.09.1980). 
While some columnists expressed broad and abstract missions for the 
military’s rule, there were also columnists who criticized this point of view. 
According to these critiques, it was unreasonable to expect the military’s rule to 
solve all problems because it was a temporary government that came to power to 
address particular issues. Mumcu was one of those columnists who opposed 
bringing everything before the military with the expectation of having every issue 
solved. He stated that (Cumhuriyet, 07.10.1980): 
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The resolution of all postponed political and social issues should not 
be expected from a ruling power that had declared itself as temporary. 
The resolution of these issues is the task of civilian governments. We 
hope that the forthcoming civilian government resolves these issues as 
soon as possible. Otherwise, this will not get us anywhere.   
 
 One of the issues that Mumcu wrote about consistently was arms smuggling. 
He argued that there was a direct link between arms smuggling and terrorism. For 
this reason he suggested that, during its rule, the military should focus on this 
problem in its fight against terrorism to get permanent results (Cumhuriyet, 
16.09.1980; Cumhuriyet 25.10.1980). 
Although economic problems were cited neither by the Armed Forces nor by 
the columnists (except Ali Sirmen, as noted above), they counted some columnists’ 
expectations from military rule. The editorial column of Milliyet argued that, in 
addition to the task of eradicating terrorism, the 12 September administration should 
also deal with economic issues, as well as Turkey’s energy deficit (Milliyet, 
24.12.1980). Burhan Felek (Milliyet, 28.09.1980) and Hekimoğlu (Cumhuriyet, 
25.09.1980) perceived solving economic issues as a secondary task for the military 
administration, after eradicating anarchy and terrorism. Refik Erduran altogether 
opposed views that saw economic issues among the tasks of military rule. He 
argued that maintaining order and safety was the mission of the military, not 
economic issues (Milliyet, 16.09.1980). According to Erduran, a task for the 
military administration that could be related to the economy was the creation of a 
legal basis for a properly functioning free market economy (Milliyet, 16.09.1980). 
While Erduran did not see the economy among the tasks of the government, he 
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highlighted the Cyprus issue as an important task of the military, suggesting that the 
military government should take decisive steps on the issue (Milliyet, 16.09.1980). 
Mehmet Kemal was another columnist who expected specific tasks from military 
rule. He argued that the military administration should urgently focus on the land 
regulation issue, and that issues of taxes and education should also be improved 
under its tutelage (Cumhuriyet, 19.09.1980). 
 
 
5.3.2.  Columnists’ Representation of the Characteristics of the 12 September 
Administration 
 
Immediately after the generals’ takeover, the tendency of columnists was to 
distinguish it from military coups and dictatorships in other countries. They also 
compared it with the previous interventions in Turkey, drawing attention mostly to 
similarities between them and the12 September takeover. Some columnists, 
however, argued that 12 September differed from the 1960 takeover in some ways. 
Finally, some columnists compared the 12 September administration with the 
previous parliamentarian system to support arguments about the strengths of the 
military’s rule to achieve its targeted goals.   
 The 12 September takeover was presented in Milliyet’s editorial column as 
the state’s protection of itself rather than a military coup (Milliyet, 19.09.1980). 
Similarly, the military’s rule was expressed to be a state rule rather than a military 
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regime (Milliyet editorial, 17.01.1981). Columnists emphasized the impartiality and 
the inclusiveness of the 12 September military government by expressing it as a 
state rule. Erel defined its inclusiveness with an analogy (Milliyet, 12.12.1980): 
The 12 September operation more resembled a sailing ship that aimed 
to bring salvation to the whole nation rather than a train that followed 
a particular path and excluded some while included some others.  
 
The aim of protecting Atatürkist principles and the restoration of a new 
political system in accordance with these principles were among the most 
highlighted characteristics of the 12 September government by columnists. They 
assessed these characteristics of the military’s rule as indicators of its impartiality, 
in other words supporting neither the political and social right nor the left. Thus, 
they perceived that the military’s rule would serve the common interests of the 
whole nation but not the interests of particular groups. On the first day of its rule, 
Akbal wrote that it was an indispensable reality that the military, as the followers, 
soldiers, and guardians of Atatürkist principles, would not overlook what had 
happened during the last years of the 1970s and would carry out its sacred mission 
one more time (Cumhuriyet, 13.09.1980). Milliyet’s editorial column emphasized 
that the official ideology of the Turkish state was Kemalism and the Turkish Armed 
Forces was undoubtedly the guardian of Kemalism (Milliyet, 03.11.1980).   
Columnists drew attention to the temporary nature of the 12 September 
government. They expressed that it was a national imperative rather than the result 
of personal ambitions of the generals. In this regard, Erduran compared the 
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generals’ takeover to the reaction of a dentist to a decayed tooth (Milliyet, 
13.09.1980): 
Unusual behaviors that happen as a result of developments in societies 
that are living organisms are not subject to the will [of its actors]. A 
dentist does not pull out a tooth because he/she wants to do so. He/she 
does so because the tooth was decayed and its pain could no longer be 
withstood. 
 
 Like Erduran, Ekşi also offered an analogy to explain the necessity of the 
takeover. He compared the military’s actions on 12 September to a surgery, likening 
the generals to the doctors and the political system in Turkey to the patient on the 
operation table. He stated (Hürriyet, 13.09.1980): 
Turkey is undergoing serious surgery on all political and apolitical 
institutions. Our country is now on the operation table under the lights. 
The ones who perform the surgery opened up the wound. The ones 
who want to see Turkey to survive through this surgery and to regain 
its health should take into account their behaviors in accordance with 
this reality.    
 
Compared it with the military takeovers in European and South American 
countries, columnists argued that the 12 September coup was not a typical instance 
of a military coup. They stated that the 12 September government differed from 
military rule in other countries in terms of its objectives and timing. Milliyet’s 
editorial pointed out the possibility that the 12 September takeover might have been 
perceived in European countries the same way the military takeovers in Chile, 
Greece, and South Korea were perceived. This possibility was refuted in the column 
by emphasizing that the parliament in Turkey was abolished by the military with the 
aim of restoring a functioning democracy (Milliyet, 16.09.1980). It contrasted the 
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takeover in Turkey with the one happened in Spain and argued that it would be a 
mistake to form parallels between them (Milliyet, 25.02.1981). According to the 
column, there was a basic difference between the two countries in terms of state 
institutions’ loyalty to democracy. It argued that democracy was the official 
ideology in Turkey that was accepted by all state institutions and citizens. In this 
regard, the 12 September takeover aimed to save democracy from anarchy and 
terrorism. But in Spain, democracy was perceived by some sections of the Spanish 
army, police, and bureaucracy as the reason for anarchy and terrorism (Milliyet, 
25.02.1981). Erel compared the military takeover in Turkey with the military coups 
in Pakistan, Portugal, and Spain. He argued that different than the Turkish Armed 
Forces, the militaries of Pakistan, Portugal, and Spain did not have a tradition of 
loyalty to a democratic regime and therefore move not to save democracy but rather 
to rule the country (Milliyet, 25.02.1981). Erel also drew attention to the deadlock 
on 11 September as a distinguishing characteristic of the 12 September takeover by 
arguing that civilians could not deal with the shootout between leftist and rightist 
militants. He wrote (Milliyet, 25.02.1981): 
When General Ziya-ül Hak overthrew [Pakistani Prime Minister 
Zulfikar Ali] Butto, the decision to hold new elections had already 
been taken. That is to say, there was a democratic method to be tried. 
When the fascist groups in Spain dissolved the parliament, there was a 
vote of confidence for a new prime minister and a new government. 
There was a way to be tried in Spain, too. The similarity between these 
two interventions was the intention to prevent a civilian remedy. When 
the Turkish Armed Forces began their intervention in the last hours of 
11 September 1980, was there any democratic way that could prevent 
a possible civil war? 
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Along with comparisons of the 12 September coup to the coups that took 
place in other countries, columnists also compared 12 September with the 1960 and 
1971 interventions in Turkey, generally highlighting similarities. From the first day 
of the military’s rule, columnists stated that all the military interventions in Turkey 
had the same aim: to restore a functioning democratic regime (Milliyet editorial, 
19.09.1980; Oktay Ekşi, Hürriyet, 13.10.1980; Oktay Akbal, Cumhuriyet, 
16.10.1980; Teoman Erel, Milliyet, 12.03.1981). Mumcu emphasized that the 
Turkish military did not have a tradition of establishing permanent dictatorship; 
each time that the officers had come to power ended with their returning to the 
barracks by handing over power to civilians (Cumhuriyet, 17.01.1981). Akbal 
pointed out that the military’s interventions were carried out not because the 
officers wanted to do so but they had to do so (Cumhuriyet, 16.10.1980). He stated 
that the military had continuously called on civilian governments to return to the 
path of Atatürkist principles with its warning letters in the pre-12 September period, 
emphasizing it had been a known fact that the military would not neglect the 
worsening situation and would intervene as they had done on 27 May 1960 
(Cumhuriyet, 13.09.1980). Erel argued that people in Turkey were familiar with the 
military’s intervention; when things got complicated, politicians drew back and the 
officers came forward to tidy up, drawing back to return power to the politicians 
once their task was completed (Milliyet, 12.03.1981).  
Along with the similarities between the 12 September takeover and the 
military’s previous interventions, Erel stressed that 12 September differed from the 
1960 takeover (Milliyet, 16.02.1981). He underlined the fact that the chain of 
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command was sustained on 12 September and criticized the 27 May intervention in 
this regard. He argued that 12 September was an institutional initiative that was 
directed by reason, whereas the lieutenant and colonel members of the National 
Union Committee in 1960 had personal motivations on 27 May 1960 (Milliyet, 
16.02.1981). According to Erel, Turkey’s population was also happy to see that the 
chain of command was maintained in the intervention because they knew it meant 
that reason would dominate and no adventurous or emotion-driven steps would be 
taken by the military junta (Milliyet, 16.02.1981). Erel argued that this was one of 
the reasons for public’s support for the intervention. He wrote (Milliyet, 
03.03.1981): 
There could have been a dominant political attitude if the takeover had 
been realized by a secret revolutionary group as it had been on 27 
May. In this case, some citizens could have considered the 
intervention as being for them while others would have seen it as 
being against them. 
 
 Columnists compared the 12 September military government with the pre-
coup parliamentary regime in order to highlight some of its characteristics. In these 
comparisons, columnists occasionally presented the democratic regime as becoming 
the source of the deadlock, having been exploited by politicians for their personal 
and party interests. Additionally, they were sympathetic to the authoritarianism of 
the military’s rule because it facilitated dealing with the necessary problems. 
Comparing the 12 September government with the pre-coup regime, Kemal stated 
that whatever befell the country was because of democratic craftiness of politicians 
who had exploited the system (Cumhuriyet, 19.09.1980). He pointed out that the 12 
September government did not act in the same manner, arguing instead that their 
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rational behavior would open the way for the flourishing of a modern society by 
working for the interests of the large majority (Cumhuriyet, 19.09.1980). Similar to 
Kemal, Faik also compared the 12 September government with the pre-coup 
regime. He stated that the former lacked, by its very nature, democratic institutions, 
and the success of the military’s rule depended on breaking the malfunctioning 
chain of instabilities of the pre-coup period (Hürriyet, 22.09.1980). He continued by 
criticizing the democratic institutions of the pre-coup period, positively evaluating 
their nonexistence after 12 September by referring to the efficiency of military rule 
in terms of taking decisions and putting them into force. He stated (Hürriyet, 
22.09.1980): 
The 12 September government could immediately install a new 
director of the press who shared the same mentality with the generals; 
it could make changes from the Anatolian Agency to city governors, 
undersecretaries, and general directors at the moment it wanted to do 
so. Which of the political powers had this opportunity? (…) The 12 
September administration is without a parliament… without a 
constitutional court… without opposition… is without unions… The 
12 September administration is far away from the troubled organized 
networks that were witch cauldrons full of professional chambers, 
unions, federations. 
 
Columnists also evaluated public reactions to the takeover and reactions 
from European countries in order to support their evaluations about the 
characteristics of the 12 September takeover and the military’s rule. According to 
columnists, 12 September was welcomed by the vast majority of the public. They 
evaluated ending the anarchy and street violence as the main reason for people’s 
contentment. Kemal expressed that people were pleased to see the efficient 
practices of the military’s rule and the reestablishment of public order and safety 
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(Cumhuriyet, 19.09.1980). According to Milliyet’s editorial, the main reason behind 
popular support for the 12 September government was the public’s belief and trust 
in the military to restore a functioning political system and democratic regime as 
soon as possible (Milliyet, 22.09.1980). It was argued in the same column that 
people perceived the military’s rule as an objective administration that represented 
the integrity of the state and that was working for the common good of the people 
(Milliyet, 21.11.1980). For these reasons, the column argued that people who had 
supported the Justice Party or the Republican Peoples Party before the takeover 
could leave aside their differences and welcome Evren during his visits to different 
towns when they saw the integrity of the state (Milliyet, 21.11.1980). Milliyet’s 
editorial pointed out that the former cadres of political parties also supported the 
military’s rule and displayed this support in various occasions, including in 
international platforms (Milliyet’s editorial, 17.01.1981).  
The 12 September takeover was interpreted as the nation’s rebirth, a 
vigorous waking up and shaking off that was full of excitement (Editorial, Milliyet, 
26.01.1981). The success of the military government was equated with the success 
of all people in the country (Milliyet, 22.09.1980). The views of columnists that the 
military took over for the common good of the state and the people, and that the 
military would act in line with national interests, contributed to the reproduction of 
the army-nation unity argument. This argument emphasized the perception that the 
military was seen by people as an organic [integral] part of the Turkish society 
(Narlı 2000, 120). In this regard, Soysal argued that the Turkish army was unlike 
the Western armies, which were monopolized in the hands of particular social 
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classes and families that were disconnected from the rest of the people (Milliyet, 
4.10.1980). Similar to Soysal’s point of view, Erel stated that the army in Turkey 
was like a sampling of Turkish society; one in every hundred wore the uniform and 
members of the National Security Council were raised in military schools, not 
isolated from the realities of the country (Milliyet, 03.03.1981).  
Assessments of the 12 September takeover within the army-nation unity 
framework were also useful in understanding columnists’ evaluations of the 
reactions against the takeover. The interesting point about columnists’ 
representation of these reactions was not that the number of instances was few but 
that the reactions were framed by columnists to emphasize societal support rather 
than to highlight objections. For instance, Faik discussed objections to the takeover 
while, in fact, aiming to highlight people’s support for the military’s rule. He cited 
reactions to a placard defining the military’s rule as fascist rule and calling people 
to revolt. He wrote (Hürriyet, 28.09.1980): 
A lady was asking “Is it pressure?” Is there a pressure more terrifying 
than yours? An elderly shouted out “You are the vagrants! How dare 
would you think you are the people? Was it not part of the people 
whose homes you entered and shot people to death?” A friend from 
the Black Sea region too saw similar situations. People spit when they 
saw similar slogans.  
 
Another representation of the reactions to the takeover that also referred to 
the army-nation unity can be detected in Ekşi’s surgery analogy noted above 
(Hürriyet, 13.09.1980). He presented the nation and the military as working for the 
common goal, i.e., the patient’s recovery from the illness, and singled out those who 
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did not contribute to the surgery or objected to it. He wrote that (Hürriyet, 
13.09.1980): 
Like any others, this situation too has opportunists. They enter in the 
operating room without anybody noticing and wait for the moment to 
confuse the surgeons. (…) It is also [among] the first and most 
important tasks of the surgeons to diagnose the real intention of the 
ones both waiting inside the surgery room and outside of it. Just as 
there are people who want to see the patient regain its health, there are 
also those who have longed to possess its inheritance.  
 
Columnists also described how the 12 September takeover was evaluated in 
European countries. In their assessments, they highlighted that the takeover was 
approved in various European countries and criticized opposition to the takeover as 
biased or inaccurate. Similar to the domestic reactions, columnists contributed to 
increase the visibility of the criticisms of the 12 September takeover in European 
countries without specifically intending to do so. Sami Kohen noted that European 
Community had an insightful standing. He referred to Gaston Thorn, then-president 
of the European Commission, and quoted a speech in which he addressed the other 
members of the community. Thorn stated (Milliyet, 21.11.1980): 
We have to get the reality. We know the pre-coup situation [in 
Turkey], the place of Turkey [in the region] and other realities. To 
pressure Turkey at the moment is inconvenient; it will bring harm 
instead of reviving it.  
 
This quotation is also important, as it was the only instance when the word 
‘coup’ was used for the 12 September takeover by columnists during the first six 
months of the military’s rule. Kohen expressed that critical views also existed in 
Europe about the military’s rule, evaluating such criticisms as ruthless or resulting 
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from lack of information about what had been going on in Turkey. In his view, any 
right-minded person knew that the 12 September takeover saved Turkey from the 
brink of disaster (Milliyet, 21.11.1980). Like Kohen, Mehmet Ali Birand noted that 
both positive and negative views about the 12 September takeover existed in 
European countries. However, he argued that the criticisms did not consider the 
military rule in Turkey in the same line with the Greek junta or Chilean 
dictatorships (Milliyet, 31.10.1980).   
Altan Öymen evaluated the support and the criticisms from Western 
countries in reference to claims of torture. He stated that the torture claims in 
Turkey caused concerns and confusions in foreign press (Cumhuriyet, 22.02.1981). 
He gave the example of an article published in the weekly Economist. Öymen 
explained that the article started by pointing out that the military’s move had 
become inevitable in Turkey, but continued by mentioning the case of Ahmet 
İsvan13 as a worrisome development. Öymen emphasized the importance of the 
news about cases of torture and suggested that these claims needed to be clarified 
by the state authorities to prevent any mutterings about groundless claims 
(Cumhuriyet, 22.02.1981).  
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 Ahmet İsvan was a politician of the Republican People’s Party who had served as the mayor of 
Istanbul during the 1970s. He was taken into custody in 1980 by the military government and tried 
for the DİSK case. He was imprisoned for 27 months and was acquitted on 22 January 1983.     
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5.3.3.  Democracy, Politicians and the Transition Period in Newspaper 
Columns  
 
Columnists emphasized that democracy had been an indispensable way of 
life for Turkish people and thus that democracy was the only regime accepted both 
by the people and by state institutions including the military. None of the 
columnists reflected concerns about military’s commitment to democracy. Instead, 
the Turkish Armed Forces was perceived to be loyal to democratic principles as 
much as civilians were. This view was given credence by the military’s 
guardianship of Atatürkist principles. The editorial of Milliyet stated (Milliyet, 
3.11.1980): 
Anybody in Turkey and abroad would share this point of view: The 
official ideology of Turkish State is Kemalism and the Armed Forces 
is undisputedly the guardian of Kemalism! Kemalism, which 
substantially aims for Westernization, also includes democracy among 
its principles. In this regard, the Armed Forces that intervenes in 
democracy from time to time is in reality against anti-democratic 
forces. 
 
Along with military’s loyalty to democracy, columnists also displayed 
certainty that the military’s rule was a temporary rule to restore a functioning 
democratic regime. Thus, they did not indicate any doubts about whether the 
military would leave power to civilians and return to their barracks. This view was 
supported by columnists with quotations from Evren’s statements, and by adducing 
previous interventions as proof of how the military would act again. Erel openly 
displayed openly his certainty in transition to democracy beginning in the first days 
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of the military’s rule. He stated that the novelty of the coming year was not the 
promise for a democratic transition, because precise and convincing statements on 
this issue had been made since the first days of the 12 September government 
(Milliyet, 02.01.1981). 
The main concern of columnists in fact was about when and under which 
conditions a transition to democracy would happen rather than whether or not this 
transition would actually take place. Erduran was the only columnist who openly 
expressed that the transition period should be kept as short as possible (Milliyet, 
16.09.1980). Most of the columnists refrained from specifying a date for the 
transition, suggesting the process should take neither a very short nor a very long 
time. What they meant by short time or long time remained vague in their columns. 
Columnists argued that some time should be allocated to allow the military to 
introduce the necessary conditions for a functioning democratic system before the 
transition. They believed that some preconditions needed to be taken by the military 
within the transition period to ensure a solidified democracy. Felek suggested being 
patient with those things the military had to do during the transition. He wrote 
(Milliyet, 19.09.1980): 
The constitution, the elections, and the political party laws will be 
changed, and a constituent assembly will be formed. These cannot be 
done in two days or within two months. For this reason, asking to the 
Security Council when they will leave power to civilians is an early 
and inopportune question.  
 
According to the columnists, the impatience for a democratic transition was 
coming from more European countries than domestic actors. Birand wrote that the 
153 
 
main question asked abroad was when democratic elections in Turkey would be 
held (Milliyet, 31.10.1980). Kohen also highlighted the impatience abroad for a 
transition to democracy. However, he displayed a critical attitude toward their 
impatience.  He wrote (Milliyet, 21.11.1980): 
There are a lot of things to be said to the ones abroad who are 
impatient and have started to murmur. First of all, they should be told 
what might have happened to Turkey if this operation had not 
happened or it had failed, and what effects this could have had on 
regional and world politics. Then, they should be reminded of how 
swiftly the Turkish Armed Forces has provided transitions to 
democracy in its previous interventions. And [they] should be 
reminded that it would be ruthless to show impatience and distrust 
when only two months have passed since the operation.     
 
Some columnists specifically mentioned the pre-12 September situation in 
criticizing those views that demanded a swift transition. They argued that such a 
rapid institutional shift would not be able to establish the necessary conditions for a 
functioning democracy, and would leave the door open for other interventions after 
the democratic regime was established. Kemal was one of these columnists 
highlighting the malfunctioning of the democratic regime in the pre-12 September 
period. He stated (Cumhuriyet, 26.01.1981): 
Many people in Europe and in our country are talking about 
democracy. Because 12 September happened, they are asking “when 
will democracy be brought back?” I am wondering which democracy 
they miss. They are asking as if democracy had existed before 12 
September and it does not exist after then.  
 
Erel, who was in favor of a smooth and slow transition, also referred to the 
pre-12 September period in arguing that impatience in Turkey for a transition to 
democracy did not exist. He stated (Milliyet, 02.01.1981): 
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In this issue [about the transition to democracy] there is no impatience 
in the domestic public at all. There is wide consensus about creating 
the necessary conditions before any transition to democracy. Since the 
pre-12 September period is well remembered, no one is saying “no 
matter what, democracy right away!” This time a democracy that will 
not be deadlocked, that will balance its defects with its ability to 
produce solutions, in short a functioning democracy is demanded.   
 
According to columnists, the establishment of a constituent assembly and 
the drafting of a new constitution were the main missions of the transition period. 
They agreed that the constituent assembly, which would be in charge of drafting the 
new constitution, should be formed in the shortest time possible. The structure and 
the formation of the constituent assembly were underlined by some columnists as 
important to achieve overall acceptance within society. Erel offered suggestions 
about the structure of the assembly, arguing that it be representative and inclusive. 
He wrote (Milliyet, 18.12.1980): 
The constitution should be prepared by a constituent assembly, which 
will be formed by elections. The members of the assembly should be 
the ones who had [professional] experience in political life, state 
institutions, and in the implementation of the constitution. 
Participation of representatives of prominent political views in the 
constituent assembly and their contribution to the making of the new 
constitution with free discussion should be permitted. In this way 
everybody will support the new constitution. 
 
 In another piece, Erel restated the importance of the existence of different 
political views in the constituent assembly. He pointed out that although harmony 
and impartiality could be necessary to achieving a united standpoint in the 
bureaucracy, a monolithic assembly would raise problems in the long run (Milliyet, 
17.01.1981). Mumcu, too, supported an inclusive approach in the formation of the 
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constituent assembly, which he saw as a factor that would strengthen the hands of 
the 12 September government (Cumhuriyet, 17.01.1981).   
While these views were mostly concerned with obtaining top-down 
permission for broader inclusion in the constituent assembly, some columnists also 
highlighted the importance of bottom-up cooperation between the civilians and the 
military. It was suggested that bureaucrats, former politicians, the intelligentsia, 
experts, and the public in general should cooperate with the transition regime and 
support the military in its efforts. This view was strengthened with the argument 
that the basic reason for the deadlock caused in the pre-12 September period was a 
lack of dialogue and any common ground between policymakers (Editorial, 
Milliyet, 18.12.1980). The editorial column of Milliyet touched upon the necessity 
of cooperation between the military government and civilians several times. It 
stated that the healthiest way would be for all the military and civilian cadres of the 
state to cooperate during the transition period (19.09.1980). It emphasized that not 
only the state cadres but the people too should support the existing rule for a 
successful transition (28.09.1980). Particular responsibility was also laid on the 
intelligentsia. As the major mission of the intelligentsia was seen as acting as a 
mentor for the rest of society, they should side with the state against terrorism 
during that period (Milliyet editorial, 27.11.1980). It also underlined that supporting 
the military during the transition period did not mean that the intelligentsia was 
supporting the establishment of a permanent authoritarian regime (Milliyet editorial, 
27.11.1980). Ekşi, too, emphasized that supporting the 12 September government 
did not mean supporting authoritarianism. He pointed out that, as long as the goals 
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stated in the first day of the military’s rule were sustained, it was the responsibility 
of everyone who believed in democracy by heart to support the transition period 
(Hürriyet, 13.10.1980). While columnists were stating that the people should act in 
cooperation with the military’s rule, Erel detailed how this cooperation and support 
should be put into practice. He suggested (Milliyet, 03.03.1981): 
The press is careful. But it does not leave out criticizing. Politicians 
should be patient but they should also share their experiences when it 
is necessary. Workers, businessmen, peasants, craftsmen should raise 
their warnings by keeping in mind that there will be a slow transition 
to a multivocal [democratic] regime.  
 
Although columnists supported the drafting of a new constitution as a 
precondition for transition to a functioning democracy, they did not state any 
opinions about what the content of the constitution should include. Support for a 
new constitution may seem paradoxical at first glance, since none of the columnists 
accused the 1961 constitution of being inadequate or responsible for the deadlock in 
political life. The rationale behind columnists’ support for a new constitution was 
their belief in creating a new system that would be implemented word for word and 
would be able to protect itself from the abuses and manipulations of politicians. A 
constitution drafted with this rationale was seen as the sole guarantee for a stable 
democracy. 
 Columnists saw politicians of the pre-12 September period as the major 
guilty actors for this disturbance of democracy. Metin Toker explicitly stated that 
disturbances in democracies were the results politicians’ behaviors. Using the 
Spanish case as an example, Toker wrote (Milliyet, 25.02.1981): 
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Democracies are not regimes that end on their own. People keep them 
alive or kill them. These people are the politicians. Politicians have an 
opportunity when their countries get into major crisis: the opportunity 
of getting over the crisis all together. If the Spanish parliament had 
given the vote of confidence to Calvo Sotelo for the prime ministry, an 
adventurous colonel would not have dissolved the parliament and 
would not have mobilized the mechanism of the military.   
 
Columnists evaluated the way politicians had acted as against the soul and 
rationale of the 1961 constitution. Politicians were criticized for pursuing personal 
interests and neglecting the common good of the people. Vedat Nedim Tör argued 
that democracy had degenerated because of politicians’ endless demands for getting 
more and more votes (Cumhuriyet, 12.12.1980). Similar to Tör, Kemal described 
politicians as ‘vote-hunters’ and claimed that the interests of politicians were in 
conflict with the common interests of the people (Cumhuriyet, 19.09.1980). Akbal 
and Mumcu were two columnists who generated the concept of ugly and bad 
politicians. According to Akbal, the actors truly responsible for the military 
takeover were the ugly politicians who had compromised Atatürkist principles for 
the sake of getting more votes (Cumhuriyet, 26.01.1981). Similarly, Mumcu stated 
that bad politicians had corrupted the democratic system in the pre-12 September 
period. According to him, the practical way of separating the bad politicians from 
the good ones was examining corruption cases. He argued that bringing the 
corruption cases of the last fifteen years before the court would be the soundest 
method of achieving this separation (Cumhuriyet, 01.10.1980).  
Along with the columnists who underlined the importance of drafting a new 
constitution that would be able to protect itself from abuses, there were also 
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columnists who pointed out the importance of the existence of a particular mindset 
for a democratic regime’s survival. As Hekimoğlu wrote (Cumhuriyet, 19.09.1980): 
What will happen next? Constituent Assembly, constitution, election 
law, political parties will be reactive but will the democratic system be 
established in such a way that it will not be corrupted again? It is not 
easy to ask this question with hope and good faith. The laws are not 
enough. The ones who are occupied with politics need to reach a 
particular way of thinking, a modern understanding of democracy. 
 
The editorial of Milliyet asked a similar question about politicians’ mindsets 
(Milliyet, 18.12.1980). The establishment of a constituent assembly and the drafting 
of a new constitution were perceived as the primary preconditions for transition to 
democracy. However, the editorial questioned whether these steps would be enough 
to keep democracy stable and undisturbed. It emphasized the importance of the 
mindset of politicians and argued that as long as previous habits and ways of 
thinking persisted, any new democracy would end in a way similar to previous 
practices (Milliyet, 18.12.1980). 
In conclusion, this chapter analyzed how Turkish columnists writing in 
Cumhuriyet, Hürriyet, and Milliyet evaluated the 12 September takeover and the 
subsequent military government in their daily pieces published during the first six 
months of the military’s rule. It showed that the officers controlled the media 
through various formal and informal methods to avoid publication of opposition and 
criticisms against the 12 September takeover. Since, the military carried out no 
formal censorship review process as was the case in Greece, Turkish columnists had 
to censor themselves in order not be caught violating the restrictions in place. The 
columnists’ evaluations of the takeover and subsequent military rule were 
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considered under three subcategories, which are in parallel with the ones used to 
analyze Greek columnists in the previous chapter. In this way it is possible to 
analyze the two cases through a comparative perspective in the following, and 
concluding, chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
Since the appearance of first newspapers across the world in the sixteenth 
century, the media have become important actors in the political lives of countries 
and also the social lives of the people. They have been important sources of 
information, particularly in issues to which people do not have direct access 
themselves. Not surprisingly, due to their power in influencing people’s opinions 
and even political behaviors, the media have become an issue of concern for rulers. 
Regardless of the methods – either democratic or undemocratic – through which 
they came to power, rulers have wanted to control the media in their communication 
with people at the mass level. 
 In democratic countries, the media is referred to having a watchdog role in 
which they check, or keep tabs on, a government’s policies. This role requires 
journalists to have an objective and critical stance in their evaluations of 
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governmental behavior and political developments. News production and its 
presentation of information, in particular editorials and commentary columns, have 
become particularly important in this respect. This is especially the case during 
times of crises due to their capacity to form a channel of dynamic communication 
between the government and the public and, of course, because of their power in 
influencing public opinion. For this reason, the media have been an important 
subject of research for scholars investigating the meanings created in the interpreted 
news, columns, and editorials.   
In this regard, this study scrutinizes the columns in Greek and Turkish 
newspapers that were published after the militaries’ takeovers: on 21 April 1967 in 
Greece and 12 September 1980 in Turkey. The study was informed by the main 
research question of how Greek and Turkish columnists framed and interpreted the 
military’s takeover in their countries during the period immediately after the 
takeovers occurred.  
When scrutinizing the media, one of the important issues that needs to be 
taken into consideration is the issue of censorship and self-censorship. Even in the 
most democratic and liberal countries, journalists and columnists feel restricted by 
working under a complex interplay among various economic and political factors. 
Therefore, it was expected at the beginning of this study that both the Greek and 
Turkish militaries, which envisioned particular missions for their media, would 
restrict the freedom of the press by introducing various regulations. The newspapers 
were particularly important for the officers because, in both countries during the 
time their respective military’s intervention, newspapers formed the main medium 
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for the transmission of information, that had not already been controlled by the 
government. For this reason, studying the control of the military junta over the press 
in each country was seen as necessary in this essay to understand the framework 
that drew the lines within which Greek and Turkish columnists expressed their 
views.  
This research on officers’ control over the press in both countries has shown 
that the military regimes in Greece and Turkey held similar views about how the 
newspapers should be acting during the interregna. When the relationships between 
the military regime and the media, and particularly the way officers viewed the 
media, are considered in light of the various media models discussed in this study, it 
is seen that they came closer to the authoritarian model.  In both countries, officers 
viewed the printed press, along with radio and television, as the main medium in 
their communication with the public. They thought that the main mission of the 
press was to support their rule; constitute a channel for transmission of their 
governments’ objectives, policies, and activities to the public; and thus help 
maintain the public’s support for the military regimes.  
As the authoritarian model suggests, the military regimes in Greece and 
Turkey also held the view that the media should not be acting in a way that could 
humiliate the government or weaken its order. Thus, Greek and Turkish officers did 
not want to see publications that would damage the “national unity” and “national 
interests” in their respective countries. The principles of “national unity” and 
“national interests” are thought to be in the military’s objectives, policies, and 
activities; expressing critical and opposing views about them were thus prohibited. 
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It follows that the officers placed censorship on those publications that they thought 
could have harmed “national unity” and “national interest,” rather than placing 
complete restrictions on press freedoms. 
In this regard, one of the first things Greek and Turkish officers did when they 
took over the government in their countries was to control the publication houses 
and offices of newspapers and close down leftist and extreme leftist newspapers, 
based on the reasoning that these were producing “harmful” publications. For those 
newspapers that were allowed to continue publication, the Greek junta established a 
process of censorship review, which necessitated the control of newspapers’ content 
before they were printed. With this censorship, officers controlled which subjects 
were taken up, as well as the framing of news and issues, i.e., what journalists and 
columnists wrote about them. 
Different from the Greek junta, the military regime in Turkey did not 
introduce a censorship review process. Instead, officers drew the framework for 
subjects that could not be written about in the newspapers with the regulations 
proclaimed by the Martial Law Command. As a result, they restricted the agenda-
setting of newspapers by prohibiting publications about particular issues. This 
situation can be seen as a negative type of agenda setting in which some issues were 
made less salient than others by columnists as a result of officers’ control over the 
press.  
In addition, the military administration affected the way columnists presented 
and framed the issues through formal statements and regulations of the Martial Law 
Command. This control was also administered through informal channels of 
164 
 
communication such as telephone calls to columnists and newspaper editors-in-
chief, visits to newspapers’ offices, and inviting columnists to the Martial Law 
Command headquarters. Turkish officers’ control over the media did not always 
succeed in preventing publication of materials considered harmful, however. 
Columnists’ views and interpretation of events and the way news was presented 
brought warnings from officers and consequently the prohibition of newspapers’ 
printing for several days. This type of control obliged the columnists in Turkey to 
practice self-censorship while stating their views about the military regime. This 
situation differed in Greece, in which censorship review process noted above 
prevented the need for the junta to shut down any newspaper for publishing 
prohibited content.  
 While  the relationships between the military regime and the media can be 
explained within the authoritarian model, neither this model nor any other can 
explain columnists’ supportive interpretations of the takeover and the subsequent 
military interregna. Both Greek and Turkish columnists’ ways of acting during the 
military regime can be best explained by examining the development of the 
journalistic profession in both countries. In Hallin and Mancini’s typology of media 
systems, the media in Greece and Turkey constitute cases of the polarized pluralist 
model. Instead of the Anglo-American type of neutral commercial journalism, 
advocacy journalism has been dominant in both countries. During the military 
regimes, journalists – and in particular columnists and editors – continued to act like 
a bridge between the political and mass level just as they had before these regimes’ 
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establishments, directing the public with their interpretations of how the political 
change in their countries should be evaluated.  
 In both countries, the reaction of Greek and Turkish newspapers to the 
military’s attitude towards the media was to continue publication while accepting 
the limits and restrictions set by the military regime. In the Greek context, the two 
conservative newspapers of Kathimerini and Mesimvrini and the centrist paper 
Eleftheria diverged from this tendency. These papers decided to suspend their 
publication because of the censorship review process. Ta Nea, a leading pro-
Papandreou newspaper of the pre-21 April period, continued its publication but 
stopped including any commentaries in its dailies. In Turkey, none of the papers 
opted to cease publication and columnists continued to write their columns.  
Greek and Turkish columnists shared important similarities but also 
differences in their framings of the militaries’ takeovers and subsequent periods of 
rule. These similarities and differences in columnists’ framings and interpretations 
of the events surrounding these takeovers can be better understood when the Greek 
and Turkish militaries’ previous interventions, their militaries’ place in politics, and 
the status of politicians in the eyes of the columnists are taken into account.  
The columnists in the Greek newspapers Akropolis and Eleftheros Kosmos 
and the Turkish newspapers Cumhuriyet, Hürriyet, and Milliyet all framed the 
military takeovers as the only solution to the political impasses in their countries. 
The circumstances under which the officers came to power, however, produced 
different explanations between Greek and Turkish columnists. In both countries, 
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however, the reasons for the takeovers presented by columnists as being behind the 
takeover were no different than the reasons offered by the officers.  
In this regard, Greek columnists emphasized the severity of the communist 
threat before 21 April and politicians’ blindness to it. They framed the takeover as 
the only solution at the time that could save Greece from the falling into the hands 
of communists. To strengthen their presentation of the takeover as the sole remedy, 
they constantly posed the counterfactual question of what might have happened in 
Greece if officers had not intervened. The takeover was mainly referred to as 
“preventive action” by the military to save the country and its democratic regime 
from total collapse before it was too late.  
Turkish columnists also emphasized that the military’s intervention had 
become an inevitable option because there was no solution within the existing 
system to overcome the political deadlock and save the country from falling into a 
possible civil war. Based on the existing political and social circumstances of the 
late 1970s, Turkish columnists emphasized broader and diverse reasons for 
military’s intervention that extended beyond the communist threat. The columnists 
in Turkey expressed the lack of personal safety due to street violence and terrorist 
acts, the possibility of the eruption of a civil war, a lack of dialogue between 
politicians and their irresponsible behaviors including legal and constitutional 
violations, the malfunctioning of the bureaucracy, and the weakness of state 
institutions as the reasons for military’s takeover.  
Turning to the performance of the two militaries once in power, Greek 
columnists paid particular attention to the economic developments achieved during 
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the junta’s rule. This was an important instance of the media’s agenda-setting 
efforts, which might have aimed to have a priming effect on the reader in terms of 
shaping their evaluations about the military’s rule. By highlighting the economic 
developments achieved by the military’s rule after they took over the government, 
columnists made these achievements more salient to the reader than other matters.  
Turkish columnists, in contrast, did not present a united point of view 
regarding the economic responsibilities of the 12 September administration. Some 
columnists believed that economic issues did not rank among the expected tasks of 
the military while in power. These columnists attributed a narrow mission to the 
military administration –ending violence in the streets, bringing back personal 
safety, and enacting the fundamental measures that would prevent an interruption of 
the democratic regime in the future. Other columnists, including the editorial of 
Milliyet, envisioned a wider mission for the military’s rule and set broader 
expectations for it. These columnists expected the 12 September rule to consider the 
resolution of economic problems as part of its responsibilities. They did not, 
however, move economic issues ahead of the main mission of eradicating anarchy 
and terrorism and taking the necessary measures for the restoration of a functioning 
multi-party regime.  
One of the main differences between Greek and Turkish columnists in their 
evaluations of the military’s rule in their countries derived from the way they 
presented the period. Turkish columnists clearly defined the 12 September rule as a 
temporal period in which particular goals and missions were to be achieved. This 
presentation was in absolute harmony with the officers’ statements about their rule, 
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which emphasized that the military had taken over to resolve the political deadlock 
and restore a functioning democracy. This harmony of viewpoints provided 
columnists with broad space for making evaluations in this direction. Columnists 
constantly pointed out that the military had intervened to clean up the mess that the 
politicians had created; they would introduce the necessary measures to do so 
before the transition back to multi-party politics so that it would not be disrupted 
again, would then return to their barracks. Thus, the columnists presented the 12 
September rule as a reconstruction period, rather than a typical instance of the 
military coups that occurred in other European and Latin American countries. 
Columnists supported their argument by referring to the military’s previous 
interventions, which they viewed as indicators for the lack of existence of a military 
tradition of seizing power for its corporate interests and/or establishing long-term 
dictatorships. The earlier interventions also had the common objective of 
safeguarding the secular-democratic state. In this regard, it can be argued 
columnists also gave messages to the officers in addition to the public regarding the 
duration of their stay in power.  
The Greek columnists did not refer to the temporality of the military’s rule 
as much as their Turkish colleagues did, rarely stating that the ultimate aim of the 
military’s rule was the restoration of a functioning multi-party system. In the Greek 
case, the officers did not want to see an emphasis in the newspapers on a quick 
transition to multi-party system. Thus columnists in Greece, not unlike a few 
columnists in Turkey, only implicitly mentioned the temporary duration of the 
takeover by resorting to some clever analogies.  
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Both Greek and Turkish columnists compared the takeovers in their 
countries to the experiences of countries. In this regard, Greek columnists referred 
to the situation in Germany when the Nazis came to power, and argued that 
Germany could have been saved from falling under National Socialism if German 
officers had considered the option of intervention. Within similar framing, Greek 
columnists argued that having the officers in power was preferred to leaving Greece 
to fall under communist rule. In their turn, Turkish columnists compared their 
country’s takeover with military interventions in European and Latin American 
countries. In doing so, they framed the takeover as the Turkish military’s above-
politics way of acting after all of the options within the multi-party system were 
exhausted.  
Columnists in both countries  refrained from framing the military’s takeover 
in their own countries as anti-democratic. Instead, they framed them as an 
extraordinary situation that had to be tolerated for the good of their democracies in 
the long run. This particular framing was important in the sense that it helped both 
Greek and Turkish columnists avoid falling into the dilemma of supporting an anti-
democratic regime as being among the leading “fighters for democracy” in their 
countries. They both depicted the military takeover in their countries as not being in 
contradiction with democracy in its essence in two ways. Firstly, they emphasized 
that the officers’ intervention in politics did not end a problem-free, functioning 
democracy and, secondly, that the ultimate aim of officers was not to establish an 
authoritarian regime. 
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In their evaluations of the military’s takeover and its rule, both the Greek 
and Turkish columnists also referred to the way their politicians had acted in the 
pre-takeover period. Both Greek and Turkish columnists blamed politicians in their 
countries as the main guilty actors responsible for bringing the democratic system to 
the brink of collapse. In Greece, the center-left political party EK, and in particular 
George Papandreou, was openly and repeatedly blamed for being the actor who had 
endangered the country’s political present and future.  
Different than their Greek colleagues, Turkish columnists did not signify 
any politician or political group as the only actor responsible for bringing about the 
military’s intervention. Rather, they blamed all politicians in abstract terms without 
personalizing the matter.  
To add a few concluding observations, this essay has been an attempt to 
discover how Greek and Turkish columnists framed and interpreted the military 
takeovers in 1967 and 1980, respectively. In the process, it has attempted to refute 
earlier assumptions positing that Greek columnists kept quiet following their 1967 
military takeover, while in the post-1980 coup environment the Turkish columnists 
had openly supported the coup. As this study has demonstrated, the situation in both 
countries was far more complex than previous studies have claimed. At least one 
aspect of that complexity highlighted in the essay is that the political system in 
Turkey seems to have been more institutionalized as compared to the situation in 
Greece. As a consequence, while in Greece the temporality of the takeover could 
not be suggested by the media, in Turkey the transition back to the civilian rule was 
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widely discussed. Also as a point of contrast, while the responsibility for the 
takeover in Greece was personalized, the takeover in Turkey was not personalized.  
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